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Abstract 
 
Media capture occurs when elites exert (in)direct actions to suppress or to disseminate 
(un)favorable information (Besley & Prat, 2006; Corneo, 2006).  The importance of media 
capture at critical junctures, such as electoral processes, has been decisive.  When media is 
captured the voting decisions of individuals are affected by the information they received 
(Besley & Prat, 2006a, p. 721; Enikolopov, Petrova, & Zhuravskaya, 2011).  This is particularly 
relevant in Central America, where most people’s information about political parties, 
ideologies and politics comes from the media (Becerra, Mastrini, & D’Alessandro, 2009; 
Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Sandoval García, 2008).  Also, literature on elites has demonstrated 
how elections are crucial in business elites’ strategies, especially when their power derives 
from the control they exert over the state (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bull, 2014; Durand, 
2016).  Thus, media capture is crucial for elites during elections because that is the time when 
their influence may be jeopardized.  This research analyzes and explores how and to what 
extent elites in Central America capture the media when they feel threatened during elections.  
It studies media capture strategies before and during the 2014 presidential elections in Costa 
Rica and El Salvador.  The study offers a fresh perspective on elites and their strategies, and 
their interactions with counter-elites and media networks.  In the rest of this research, I show 
that elites have different strategies at their disposal for media capture and that their chances to 
successfully do so drastically increase when they are more cohesive and when there a network 
in place that constrains opposing voices. This, in turn, strongly augments their capacity to 
influence the society.  In Costa Rica, coordinated media capture occurred because elites were 
cohesive, and the type of networks woven by elites and media are so called elitist.  On the 
contrary, in El Salvador, the fragmentation of elites since 2009 and a pluralist media network 
turned media capture into an arena of fierce dispute among elites and counter-elites.  This 
research employs a mixed method approach with the primary goal of building upon and 
complementing each method.  Analysis and data collection methods techniques included 
interviews with elites that provide new empirical evidence on the strategies’ elites employed 
to capture the media.  Historical analysis to understand the historically grounded explanations 
of elites’ cohesion.  Finally, Social Network Analysis (SNA) was a tool to map and uncover 
the ties among elites and media. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
„Media Capture“ findet statt, wenn Eliten (in-)direkte Strategien aufwenden, um vorteilhafte 
Informationen zu verbreiten oder unvorteilhafte Informationen zu unterdrücken (Besley & 
Prat, 2006; Corneo, 2006). Die Bedeutung von „Media Capture“ zu kritischen Zeitpunkten, 
wie beispielsweise Wahlperioden, hatte bereits entscheidende Auswirkungen in der 
Vergangenheit. Im Fall von „Media Capture“ ist die Wahlentscheidung von Individuen durch 
die Informationen die diese beziehen, beeinflusst (Besley & Prat, 2006a, p. 721; Enikolopov et 
al., 2011). Dies ist insbesondere in Zentralamerika relevant, wo der Großteil der ohnehin 
eingeschränkten Informationen der Menschen im Hinblick auf politische Parteien, Ideologien 
und Politik im Allgemeinen, aus den Medien stammen (Besley & Prat, 2006a, p. 721; 
Enikolopov et al., 2011). Bestehende Fachliteratur zu Eliten zeigt die essentielle Bedeutung 
politischer Wahlen in den Strategien der Wirtschaftselite, insbesondere wenn diese sehr 
abhängig davon ist, das Land zu kontrollieren (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Bull, 2014; 
Durand, 2016). Daher ist „Media Capture“ besonders wesentlich für Eliten, wenn politische 
Wahlen anstehen, da zu dieser Zeit ihr Einfluss unter Umständen bedroht wird.  Diese 
Forschungsarbeit analysiert und erforscht wie, und zu welchem Ausmaß, Eliten „Media 
Capture“ betreiben, wenn sie sich bedroht fühlen, am Beispiel der Präsidentschaftswahlen 2014 
in Costa Rica und El Salvador. Diese Studie bietet eine frische Perspektive auf Eliten und deren 
Strategien sowie auf Anti-Eliten und Mediennetzwerke. In diesem Forschungsprojekt zeige 
und argumentiere ich, dass Eliten bezüglich „Media Capture“ verschiedene Strategien in ihrem 
Repertoire haben und dass ihre Erfolgschancen sich verändern und drastisch erhöhen, sobald 
sie vereint vorgehen, und wenn es eine Art Netzwerk gibt, welches Gegenstimmen einschränkt. 
Dies wiederum erweitert drastisch ihre Kapazitäten, die Gesellschaft zu beeinflussen. Wie der 
Fall von Costa Rica zeigt, findet koordinierte „Media Capture“ statt, wenn Eliten sich 
vereinigen und wenn die Art von Netzwerk zwischen Eliten und Medien elitär ist. Auf der 
anderen Seite hat die Fragmentierung der Elite in El Salvador „Media Capture“ in eine Arena 
der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Eliten und Anti-Eliten verwandelt.   Diese Forschungsarbeit 
wendet eine Vorgehensweise gemischter Methoden an, mit dem primären Ziel, auf diesen 
gegenseitig aufzubauen und zu komplementieren. Methoden der Datenerhebung beinhalten 
direkte Befragungen von Eliten sowie Aufzeichnungen. Diese Studie bietet tiefe Einblicke im 
Hinblick auf Faktoren, welche „Media Capture“ vereinfachen und auf die Art von Strategien 
und Maßnahmen, die Eliten ergreifen, um vorhandene Informationen zu verändern oder zu 
unterdrücken. 
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Hard times call for harsh measures.  The presidential elections of 2014 turned into a battlefield 
of money, lobbying, and censorship within the Costa Rican and Salvadoran media.  In El 
Salvador, elites were furious with the media for, what they saw as, supporting the leftist party, 
Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) instead of Alianza Republicana 
Nacionalista (ARENA), the historical ring-wing party.  Elites in Costa Rica perceived, during 
the first months of the electoral campaign, the media to be too much on the hand of the leftist 
party Frente Amplio (FA).  Both in Costa Rica and El Salvador, elites felt threatened by left-
leaning political forces who were leading in the polls.  An electoral victory of the Left in Costa 
Rica and a second consecutive win of the Left in El Salvador would have limited elites’ 
influence over the government; thereby going to the core of one of elites’ primary competitive 
advantages (Bull, Castellacci, & Kasahara, 2014).  With less than four months before the 
elections, elites in both countries felt they were in a tight spot.  Something had to be done. And 
something they did.  
 
The described context provides a unique and ideally captivating setting to study how elites 
react when they feel threatened.  Here, I examine how and to what extent elites capture the 
media when they feel threatened by electoral processes.  What I argue and mean to show in the 
rest of this document is that elites have different strategies at their disposal to capture the media 
and that their chances to successfully do so drastically increase when they are more cohesive 
and when there are networks that constraint opposing voices. This, in turn, strongly augments 
their capacity to influence society. 
 
The decisive role and influence of the news media in Latin American politics is widely 
acknowledged (Fox & Waisbord, 2009a; Kitzberger, 2016; Porto, 2012; Rockwell & Janus, 
2003; Waisbord & Segura, 2016).  For decades, the media allowed elites to maintain political 
stability and economic growth thanks to highly concentrated markets and compliant media that 
echoed power structures while constraining opposing voices (Fox & Waisbord, 2009b; 
Rockwell & Janus, 2003).  In this context, the evolution of new technologies allowed the media 
   2 
to spread its role as a sophisticated mechanism of control oriented to satisfy market needs 
(Lugo-Ocando, 2008).  In the hands of few media groups, Latin American media transformed 
from being dominated by family businesses to more complex holding groups with diversified 
business interests in the last two decades (Becerra & Mastrini, 2017).   
 
Over the last ten years, during which many media outlets faced considerable economic 
hardship, Latin American tycoons, aware of the media’s role and its influence in politics, 
started to purchase traditionally family-owned media holdings1.  These purchases have turned 
the media into “the new toy of the richest” and have restricted one of the most critical media 
functions: providing checks against abuses of power (Stiglitz, 2017). Considering that tycoons 
have particular perspectives that differ from the rest of society, the media has become a 
strategic tool for pursuing individual wealth over collective welfare (Freedman, 2016). 
 
Despite the importance of media -not just for its democratic role (Curran, 2002), but also for 
helping us to structure our knowledge about, and our ability to participate in changing the world 
(Freedman, 2016), the study of how the media had been captured by the individuals that possess 
privileged control over economic, political and social resources -elites- has been lacking in 
political sciences in Latin America in general and in Central America in particular.  Media 
studies have focused primarily on the analysis and consequences of media concentration 
(Becerra & Mastrini, 2017; Becerra, Mastrini, & D’Alessandro, 2009), the political 
development of specific media groups or media systems (Acevedo Rojas, 2017; Juárez Gámiz, 
2009; Porto, 2012), the imbrication among political and media spheres (Fox & Waisbord, 
2009b; Pérez & Carballo, 2013; Rockwell & Janus, 2003) or business strategies, resilience, and 
evolution of elites (Bull et al., 2014; A. Schneider, 2012; Segovia, 2005). However, little has 
been written on how elites seek to capture the media and what factors may facilitate this 
process. 
 
The seminal literature in the field has demonstrated the capacity of media to enlarge elite 
power, legitimize dominant classes, distract, disempower and produce consent (Herman & 
Chomsky, 2010a; Miliband, 1969a; Mills, 2000).  Nonetheless, in all of these accounts there is 
a lack of empirical evidence and knowledge about audiences, as well as about the contradictory 
                                                 
1 Some examples, Luis Carlos Sarmiento in Colombia (El Tiempo; 2012); Carlos Alberto Solari-Heller (Chile 
Visión; 2010), Luksic Family (Canal 13; 2017) in Chile; or Stanley Motta in Panamá (TVN; 2009). 
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relations among elites that undermine such big claims (Freedman, 2014b).  More recently, 
political scientists and economists have broadened the discussion by including new ways to 
comprehend the obscure relations and the capacities to influence societies by media and elites, 
media capture being one of them.  I define media capture as the situation when elites exert 
direct actions of control and influence over media to suppress or to disseminate information 
(Besley & Prat, 2006; Corneo, 2006).  Among the direct actions in the hands of elites are the 
use of force, violence, bribery, advertisers’ influence, media ownership, censorship, legal 
favoritism, public relations or lobby.  Media capture has been used to refer to the situation 
when elites seek to exercise hegemonic dominance in the media to prevent people from 
challenging ideas in their interests, such as during electoral campaigns or during the debates 
about tax legislation (Bernhagen, 2008).  Media capture ensure that threats to the status quo 
never materialize in the public arena or that they will be reframed to support elites’ positions 
(Fuchs, 2007).   
 
At critical junctures, such as electoral campaigns, media capture acquires significant 
importance.  The information provided by the media and made available to voters enables them 
to punish or reward politicians (Besley & Prat, 2006a; Strömberg, 2015).  This information 
may persuade voters to choose politicians and political parties in line with the elites’ 
preferences (Nordin, 2014).  Indeed, it has been shown that, when media is captured, the voting 
decisions of individuals are affected by the information they receive (Besley & Prat, 2006a, p. 
721; Enikolopov et al., 2011). This is particularly relevant in Central America, where most 
people’s information about political parties, ideologies, and politics in general, come from the 
media (Becerra et al., 2009; Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Sandoval García, 2008).  For example, 
in Costa Rica 67% of voters said that their main source of information before the elections 
came from the media (CIEP, 2018).  
 
Likewise, literature on elites has demonstrated how elections are crucial in business elites’ 
strategies, especially when their power derives from the control they exert over the state. Thus, 
studying media capture during elections gains central importance, because it is the time when 
elites’ influence over the state may be jeopardized, and their reactions and power is most visible 
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1.1 Objectives and propositions 
 
Drawing on two Central American countries, Costa Rica and El Salvador, this study offers a 
fresh perspective on how elites seek to suppress or modify what is reported by the media in the 
electoral process.  While most research has focused on ownership of media to explain media 
capture (Corneo, 2006; Prat, 2015; Stiglitz, 2017; Strömberg, 2015), I seek to contribute with 
the proposition of four types of elite strategies to capture the media during elections.  First, 
violent strategies designed to shock media through the use of force, violence, and intimidation; 
second, economic strategies, when elites allocate money (legally or illegally) to media in order 
to modify or suppress information through advertising and bribery; third, ownership strategies, 
when the owners censor information; and finally, political strategies, when elites seek to gain 
or protect the way they frame policies, politics and actors.  This perspective is innovative 
because analyses altogether practices that haven studied separately and adds empirically 
grounded evidence to supports its claims.  It is not merely about finding and classifying 
proactive ways of elites to change or suppress information, but on examining the choices, elites 
may have to act in times of threats.  
 
Literature on elites has extensively recognized the role and need of elite unity to achieve 
common interest and to overcome conflicting interest (Domhoff, 2006; Mills, 2000; Mizruchi, 
1992; Useem, 1984).  As Vogel distinguishes, elites’ cohesion has often resulted in impressive 
political power (Vogel, 2003).  While most studies regarding elites’ unity have focused on 
business associations (B. R. Schneider, 2009), or interlocking directorates (Cardenas, 2014a; 
Mizruchi, 1992; Useem, 1984), this study focuses on common background (family history, 
education, training), ideology (sense of community) and interests (narrow range of economic 
and political interest) to explain elites’ cohesion (Fairfield, 2015).  I argue and show through 
the analysis of Costa Rican case that when elites are united they have more opportunities to act 
as a block, coordinate and save resources (capital and time) to capture the media.  Also, I 
demonstrate that in the case of El Salvador, the electoral victory of the left in 2009 facilitated 
the emergence of a new group of actors, who I am calling counter-elites, with political and 
economic interests dissimilar to the interests of traditional elites that opened up a dispute over 
control and influence of the media. 
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Second, this research also sheds light on how the networks created by media owners may affect 
media capture.  The different types of media owners’ networks, that means an elitist or pluralist 
network, assure a web of mutual interest, access, information, commitment, and business 
interest (Cárdenas, 2016b; Graaff, 2014; Mizruchi, 1992; Rentería & Figueroa, 2016; 
Schoenman, 2014).  In fact, these different networks allow or constrain elites’ ability to 
coordinate among themselves to reproduce messages and to repress opposing voices (Fennema 
& Heemskerk, 2002; Kocks, 2016).  When there is a situation of elitist media networks, a group 
of elites has more chances to produce and repeatedly send common messages that garner 
privileged representation of specific business and political interest. The opposite would occur 
in a situation of pluralist media networks, when elites compete to produce information due to 
the lack and higher cost of coordination. 
 
This research argues that media capture is shaped by elites’ cohesion and the type of media 
owners' networks at play.  When elites are characterized by high levels of cohesion, and they 
form together with the media so-called elitist media networks, coordinated media capture takes 
place increasing elites’ influence over society.  In such cases, elites tend to coordinate political 
and economic strategies in accordance with their common interest and based on high levels of 
trust among them.  In contrast, when elites are divided, and media and elites form a pluralist 
type of media networks, takes place a disputed media capture curbing elites’ influence.  In such 
cases, elites tend to compete fiercely for ownership strategies to guarantee total control of the 
information produced by the media. 
 
1.2 The Cases: Why Costa Rica and El Salvador 
 
Central America, in general, offers a fascinating setting to study the ways in which elites seek 
to capture the media to exercise influence on society.  In Central America, the lack of state 
capacity and weak institutions are the result of a system that has perpetuated an elite-dominated 
social-political system that has concentrated money, political power, and resources in the hands 
of few people (Sanchez-Ancochea & Puig, 2013).  In part, these inequalities have been secured 
by a media system that has echoed and legitimizes elites’ privileges, while constraining 
opposing voices in the public arena (Hughes, 2006; Rockwell & Janus, 2003).   
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From the standpoint of finding “most similar” or “most different” cases, the examples of Costa 
Rica and El Salvador might make comparison potentially challenging.  In general terms, Costa 
Rica and El Salvador are representative of the main political and economic characteristics of 
Central American countries.  On the one hand, Costa Rica is a country that has experienced a 
spell of more than seventy years of uninterrupted democratic rule (Casas-Zamora, 2005).  On 
the other, El Salvador is a young democracy with the highest levels of violence in Latin 
America (Wade, 2016).  That is, the political and social contexts in Costa Rica and El Salvador 
are similar, but not so similar as to render comparison pointless (Casas-Zamora, 2005, p. 9).  
However, following Casas-Zamora (2005), this type of comparison is highly appropriate in 
research projects that seek to show that the historical, political, and institutional contexts -
including similarities and differences- are essential to understanding elites’ practices.   
 
Costa Rica and El Salvador share many political, cultural, and economic similarities.  In both 
countries, elites have concentrated wealth and political influence that has resulted in an 
extended process of undermining institutions (Bull, 2014).  In both countries, the economy is 
dominated by business family groups (Bull et al., 2014; Sánchez-Ancochea, 2009); their 
economies are highly dependent on the United States; and they have a similar population size 
of the super-rich (in Costa Rica 100 people, in El Salvador 150 people) (Wealth-X, 2017). Both 
countries have high levels of income inequality and the income share held by the highest 10% 
is more than a third of total income.  Their economies are based on services (see table 1).  In 
terms of the political system, the presidential regime operates in both countries and the political 
arena is disputed mainly by three political parties, where one political party is closely related, 
in terms of private contributions and revolving doors, to elites (ARENA in El Salvador and 











Table 1. Socioeconomic indicators of Costa Rica and El Salvador 
 Costa Rica El Salvador 
Population (mill) 2016 4.8 6.3 
GDP (US billions) 2016 57.4 26.7 
GDP per capita (US dollars) 2016 10.8 3.9 
Poverty and Inequality   
Gini coefficient -2016 48.7 40 
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty 
lines (% of population) 2016 
20.5 38.6 
Income share held by highest 10% -2016 37.3 30.7 
Income share held by lowest 10% -2016 1.5 2.3 
Personal remittances received (% of GDP)-
2016 
0.9 17.1 
Corruption   
Corruption perception index- 2017 (0-
verycorrupt; 100 very clean) * 
59 33 
Tax payments (number) -2017 10 7 
Tax revenue (% of GDP) -2014 13.3 15.6 
Education   
Adult literacy rate, population 15+ years, 
both sexs (%) 
97.4 85.8 
Others   
Intentional homicides (per 100.000) -2015 10.8 108 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)-2016 5.5 11.0 
Services value added (% of GDP)-2016 72.9 62.4 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 21.5 26.5 
Unemployment Total (% of Total Labor 
Force) 
8.5 4.5 
Urban population (% of total) 77.6 67.1 
*Based on Transparency International, 2017 
Source: World Bank 2017 
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At the same time, there are significant institutional, political, economic and historical 
differences.  For instance, El Salvador as pointed out above has undergone a profound 
institutional change since the peace agreements in 1992, but as pointed out by Wolf (2009) 
public institutions remain unresponsive, social exclusion persists and violence soars.  Also, 
while Costa Rican economy diversified since mid -1980s, Salvadorian core economic income 
comes from remittances.  The dependency of Salvadorian economy on this external source of 
income have turned its economy into a more susceptibly one to external shocks.  Also, while 
Costa Rica is worldwide known by its inclusive social security system in El Salvador the social 
security has undergone through different and contradictory processes during ARENA and after 
with FMLN administrations (Martínez-Franzoni & Sánchez-Ancochea, 2013).  Also, in 
political terms, the recent experience of a Civil War in El Salvador (1980-1992) accounts for 
clear contrast in the development of institutions, political parties and actors. 
 
Concerning the media, Costa Rica and El Salvador are highly concentrated media markets (see 
table 2).  In previous works, Becerra et al. ( 2009) and Rockwell & Janus (2003) have drawn 
attention to the highly concentrated nature of media markets in the Central America.  Data from 
Becerra et al. (2009), based on the Four-Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4), a ratio that measures 
market concentration, showed that the first four main firms control more than 50% of the 
market.  Also, they found out that media concentration was superior in telecommunications 
and TV.  With the aim to update and compare Becerra et al. ( 2009) data, I built another CR4 
index for 2017 (see table 1).  The data obtained allow this research to conclude that there have 
not been significant changes in El Salvador and Costa Rica since 2009.  In most industries, four 
main companies exercise a dominant control.  According to the data, media industry is still 
highly concentrated. The data also shows that: i) TV is still dominated by few companies, two 
companies in Costa Rica (Teletica and Repretel) and one in El Salvador (TCS); ii) radio, despite 
the lack of data, is the less concentrated industry; and iii) press and telecommunications are the 
markets with highest levels of concentration.  In the press, this is so, because, traditional press 
companies started since 2000´s with new editorial projects with a more sensationalist approach 
and a lower price.  For instance, Grupo Nación that publishes La Teja in Costa Rica (c.a. US$ 
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Table 2.  Media Concentration in Costa Rica and El Salvador:  
Four Firm Concentration Ratio (CR4; 2009-2017) 
 2009 2017 
 Costa Rica El Salvador Costa Rica El Salvador 
TV 0.8 0.8 0.87 0.95 
Radio 0.14 - 0.47 - 
Press 0.98 0.92 1 0.85 
Telecommunications 1 1 1 1 
Average 0.81 0.96 0.83 0.93 
Source. Own elaboration.  According to data found and following (Becerra et al., 2009), I 
included market shares, revenues, or audiences   Data from 2009 was taken from Becerra, 
Mastrini, & D’Alessandro (2009). Costa Rican data on TV and Radio was taken from Jiménez-
Alvarado (2017).  Data of press comes from IPSOS MediaCT (2016). Telecommunications 
data from SUTEL (2017). In the case of El Salvador, data from TV and Telecommunications 
comes from (SIGET, 2016) and data from the press (Starcom Mediavest Group, 2015).  
 
In terms of the media, the media in El Salvador has been inherited from the war, with close ties 
to the political and economic spheres, especially with the right-wing party ARENA and it has 
also been strongly associated with the media mogul Boris Eserski, the Salvadoran Rupert 
Murdoch (Pérez & Carballo, 2013; Segovia, 2002; Wade, 2016; Wolf, 2009).  As in Honduras 
and Guatemala (The Northern Triangle), the media often supports powerful economic and 
political oligarchies. Nevertheless, El Salvador boasts the region’s oldest daily left-wing 
publication, Diario Co-Latino (Rockwell, 2014).  In Costa Rica the media system appears to 
be the most democratic and plural in the region in terms of competitors (Sandoval García, 
2008).  Costa Rica has also been seen as a copy of the US private model, with attempts at 
appearing objective (Sandoval García, 2008).  Today, the media system is more concentrated 
and exhibits a growing tendency towards diversification of capital into other economic sectors 
and greater linkages with the private financial sector (Jiménez-Alvarado, 2017; Robles-Rivera 
& Voorend, 2012).  However, the present-day situation in both countries constitutes an 
important similarity: in both cases, elites have built economic-political-media bridges as a 
result of the appointment of media owners, former journalists, or shareholders of larger media 
in senior positions in governments.  Those bridges include presidents in the case of El Salvador 
and vice-presidents and ambassadors in the case of Costa Rica (Rockwell, 2009).  
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Otherwise, methodological, practical and personal motives underpin the choice of Costa Rica 
and El Salvador.  Following Rockwell and Janus (2003), I have focused on media and elites in 
these countries not only because of my personal ties, but also because empirical information 
on elites and media capture is scarce and limited, and to some extent ignored.  On an academic 
level, this research aims to contribute to a growing literature on elites in Central America that 
has as a primary goal to improve institutional strengthen and democracy in the region.  On a 
practical note, the opacity of the media and elites and the reduced public access to data makes 
research on elites a difficult mission.  In this context, an attempt such as the study of obscure 
actors stands a far better chance of success in small countries (Casas-Zamora, 2005).   
 
1.3 Methods and Data 
 
This research employs a mixed method approach with the primary goal of building upon and 
complementing each method.  Data collection methods techniques included interviews with 
elites, and documents and records.  For data analysis, I used the methods of social network 
analysis and historical analysis.  Rather than embracing a notion of political science oriented 
to the formulation of laws with predictive power, this research is oriented towards a more 
pluralistic approach in political science dedicated to explaining and interpreting how actors in 
privileged positions respond to threatening situations (Casas-Zamora, 2005).  In this regard, 
this approach follows an inductive rather than a deductive approach. The deduction of 
hypotheses and concepts comes from interpreting empirical evidence and data in a way that 
reflects how complex political situations and actors are in real life (Casas-Zamora, 2005; 
Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstreth, 1992; Thelen, 1999).  Generally speaking, this document relies 
on an intensive research approach, where a small number of cases (two) are studied in great 
depth in order to highlight historical, political, and economic understandings that may shape 
elites’ responses to hostile situations (Blaikie, 2009).  
 
Interviews with elites were central to provide new empirical evidence on the strategies’ elites 
employed to capture the media (chapters six and seven).  Interviewing elites is fundamental not 
just because it provides with new information, but also because it sheds light on for whom and 
by whom this information is produced (Mosley, 2013).  Two main factors were considered 
when conducting the interviews and while coding the transcripts.  Taking into account that 
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“elites do not like being put in the straightjacket of closed-ended questions” (Aberbach & 
Rockman, 2002, p. 674), in my interviews I decided to conduct semi-structured interviews that 
allowed respondents to engage in more open discussions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002).  Elites’ 
responses to questions are usually coherent and well-structured due to their higher cultural 
capital (Lancaster, 2017).  All the interviews were fully transcribed by three collaborators 
(students of sociology based in Costa Rica).  I coded the interviews using two types of codes, 
following Aberbach & Rockman (2002, p.675).  First, manifest coding items, regarding direct 
responses to particular questions and second, latent coding items, where the characteristics of 
the response coded were not explicitly called for by the questions themselves.   
 
Historical analysis was an essential tool to study and understand the historically grounded 
explanations of the configuration of elites’ cohesion (chapters three and four).  Rather than 
providing a total account of explanations of media capture, I was interested in addressing the 
question of how throughout history elites have configured more or less united blocks that may 
or may not facilitate media capture (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2012).  Social Network 
Analysis (SNA) was a tool to map and uncover the ties among elites and media (chapter five). 
Due to lack of access to elites in most cases, SNA has been a privileged methodology on the 
study of elites (Scott 1994).  SNA is a methodology that studies, measures and maps social 
structures and therefore is useful to uncover power hierarchies (Rodríguez 1995).  At the heart 
of SNA is graph theory, and it is employed to measure cohesiveness, to identify communities, 
and to elucidate central actors (Scott, 1994). It is important to highlight that one advantage of 
social network analysis is that it allows us to scrutinize the invisible relational structure of elites 
(Zeitlin 1974, Mizruchi 1992).   
 
1.4 Data sources 
 
Over the last four years of this research, I conducted circa eight months of fieldwork in Costa 
Rica and El Salvador in 2015 and 2017 supported by the German Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD) and the University of Costa Rica.  I collected data from different sources, such as 
interviews with elites, newspapers, documents, companies’ ownership records, electoral polls, 
data from electoral courts (private funding to political parties; party expenditure on media) 
reports, and social networks (twitter).  This information allows me to understand and trace 
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elites’ strategies to capture the media and the particularities and differences among elites in El 
Salvador and Costa Rica. 
 
Of especially significant empirical value is the data collected from the semi-structured 
interviews with elites, media owners, top politicians, journalists, and academics.  I conducted 
64 interviews with 62 interviewees in Costa Rica and El Salvador. The elites interviewed were 
among the top wealthiest people in both countries according to previous studies of elites (Bull, 
Castellacci, & Kasahara, 2014; Segovia, 2005) and according to Forbes (FORBES, 2017).  The 
interviews with these elites included CEO of regional companies, owners of business groups, 
top retailers, media owners, and real estate developers.  The politicians interviewed included 
former presidents, vice-presidents, ambassadors, former ministers, judges of the electoral 
court, and congressmen.  Media owners and journalists came from among the top outlets, and 
the academics were prominent analysts of media in Central America.   
 
Access to the elites was secured differently in the two countries.  In Costa Rica, most 
interviewees with elites were organized through personal emails.  In El Salvador, I had the 
support of the secretary of a well-known media owner that help me to arrange interviews for  
my research after being in contact with them for six months.  Out of 62 informants, just six 
were woman.  This gender bias is important to highlight because it reflects that power is 
concentrated in the hands of men and it opens up further research questions about the gendered 
construction of power in Central America.  Almost all interviews were conducted in person 
between 2015 and 2017, while four of them were done through Skype in the same period.  Each 
interview lasted around one hour.  Interviews with these informants provided first-hand, 
invaluable information about the actors involved in the different stages of elites’ media capture 
and in the choices and actions they made.  Informants included elites that lead the organization 
of a common front to collect money, organize, and gather information; media owners that were 
pressured by elites or that played elites’ role, and journalists that experienced censorship and 
to some extent workplace harassment.  Another valuable contribution of this research is that 
much of the information collected in these interviews corresponds to information or events that 
might not have been shared with the public.   
 
In my experience, elites tend to be open and outspoken as well as reliable with researchers from 
foreign universities.  There is a kind of “cultural bridge” built by the social capital elites already 
possess (most of them have studied abroad) and the social capital the researcher is in possession 
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of by studying abroad.  For instance, two elites interviewed studied in the Humboldt Schule in 
Costa Rica and had been in Germany for student exchange programs.  These two personal 
experiences made the interviews very fluid and open.  In general, these “cultural bridges” 
reduce elites’ incentives to distort facts to researchers from foreign universities because they 
do not perceive any kind of threat (Fairfield, 2015a).  However, informants’ memory may not 
always be accurate. So, to resolve inconsistencies or flaws, I cross-checked facts with written 
records from other sources of information such as news reports.  Before the interviews, I let all 
of my informants know that all the information would be anonymized which also increased 
interviewees’ willingness to speak. 
 
In addition to my interviews, I examined written information that included companies’ 
ownership records of media outlets and top business companies.  The information related to 
the board of each media company and the companies associated with media and elites were 
collected from Centro Nacional de Registro in El Salvador and Registro de la Propiedad in 
Costa Rica during June-July in 2015.   The primary data collected also included electoral polls 
published in El Salvador by Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) at the 
Universidad José Simeón Cañas and in Costa Rica by the Centro de Investigación y Estudios 
Políticos (CIEP) of the Universidad de Costa Rica.  Also, thanks to the support of different 
people in Costa Rica and El Salvador I was able to study data about media market, audiences, 
readership, and others elaborated by private firms. 
 
Newspapers were also a useful source of information regarding the political context of the 
presidential campaigns in 2014 and elites’ positions.  For this, during field work I collected and 
scanned all the political reports published during the electoral campaign (October 2013-
February 2014) in the main newspapers from El Salvador (La Prensa Gráfica; El Diario de 
Hoy) and Costa Rica (La Nación; Diario Extra).  The material accounts for more than a 
thousand reports.  The information collected included press coverage, reports, editorials, and 
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1.5 Overview  
 
This document is divided into eight chapters.  Chapter one the Introduction.  Chapter two 
discusses the main theoretical considerations about elites, counter-elites, elites’ cohesion and 
media capture, providing a dissection of concepts to clarify its theoretical and conceptual scope.  
This chapter provides readers with a detailed clarification of a novel concept in political science 
-media capture- and develops a typology of strategies that elites used to capture the media.  
Conceptually, I classify these strategies in four categories regarding the type of actions elites 
use (ownership, violent, political, economic).   
 
Chapters three and four explore and analyze the cohesion of elites in historical perspective in 
order to trace differences in Costa Rica and El Salvador.  In chapter three, I argue, the cohesion 
of Costa Rican elites is the result of different factors.  First, their common background that 
helped them to procure social prestige, access to the state, money and overcome dearth of labor 
and capital.  Second, their shared ideology that settled down their internal disputes.  Finally, 
their homogeneity of interest, that secured a friendly business agenda for a reduced number of 
groups through their active political participation.  In this chapter the cohesion of elites is 
analyzed in order to understand that when elites’ access to the state or their business agenda is 
threatened, they have been able to coordinate and sustain political actions without opposition, 
such as media capture, to secure status quo.  This is so because cohesion has reduced inter-
elites’ conflict and has helped them to form, despite their sectoral differences, a community 
capable of engaging in political actions, organizing, and collecting money.  That was the case 
of the organization created in 2014 to capture the media, Alianza Costa Rica 
 
In chapter four, I study and discuss the fragmentation among Salvadorian elites.  The 
fragmentation of elites caused that the elites’ engagement in political actions, such as media 
capture, turned into an arena of dispute.  In doing so, I address the issues of common 
background, shared ideology and homogeneity of interest of two different fractions of elites in 
El Salvador.  With this as the focus, I study a group of what I have called traditional elites. 
These elites have prevailed since XIX century thanks to their control of main economic sectors, 
social closure, anticommunist ideology and neoliberal policies.  Also, I study a group of 
counter-elites that gather together politicians and businesspeople that share ethnic origins, a 
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common reject to traditional elites and the will of promoting new political and economic actors.  
Once counter-elites won elections in 2009, they were able to form a common front and increase 
their political and economic influence based on privileged access to public funds and funding 
from Venezuela through ALBA Petróleos.  It is argued that the fragmentation of elites since 
2009 augmented the competition among traditional elites and counter-elites to capture the 
media in 2014 elections.   
 
Chapter five maps and discusses the networks built among media owners and media owners 
and elites.  This chapter proposes media networks as another independent variable to explain 
differences in the media capture in Costa Rica and El Salvador.  Focusing exclusively on media 
concentration runs the risk of losing track of the media possible contradictions and differences.  
In contrast, the focus on media networks unveil ties that unite or differentiate media interests 
and exposes variations in the networks.  Literature has shed light on two main kinds of networks 
(Cardenas, 2012).  A first type, named elitist networks, are characterized by high degree of 
network cohesion and a significant number of ties among elites.  This type of networks 
promotes unity and the articulation of interest among the actors that join the network.  Also, in 
this kind of network there is a powerful “inner circle” that facilitates the creation of alliances.  
The second type, pluralist networks, are characterized by a low level of cohesion that promotes 
individual actions instead of collective collaboration.  The dispersion of these networks point 
out to the creation of different centers of power which increase the competition among actors 
(Cardenas, 2012; Cárdenas, 2014). 
 
The empirical chapters follow.  In chapter six, I show that in Costa Rica the capture of the 
media was coordinated due to elites’ capacity to organize a common block.  Elites were able 
in a brief period to collect money, gather information, lobby and pressure media owners to 
frame Frente Amplio and its’ candidate as a “populist/communist” threat to Costa Rican 
democracy, liberty, and freedom of the press.  For media owners, it was not just political 
affinity with elites, but also a matter of access to money and privileged status among the upper 
circles.  In chapter seven, I show that in El Salvador media capture was an arena of dispute.  
Elites on their side used their ties with traditional media to suppress information when it was 
necessary.  They also organized with business associations and think tanks the production of 
negative information about the performance of the first FMLN government that was distributed 
as such by traditional media.  Likewise, counter-elites used contracts and money to pact with 
media owners to reduce negative information and to reproduce the frame “the corrupts”- with 
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the main goal of hurting electoral aspirations of ARENA.  They were also keen in founding 
new media.  These new media gave back counter-elites the opportunity they lost after peace 
agreements: the possibilities of having their own media. 
 
The final chapter concludes that the influence of elites relies on their capacity to capture the 
media to prevent people of exchanging or acquiring information and ideas that may affect the 
interest of elites.  It also offers a perspective of how this research inform debates conceptually 
and methodologically around media capture and elites and also shed light on new avenues for 
future research in Latin America.   
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Since the 2009 economic crisis, issues relating to “elites” and “media” once again gained 
immense relevance in public debates, coffee discussions or even parties.  The triggers of the 
popularity of these two concepts are the economic crisis of 2009, the publication of the book 
“Capital in the Twenty-First Century” authored by the French economist Tomas Pikkety (2014) 
and the election in 2016 of Donald Trump.  The crisis and Pikkety’s book opened up a debate 
about wealth concentration and inequality in a tiny fraction of the world population (1% or 
even 0.1%) (Braig, Costa, & Göbel, 2016).  The latter stimulated debates about the role of 
media in daily life, especially during electoral campaigns.  Likewise, international 
organizations such as International Monetary Fund, and especially OXFAM International have 
started to draw attention to global unequal wealth distribution whereby the richest one percent 
accumulates 50.1% of the world’s wealth (Oxfam, 2018).  Despite this attention elites are one 
of the most disputed concepts in academia and one of the poorest defined by the public or 
practitioners.  On the other hand, media capture is a novel concept that has been related to 
political transition processes in Eastern Europe where the government’s control of media is 
entangled with private interests (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008; Schiffrin, 2017). 
 
This chapter seeks to address theoretical and conceptual clarification for the main concepts 
used in this research.  The main goal is to establish a framework for the debate about my main 
theoretical assumptions about elites, as well as to explore possible theoretical contributions of 
the differences of media capture by elites.  Drawing on the literature on political economy, 
media and business, as well as empirically grounded evidence, I developed a typology of 
strategies based on the different actions the elites used to capture the media.  These strategies 
as described in detail below are divided into sections on political, economic, ownership and 
violent strategies.  While most of the literature has focused on media ownership as a source of 
explanation of media capture, this dissertation advocates for a more detailed and precise 
description and analysis of different strategies.  Also, in the inclusion of the concept of counter-
elites this dissertation encourages a more comprehensive view of media capture, in which not 
only ruling elites can benefit from it but also opposing actors.  This approach seeks to broaden 
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the debate about how privileged actors may affect media coverage which in turn may influence 
a broad public audience.  
 
2.2 Media Capture 
 
There has been a long tradition of research on how privileged actors, such as governments and 
elites, seek to manage or suppress information, including the selection and framing of the 
public agenda.  Scholars have claimed that influencing media in such a manner is done in order 
to shape public opinion (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014; Castells, 2013; Curran, 2002; Golding & 
Murdock, 1991; Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 2010b; McChesney, 1997).  
Political economists have traditionally defined media capture almost exclusively as the direct 
control over mass media companies (Bagdikian, 2014; Golding & Murdock, 1991).  For 
scholars like Mills, Milliband Chomsky and Hernan, media is described as the most direct 
socialization factor which is most immediately accessible by elites to deliver their message and 
manufacturing consent (Herman & Chomsky, 2010b; Miliband, 1969b; Mills, 2000).  
Likewise, some of the most influential studies have worked with similar concepts such as the 
propaganda model or instrumentalization of media (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 
2004; Mancini, 2012; Meyer, 2002).   
 
In their propaganda model, Herman & Chomsky (2010), emphasized in which ways state 
bureaucracy, official censorship and monopolistic control over the media is used to explain 
how the media serves the ends of dominant elites.  The model traces the routes by which money 
and power filter news to serve the interest of governments and business (Herman & Chomsky, 
2010b, p. 257).  Nevertheless, their model, focused on State actors, gives an excessive role to 
private media in this way constraining elite’s will.  For instance, the authors’ approach suggests 
that it is more difficult to unravel propaganda models when private media is involved (Herman 
& Chomsky, 2010b, p. 257).  The model has further been criticized for lacking empirical 
evidence and knowledge about the audiences (Freedman, 2014b).  
 
Other authors have employed a concept called “instrumentalization of media” (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004).  This model refers to the control of media by external actors -social 
movements, political parties, or economic elites- to influence the world of politics (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004).  For the authors, instrumentalization may be witnessed in unstable political, 
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ideological and economical contexts. Thus, the concept rather implicitly refers to specific 
countries than to a common phenomenon.  It is Hallin and Mancini’s claim that the 
instrumentalization of media focuses on specific interests and goals of groups, instead of  
aiming at producing informed citizens (Mancini, 2012).  Instrumentalization targets  media as 
a tool to intervene in the decision making process, reach specific goals or to support political 
candidacies (Mancini, 2012, p. 271).  One of the problems of this concept is that lacks 
explicative analysis since media owners can also use the media for their purposes (Kocks, 
2016).   
 
Despite the fact that the boundaries between the propaganda model, the instrumentalization 
concept and the media capture model cannot  always be clearly established,  I will nevertheless 
rely in my research on the  media capture model because this  concept in my view  best explains 
the collusion of governments and elites in not informing but  using media to their own particular 
benefits such as image building, extracting money or intervening in the decision-making 
process (Mancini, 2012; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2012; Schiffrin, 2017).  Media capture in this context 
is not a new phenomenon but rather an old one.  In places raging from the United States, Spain, 
United Kingdom, Argentina, China, Tanzania, Mexico, Central and Eastern Europe, Italy, 
Tunisia to Turkey there has been an increase of examples of media capture in the last two 
decades (ATAL, 2017; Di Tella & Franceschelli, 2011; Durante & Knight, 2012; Enikolopov 
et al., 2011; Hughes, 2006; LABIDI, 2017; Qin, Wu, & Strömberg, 2014; Stanig, 2014; 
Strömberg, 2015).  
 
Likewise, the concept of media capture is closely related to another concept developed since 
the beginning of the 2000s’ by international financial institutions, academicians and 
practitioners: the model of state capture.  This concept has been used to talk about private 
companies shaping policy and legal environment at the expense of the rest of the economy 
(Hellman, Jones, & Kaufmann, 2000).  In this context, the term state capture became popular 
among those interested in knowing how companies exert influence and collude with public 
officials to extract advantages (Carpenter & Moss, 2013; Dal Bó, 2006; Durand, 2016).  The 
term capture was first coined in the seventies to describe a process where specific economic 
groups could use public resources and power to improve their economic status (Stigler, 1971).  
In this tradition, the focus has been centered around private actors whose structural 
characteristics, such as market dominance, economic capital or closeness with public officials 
provided them with advantages over other actors to receive benefits from public contracts, 
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policy regulations or tax reimbursements (Carpenter & Moss, 2013; Crabtree & Durand, 2017; 
Hellman et al., 2000).   
 
In the case of media capture, the concept started to evolve from a well-known forensic work in 
Peru.  In their study, McMillan & Zoido (2004) accounted for how Vladimir Montesinos, head 
of the National Intelligence Services, recorded (written or videotaped) his bribes to judges, 
politicians and media owners.  The strategy of Montesinos and president Alberto Fujimori was 
to buy off those institutions that could check their power.  A primary finding that since then 
has explained the research on media capture was that Montesinos has paid media owners one 
hundred times more money than he has paid to politicians and judges (McMillan & Zoido, 
2004).  Montesinos and Fujimori realized that media hold-up power in a way not even 
politicians or judges do, and that media could be a more constraining mechanism than 
politicians or judges (McMillan & Zoido, 2004, p. 86).  Since then, media capture studies, with 
a notable emphasis on economical approaches, have sought to model how media capture can 
explain inequality (Petrova, 2008), government accountability (Besley & Prat, 2006a), distort 
collective actions (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014), advance government agenda (Dragomir, 2017) or the 
quality of policy and welfare (Strömberg, 2015).  
 
For the purpose of this research, I rely on the concept of media capture in order to explain the 
situation when elites exert direct actions over media to suppress or to disseminate (un)favorable 
information.  Among the direct actions in the elites’ hand are the use of force, violence, bribery, 
advertisers influence, media ownership, censorship, legal favoritism, public relations or lobby.  
Media capture in these regards, to quote Bernard Cohen (1963), may not be successful most of 
the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to 
think about. 
 
This concept follows the main theoretical discussions of Petrova (2008), Corneo (2006), Prat 
(2015), Mungui-Pippidi (2013) and Bajomi-Lázár (2014).  The authors have focused on two 
main approaches to understand media capture.  First, media capture is described as an 
expression of the power of the wealthy and of interest groups (Corneo, 2006; Petrova, 2008).  
Second, the scholars explain media capture as an expression of the power of political actors, 
such as governments and political parties (Bajomi-Lázár, 2014; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008; Prat, 
2015).  For Petrova (2008) the rich spend money influencing media companies to affect policy 
preferences of voters.  In the author’s perspective media capture “is a form of institutional 
   21 
subversion used by the rich to grasp the benefits in the struggle for resources in an economy” 
(Petrova, 2008, p. 187).  For her, the higher levels of income inequality “makes media capture 
more profitable for the rich, and the probability of media capture grows” (p.184).  Petrova 
(2008), suggests that media capture occurs when the rich use money (buying media firms, 
paying for political advertising, bribing) to influence media.  In a similar line, Corneo (2006) 
explains that media might collude with interest groups to influence public opinion.  For Corneo 
(2006), who lacks a definition of media capture, wealth concentration increases the 
probabilities of media capture.  Corneo is critical in shedding light on the actors and media 
intentions behind media capture.  He argues that, there is a group of actors willing to pay media 
to affect voters’ decisions, and also a group of media willing to accept money to inform the 
public in a way that serves the interest of the donor.  On the other hand, Bajomi-Lázár, (2014), 
Mungiu-Pippidi (2008); Prat (2015) and Dragomir (2017) add methodological and theoretical 
explanations of media capture operated by governments.  For instance, in Prat (2015), the 
media capture model depends on governments capacity to single out media companies for 
rewards and punishments, and to also select weak institutions that cannot exercise checks-and-
balances.  Also, different empirical studies have shown that when governments decide to 
advertise in a specific media company, that company is less likely to talk about government 
corruption (Di Tella & Franceschelli, 2011).  The same applies to cases in which governments 
have implemented defamation legislation, like in México, media reduced the coverage of 
corruption in states with a more repressive defamation law (Stanig, 2014). 
 
Nowadays, the changes in technology and the loss of subscribers and advertisers of many 
outlets have increased the need for media to make pacts with governments or/and elites to 
finance their operations.  Considering that governments are usually the main advertisers, and 
that the economy tends to be more and more concentrated around few business groups, the 
chances for media capture are higher when media depends mainly on public or private 
advertisers rather than on independent revenues (Curran, 2002; Enikolopov & Petrova, 2015; 
Petrova, 2008; Strömberg, 2015).   
 
In this context, this research seeks to address and sum up the current theoretical discussions 
about media capture emphasizing it as a situation where actors in privileged positions, namely 
elites seek to change the course of media coverage through different strategies and actions. 
Likewise, in contrast to other approaches mentioned above, this research emphasizes on 
interviewing elites, SNA, historical analysis and empirical grounded evidence to give an 
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account of differences and explanations of how media capture could occur in times of electoral 
processes.   
 
2.3 Uncovering the Strategies of Elites to Capture the Media 
 
As it was defined above, elites need media to promote their views and shape public opinion.  
Nevertheless, there has not been any agreement among scholars on the strategies and actions 
elites carry out to capture the media.  While most of the academic research in this field has 
focused on the ownership of media, this section aims at informing and building a broader debate 
on elites’ strategies to capture the media to suppress or influence information.  Drawing from 
the literature on the political economy of media and business (Miklian & Rettberg, 2017), as 
well as from empirical evidence, I first develop a typology based on four main strategies, and 
second describe multiple actions elites could use to capture the media.  These strategies may 
act in two principal directions: suppressing information or modifying and influencing what is 
reported by the media. 
 
2.3.1 Economic Strategies 
 
These strategies are related to the elites’ capacities to (re) allocate money (legally or illegally) 
in media to modify or change the production and distribution of information.  Media tend to be 
more oriented to the elites rather than the poor because elites grant advertiser rewards (Curran, 
2002).  Such economic strategies are based on a simple concept: elites exert clear or dubious 
influence by rewarding some media that offer positive information about their products, 
projects or ideas while punishing or threatening to punish others that are critical of them 
(Curran, 2002). Apart from advertising rewards, elites may use money transfers to buy the 
willing of outlets and journalists to influence directly their reports (bribery).  In Latin America 
where advertising is provided mainly by a small pool of advertisers, the State and business 
companies, the chances to capture the media are higher due to the role of advertiser’s economic 
influence. Among the actions the elites can use they have bribery, money transfers, advertisers 
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2.3.2 Political Strategies 
 
These strategies refer to the actions of elites to influence the way policies and politics in general 
are framed (Miklian & Rettberg, 2017).  Elites may use superior information access and 
expertise via business organizations, think tanks, public relations or lobby campaigns to 
influence what is reported (Fuchs, 2007).  Elites may promote official statements, “media 
tours,” organize “newsworthy” events, publicity campaigns or films to express their views 
during elections or policy reforms (Fuchs, 2007).  All those events are oriented towards 
providing media with elites’ views and perspectives about specific topics.  Elites’ related think 
tanks may also provide outlets and journalists with documents, reports, and information.  Elites 
and think tanks spokespersons may receive more media attention based on the general 
perception that these people are well prepared and informed. This in the end, increases elite’s 
political potential and legitimacy (Almiron, 2017; Bernhagen, 2008; Pautz, 2011).  Elites may 
also lobby media owners. In Latin America, the different networks that tied elites and media 
owners (familial, kinship, friendship, business interlocks), facilitate the lobby.  Those elites are 
usually family, advertisers or business partners. Lobbying media owners is common and not a 
well-studied mean of influencing information in Latin America.  In these matters’ elites can 
use lobbying and public relations campaign, reports from business associations and think tanks, 
or newsworthy events (Fuchs, 2007). 
 
2.3.3 Ownership Strategies 
 
These strategies are related to a particular form of capture. While nobody can openly buy a 
regulatory institution, elites can and do buy media (Stiglitz, 2017).  Through the ownership of 
media or the interlocked networks among media owners and elites, the latter can veto media 
content that questions socio-economic structures and elites’ interests (Waisbord & Segura, 
2016, p. 26); allocate people (journalist, editors) and influence editorial agenda (Davis, 2007).   
Elites have interests and perspectives that differ from the rest of the society and have a stake in 
the status quo (Curran, 2002; Freedman, 2014b; Stiglitz, 2017).  They tend to use media to 
oppose progressive taxes and regulations and to support political parties with similar political 
agendas that at the end increases the electoral advantage for right-wing parties (Fairfield, 2015).  
These strategies are on the rise in Latin America, where the wealthiest elites in different 
countries have started to buy or form new media.  The new digital technologies have reduced 
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entrance barriers and have increased the opportunities for wealthy elites to form digital media.  
It has been the beginning of what Stiglitz (2017) calls “the new toy for the super-rich.”  Central 
actions of ownership strategies: media ownership; allocation of people, private reprimands, 
theme selection, headlining and censorship. 
 
2.3.4 Violent Strategies.  
 
These are the most radical strategies elites can use with the primary goal of silencing the media. 
By relying on the use of physical force, violence or intimidation, elites seek to shock media 
and journalists.  Violent strategies are an effective way to reduce accountability and allow the 
emergence of non-democratic ends (Cottle, Sambrook, & Mosdell, 2016). Every day, these 
strategies are used in Latin America, particularly in México, Brazil and Colombia (Waisbord 
& Segura, 2016).  In the region, institutional weakness and impunity granted to elites and 
organized crime with incentives to pursue violent strategies as an effective tool to censor media 
and journalists due to the lower chances of being caught (Cottle et al., 2016).  Those with 
money are the ones who give orders and pay hitmen (sicarios) to execute them.  For example, 
in Costa Rica in 2001 an outspoken and corruption-hunter journalist, Parmenio Medina, was 
killed in his house by two hitmen.  A businessman, Omar Chaves paid the killing. He had been 
accused and denounced for money laundering in Medina’s radio program. The common actions 
used are killings, physical threats, and kidnapping. 
 
These four strategies illustrate tools and goals which can help to build a more detailed 
framework for the study of elites’ influence on media. The given definition of these strategies 
allows us to understand which actions and resources the elites may need and what structural 
context would facilitate media capture.  The differentiation between strategies and actions not 
necessarily denied the overlapping, but on the contrary allow us to understand when elites may 












The core of multiple debates about influence and power is centered around the idea that there 
may exist in any society a minority of the population which can influence major decisions 
(Parry, 2005).  Different from other paradigms that propose a diversity of groups that employ 
non-cumulative power in only one or few sectors at the same time (Dahl, 1973), the elitist 
paradigm proposes the idea of a small group of people that gain power from the fact that they 
form a more or less compact entity (Mills, 2000).  Pareto (Pareto, 1935), for instance, defines 
elites as distinct individuals with most excel in all aspects of life, those with power and wealth.  
Mosca, another classical author on elites, defines elites as a small number of people with 
control over the government of those governed, the masses (Meisel, 1958; Mosca, 1896).  
Common denominators on the definition of elites in these classical literature pieces are their 
description of elites as la crème de la societé and on common characteristics of these 
individuals: consisting of a small number of people, cohesiveness, stability and that they share 
significant decisional power (Higley, 2018).  
 
Mills (2000) did shed light on an unequal distribution of power associated with the existence 
of a selected group of people at the top of business, politics and the military.  For Mills, these 
three sectors form the centers of power in any given society. Their interdependence and 
intensive coordination shape the power of elite (Hartmann, 2007).  These elites share some 
characteristics.  They share a common identity defined by the similarities of societal origins, 
parental backgrounds, education and training, and social ties (Hartmann, 2007; Mills, 2000). 
These characteristics help elites to reinforce their advantageous positions and domination over 
other groups in the society (Parry, 2005, p. 30).  For Mills, the social mingling among elites 
and the many ties they share in different areas have equipped them with “a common class 
consciousness” (Mills, 2000). 
 
Contemporary research on elites has more critically described elites as active groups with not 
necessarily homogeneous perspectives (Hoffmann-Lange, 2018).  Some of these new 
approaches differentiate types of elites (Keller, 2017), their transnational nature (Carroll, 2013; 
Robinson, 2003; Van der Pijl, 2005); their circulation (Rentería & Figueroa, 2016; Szelényi & 
Szelényi, 1995); elites and financialization (Davis & Williams, 2017) or their role in 
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institutional building (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; Schoenman, 2014).  Rather than focusing 
on the study of the characteristics of elites that were taken for granted by classical studies, 
nowadays researchers have focused on cooperation, organizational structures, prevention of 
inter-elites’ conflicts, new state-elites’ relations and degrees of elites’ cohesion (Davis & 
Williams, 2017; Hoffmann-Lange, 2018). 
 
In Latin America the long tradition in the study of elites has led to the shared understanding of 
elites as a small group of people who occupy or control resources from powerful organizations 
and whose privileged positions allow them to exert formal and informal influence over societies 
(Birle, Maihold, & Potthast, 2007; Bull, 2014; Camp, 2002; Casaús-Arzú, 1992; Crabtree & 
Durand, 2017; Durand, 2005; Kaltwasser, 2009; Lipset & Solari, 1967; Mahoney, 2001; Paige, 
1998; Salas-Porras, 2014; Saxe Fernández, 1999; Stone, 1982; Vilas, 1992; Zeitlin, 1974). One 
characteristic of Latino elites is their historically overlapping among political and economic 
elites (Anderberg, 1967; Bull, 2014; Cardoso, 1968; Saxe Fernández, 1999).  Historically, the 
state building process in the region led to the development of a class that in order to maintain 
its privileged positions took direct control over state institutions (Stone, 1982).  While in some 
eras, elites decided to run the government directly, in other periods, elites used a variety of 
means to maintain their influence over the State (Paige, 1998). Among these means, elites used 
the military to defeat contested social movements, or electoral frauds and political violence to 
block the emergence of contesting elites (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Paige, 1998). Since 
the second part of the twentieth century, the overlapping of political and economic elites in 
Latin America has been favored by three main situations. First, politicians turned to economic 
elites thanks to the import substitutions industrialization policies in the sixties and the 
privatization of public enterprises in the nineties (Franco & Sojo, 1992).  Second, the 
recruitment of economic elites into the governments via traditional parties (Fairfield, 2015; 
Heredia, 2004).  Third, a recent situation defined by the formation of new political parties lead 
by elites, such as PRO in Argentina or National Renewal in Chile. 
 
Taking the above context into account, in this research elites will be defined as male 
individuals, that own or control the largest companies in the country and that due to their 
personal economic capital and/or company’s stake in the local economy, they also play an 
important political role.  This definition allows me to limit elites to a specific type of 
individuals: male owners of largest companies in a country.  For instance, Francis Durman 
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Esquivel in Costa Rica owner of the business group Montecristo or Ricardo Poma, CEO of 




Another critical concept proposed in this research is the “counter-elites” concept.  In the 
classical debate proposed by Pareto, there is an inescapable historical law where elites may be 
replaced by counter-elites (Pareto, 1935).  Counter-elites emerge among the masses to fight the 
ruling elites by using precisely those tactics the elites lack (Hoffmann-Lange, 2018, p. 56).  The 
key for an elite’s stability as proposed by Femia (2001) would be an even balance between 
force and persuasion.  Counter-elites is also a concept referred to in Schumpeter’s 1942 work, 
as those that in a defined democracy mobilize the masses to get rid of the potentates by the 
grace of vote (Schumpeter, 1942).  
 
In Latin America this conceptualization is connected to works that have considered social 
movements, leftists parties, and guerrillas as counter-elites.  For these researchers in Latin 
America, the counter-elites concept is defined as a group of actors that wants to conquer power 
and pursue ideas and interests in contrast to those from the ruling elites (Dallanegra Pedraza, 
2013; Espinoza, 2014; Espinoza & Franz Junior, 2016; Waldmann, 2007, Maihold, 2007).  
Recce (Recce, 2010) goes further and defines the concept regarding ethnic origins and 
historical exclusion.  This differentiation based on ethnic origins is central in this research.  
Also, Rovira-Kaltwasser (2018, p. 269) argues that contestation and struggle exist in any 
society between elites and counter-elites on how to guide and command societies.  For the 
author, the development and changes in the society pose challenges for the ruling elites.  For 
Rovira (p.270), elites may usually prevail, but in different circumstances, counter-elites may 
gain influence and sometimes may even replace those at the top.  In the case of Latin America, 
as pointed out by Rovira, growing public discontent and growing inequalities have led to the 
emergence of counter-elites that have led the resistance against those at the top.   
 
Taking the above said into account, in this research I define counter-elites as individuals and 
organizations that have opposed power structure from which elites have benefitted and against 
which they have formed a common front to replace them through electoral processes, social 
mobilizations, or revolutions.  Counter-elites may share ideas and alternatives that oppose 
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ruling elites, but also, ethnic origins.  Counter-elites are most likely to emerge in societies 
highly polarized by class, ethnic origins or public discontent. 
 
2.6  The Cohesion of Elites 
 
Another fundamental concept of this research is the cohesion of elites.  Cohesion assures that 
elites cooperate in political actions to defend their interest without competition.  Cohesion, also 
referred in many studies as unity, has been subject of intense debate for many years.  On the 
one side the pluralist school lead by Dahl (1973) that recognizes elites’ conflict and 
fragmentation as a cornerstone of polyarchal pluralism.  On the other side, elitist paradigm that 
despite acknowledging fragmentation as a process of elites’ development, it emphasizes 
various actions that may facilitate the cohesion of elites such as interlocking directorates, 
business associations, political parties, family ties or club memberships (Domhoff, 2006a; 
2009; Mills, 2000; Zeitlin, 1974).      
 
For the classical authors such as Meisel (1958) cohesion is a central aspect of elites’ DNA, 
together with consciousness and conspiracy (triple C’s).  For Meisel, if elites do not act as a 
unified body, they are less an elite and fall under the category of “top persons” (Parry, 2005, 
p. 29).  Classical authors such as Mosca and Michels believe that elites’ cohesion was defined 
by “a small number of people with similar interest” (Hoffmann-Lange, 2018; Michels, 2005; 
Mosca, 1986).  This idea, as pointed out by Parry (2005), suggested that elites constitute a 
static, coherent and united group.  Rather than considering cohesion generated by the “principle 
of small numbers”, authors, like Mills (2000) have defined cohesion as a complex process 
where social intermingling, psychological similarities, structural coincidences of commanding 
positions and coordination have helped elites to pursue more easily common interests (Mills, 
2000; Pakulski, 2018).  Mills’ suggest that the increased concentration on property in big 
corporations led to a larger cohesion among elites.  He describes cohesion as an outcome of 
the elites’ common interest.  For the author, since most of the largest companies are owned by 
proprietors that share multiple boards, they have exchanged reciprocal views and have 
expanded their individual interest to embrace the interests of their entire class (Hartmann, 2007; 
Mills, 2000).  In Mills, elites’ cohesion is regarded also as an outcome of common social 
background and as one of its core resources (Kocks, 2016; Mills, 2000). 
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The majority of scholars examining the concept of elites’ cohesion has referred to two aspects 
of it.  First, political behavior, common rules, institutions and norms that constraint opposition 
and the need for regulation of elites’ conflict.  Second, the interactions and networks of elites 
that shape values, allow communications and reinforces consensus (Cárdenas, 2014; 
Hoffmann-Lange, 2018; Parry, 2005).  However, one of the significant challenges is how to 
unravel empirically the ties that link together elites, as commonly assumed by Mills (2000).   
In resolving these challenges, different studies, as pointed out by Hoffmann-Lange (2018), 
have relied on different informal and personal indicators such as class background, family, 
religion, ethnic identities, education or social clubs (Casaús-Arzú, 1992; Domhoff, 2006b; 
Fairfield, 2015; Stone, 1982; Szelényi & Szelényi, 1995; Zapf, 1965). 
 
In Latin America, the cohesion of elites has been a useful tool to explain different political 
process.  Peace negotiations in Central America and Colombia (Rettberg, 2007).  Tax policy 
reforms in Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Argentina and Bolivia (Fairfield, 2015; 
A. Schneider, 2012).  Social and market incorporation in Costa Rica (Sánchez-Ancochea, 
Martínez, & Martí, 2015).  Income distribution in El Salvador and Honduras (Martínez-Vallejo, 
2017).  Despite explanations of elites’ cohesion like business associations (B. R. Schneider, 
2009), interlocking directorates (Cardenas, 2014a) or family ties (Casaús-Arzú, 1992), in this 
research, I focus on the interplay of four main cohesion forces: common background; shared 
ideology; homogeneity of interest and interlocking directorates (Cardenas, 2014a; Fairfield, 
2015).   
 
Cohesion, according to Fairfield (2015), describes elites’ potentials to organize and sustain a 
united front and engage in collective action.  When elites organize and form united forces, they 
collaborate, mobilize resources and transcend their interest to achieve elites-wider goals 
(Bernhagen, 2008; Domhoff, 2006a; Mizruchi, 1992; Zeitlin, 1974). In fact, as Vogel 
recognizes, elites’ cohesion has often resulted in impressive political power (Vogel, 2003).  I 
argue that when elites are cohesive, prospects of media capture regarding specific economic, 
media, and political interest tend to be stronger than when different fractions act independently.  
In fact, elites’ cohesion implies that elites will need less resources, actions and time.   
Fragmentation on the contrary requires a strong grip over the media.  While cohesive elites 
might just need some influence over the media, fragmented elites need to rely on means of 
censorship to constrain information.  I will argue that cohesion might boost elites use of 
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political and economic strategies, while, fragmentation might require ownership and violent 
strategies to modify what is reported on media. 
 
In this research on the operationalization of the degree of cohesiveness among elites I analyzed 
four factors: common background; shared ideology; homogeneity of interest; and networks.  
For Mills (2000) a particular distinction of elites is the “common background” defined by 
family history, education, and training.  Common background is essential because it entails 
elites with a common judgment that allows them to coordinate political actions.  Shared 
ideology allows elites to promote a sense of community and shared identity, while maintaining 
and justifying social differences and unequal access to wealth and authority (DeMarrais, 
Castillo, & Earle, 1996). Homogeneity of interest, understood as a narrow range of economic 
and political interest, makes it easier to sustain a united front and it is a competitive advantage 
enjoyed by elites over other groups (Fairfield, 2015; Heath, 2011).  Finally, networks are a 
feature of elites that allowed them the unification of interest. Mills and others have drawn 
attention to a particular form of elite’s networks, the ones formed by directors that occupy two 
or more directorships in different companies (Mizruchi, 1992; Zeitlin, 1974).    
 
In the next three chapters I operationalize these variables to compare the cohesion among elites 
in Costa Rica and El Salvador.  Specifically, in chapters two and three I study the different 
structures elites have built in each country.  In the case of Costa Rica, I found a cohesive elite 
that has established strong capacities to transcend their particular sectorial interest to meet, 
fund and engage in political actions when their business-friendly agenda has been subject to 
threats since the mid-1980s.  In El Salvador, on the contrary, I found a fraction of elites that 
has shared for a long time an indisputable hegemony but since 2009 has been challenged by a 
group of counter-elites.  Finally, in the chapter five where I analyzed the networks created by 
media owners I concluded that media owners may be incorporated with large business 
communities to form larger media-economic communities.  
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3 Cohesive Costa Rican Elites 
 
“Para empezar, el empresariado costarricense, la derecha más derecha, es izquierda en                  
El Salvador. A nosotros nos estereotipan diciendo es que ustedes los ticos, no jodás. O sea, 
ustedes a dónde dicen que son derecha. Si ustedes creen en la igualdad y creen que tiene que 
haber un seguro social para todo el mundo, y creemos en que la educación tiene que ser para 
todos.  O sea, nosotros los ticos en eso somos bastante diferentes.  
Entonces somos una mezcla complicada”. 




Two months before the 2014 elections, a poll revealed high chances of an electoral victory on 
the left, but fifty leaders of main Costa Rican business groups stood ready to make those 
chances slim.  They had the money and information.  They also knew the strategy to follow: 
capturing the media. This was not the first time they would capture the media to overcome a 
threat.  Seven years earlier, in 2007, a national referendum threatened elites and traditional 
parties to be excluded from Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).  As a response, 
elites started an unprecedented movement called Alianza por el Sí to push for the political and 
electoral approval of CAFTA.  This Alianza por el Sí succeeded in capturing the media, 
flooding TV broadcasters and newspapers with extremely positive coverage about the benefits 
of CAFTA and with negative information regarding the non-approval of this commercial deal 
(Cortés Ramos, 2008).  Eventually, CAFTA was approved in the national referendum.  The 
approval of CAFTA was the pinnacle of business-friendly driven agenda. 
 
In 2013, two months before presidential elections, elites were worried about the possible 
electoral defeat of Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) and in consequence their risk of being 
excluded from government for the first time in 30 years.  With the experience of CAFTA, elites 
again took initiative and created an informal association, Alianza Costa Rica.  This time the 
goal was to impede an electoral victory of the Left.  The CAFTA referendum and the 2014 
elections revealed the remarkable capacity of Costa Rican elites to act as cohesive group to 
organize, defend a policy agenda, and coordinate political actions when they feel threatened. 
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This is possibly the most important single factor to explain why, historically, elites in Costa 
Rica have experienced few threats and scarce periods of turmoil.  They overcome disputes 
through cohesion.   
 
The cohesion of Costa Rican elites is the result of different factors.  First, their common 
background that helped them to procure social prestige, access to the state, money and 
overcome dearth of labor and capital.  Second, their shared ideology that settled down their 
internal disputes.  Finally, their homogeneity of interest, which as a result secured a friendly 
business agenda for a reduced number of groups through their active political participation.  In 
this chapter the cohesion of elites is analyzed in order to understand that when elites’ access to 
the state or their business agenda has been threatened, they have been able to coordinate and 
sustain political actions without opposition, such as media capture, to secure status quo.  This 
is so because cohesion has reduced inter-elites’ conflict and has helped them to form, despite 
their sectoral differences, a community capable of engaging in political actions, organizing, 
and collecting money.  That was the case of the organization created in 2014 to capture the 
media, Alianza Costa Rica. 
 
3.2 Costa Rican Elites: Common Background Coffee Boom and Civil War  
 
The coffee economy, as well as in the rest of the region, allowed a small group of families, 
with a shared colonial lineage, to amassed fortunes and control the government until 1948. 
With the civil war in 1948, the Cafetaleros were displaced from the center of power, while the 
government promoted new economic actors: the Industrialist (Rovira-Mas, 1982).  These two 
fractions shared in common a past of economic growth linked to the State.  Different from other 
elites in Central America, Costa Rican elites’ relations with the State would be defined by 
access to markets, but most important by their direct and active participation in politics (Stone, 
1976).  While the cafetaleros got into politics mainly to secure social prestige, the industrialists’ 
relations with politics were mainly shaped to secure and promote their investments, as well, as 
to restrict other competitors.  In these regards, in this section I analyze the origins of these two 
fractions to show that despite of their differences, they share a common background that has 
shaped their need to control the government. 
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3.2.1 The Cafetaleros’ Fraction 
 
Before the first coffee tree was planted in the 1830s by a German immigrant, Geog Stiepel, 
Costa Rican elites were among the poorest in the isthmus (Acuña Ortega & Molina Jiménez, 
1991; Gudmundson, 2010; Stone, 1976). In colonial times, Costa Rica was economical, 
geographical and politically isolated from the colonial center of power in Guatemala.  There 
was insufficient slave labor (indigenous people) and mineral resources to make Costa Rica 
really interesting for the colonial powers (Acuña Ortega & Molina Jiménez, 1991; 
Gudmundson, 2010; Winson, 1989).  The conquistadores who settled down in the country, 
rather than being powerful hidalgos, they belonged to an hidalguía rural (Stone, 1982). 
Colonial institutions such as latifundio, la encomienda and el repartimiento were incomplete 
in Costa Rica (Gudmundson, 2010).  Because of these factors, for a long period of time (1650-
1790), a small group of people struggled to open and diversify the Costa Rican economy 
through cacao production.  While this cacao production allowed the accumulation of limited 
wealth for very few people, it also reduced external demand and colonial control over the 
country’s economy. This situation made it impossible for a solidified elite in Costa Rica to 
emerge until the boom of the coffee industry (Acuña Ortega & Molina Jiménez, 1991; 
Gudmundson, 2010; Winson, 1989). 
 
Contrary to what happened with the cacao, the coffee boom of the IXX century caused the 
emergence of a new class: the cafetaleros.  This emergence was facilitated by large areas of 
empty productive land, sparse population and no institutional constraints whatsoever (Winson, 
1989, p. 12).  The arising elite group was made up of affluent Costa Rican families.  Among 
the Costa Ricans, the cafetaleros were joined by prominent political leaders that since 1840 
started business companies to export coffee such as Gordiano Fernández and Mariano 
Montealegre2 (Fernández & Montealegre); Juan Rafael Mora Porras3 and Vicente Aguilar 
Cubero4 (Mora & Aguilar); José María Cañas5 and José María Montealegre6 (Cañas & 
Montealegre) (Quijano quoted in Stone, 1976b, p. 80).  During these years coffee exports grew 
                                                 
2 He was a diplomat and Head of State of Costa Rica. 
3 President of Costa Rica 1849-1960. 
4 He was a Supreme Court judge, Vice-President, President of Congress and Minister of Finance. 
5 Prominent politician, married to Guadalupe Mora Porras, sister of Costa Rican presidents Juan Rafael and 
Miguel Mora Porras. 
6 President of Costa Rica from 1859 to 1863. 
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exponentially from twenty thousand kilos in 1832, one million kilos in 1840, four million in 
1850 to more than 20 million kilos at the end of XIX century (Gudmundson, 2010) 
 
A singular characteristic of the cafetaleros is that two-thirds of these families came from the 
same two colonial families (Stone 1976b).  These inbred relationships advanced control over 
politics because members of the same family used to occupy official or opposition roles7.  The 
cafetaleros’ enrollment in politics has been a singular characteristic of Costa Rican elites in 
contrast with the elites from other countries in the region.  For Stone (1976b), the limited access 
to resources (land, slave labor, capital) -in comparison with the rest of the countries in the 
isthmus- forced Costa Rican elites to enroll in politics to gain social prestige but also to control, 
promote and defend their economic interest.  Also, it should be considered that the cafetaleros 
economic power and influence was largely based on activities where politics played a crucial 
role, such as, processing, trade, and credit (Hall, 1978; Paige, 1998; Seligson, 1980; Stone, 
1982).  The resources that arose from coffee exports, which represented between 75% and 95% 
of total exports, increased the State’s economic support for the national army.  Also, the 
cafetaleros play a crucial role in the consolidation of the army through designation of members 
of their families in high rank positions in the Army. Some of them were , such as Tomás 
Guardia, Bernardo Soto, and Próspero Férnandez, three military men who ruled Costa Rica 
between 1870 to 1890 (Stone, 1982).  
 
Later on, the cafetaleros were joined by more migrants (Spaniards, Germans, French) who 
arrived mainly to Costa Rica in the second half of the XIX century motivated by the coffee 
boom economy.  Due to the scarce land and fierce control over coffee production, some of 
those migrants moved to the commercial sector where they became powerful comerciantes 
since then.  That is the case of the Uribe family (see table 3).  They arrived in Costa Rica in the 
late 1890s and founded a “department store” –Almacén- together with an important Cafetalero 
Family –Cañas Mora- in 1903.  Then, in 1909, together with another Spanish migrant family, 
they expanded their store in 1909.  During most of the XX century, the Uribe’s family ruled 
the largest and most important retail chains in Costa Rica. They sold it to Wal-Mart in 2007.  
                                                 
7 A singular case is Juan Rafael Mora Porras who controlled 8% of total exports and 16% of coffee processing 
capacity between 1846 and 1850. Mora Porras became president in 1850 and then he appointed family members 
in prominent public offices.  Later he was overthrown and executed by order of his brother-in-law José María 
Montealegre Fernández (Paige, 1998; Stone, 1982). 
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Since 2008, they became one of the most important business groups –Cuestamoras- in the 
country with investments in energy, real estate, and pharmacies. 
 
 
Table 3:  Grupo Cuestamoras, a Story of an Elite 
Year Family Business company Sector 
1903 Pagés Elías (Jerónimo) 
Cañas Mora (Rafael) 
Almacén Dos Mundos Retail 
1909 Uribe Urreirtieta 
(Enrique) 
Pagés Elías (Jerónimo) 
Uribe & Pages Retail 
1969 Uribe Pagés (Enrique) 
Moretti (John) Hidalgo 
Solano (Samuel) 
Más x Menos Retail 





1992 Uribe Saénz 
Hidalgo Solano 
Inmobiliaria Enur Real-Estate 






2002-2008 Uribe Saénz 
Hidalgo Solano 
Joint-venture with 
Dutch Group Royal 
Ahold and the 
Guatemalan Group La 
Fragua (CARHCO) 
Retail 
2008- Uribe Saénz 
Moretti 
Cuestamoras Investment Fund 
Real Estate 
Energy 
2009- Barnabó Uribe Da Noi Gelateria 
2015- Uribe Saénz Farmacias Fischel Drugstores 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Media also constituted an important source of the cafetaleros’ influence. In 1830, Miguel 
Carranza, a cafetalero, invested in the first printing machine in Costa Rica. Simultaneously, in 
1833, El Noticioso Universal and El Correo de Costa Rica were published for the first time 
(Vega-Jiménez, 2007).  In this period, media was consolidated as an important mechanism to 
solidify the hegemony of the cafetaleros.  Due to the high illiteracy rates in the country, media 
was accessed only by the privileged cafetaleros families.  It was an elitist media, where 
different actors from the most affluent families discussed social, cultural and political 
problems.  Media, then, was meant as an instrument of social cohesion and identity-building 
among elite families (Morales, 1995; Vega-Jiménez, 2007). 
 
In the onset of the XXth century, the rule of power of the cafetaleros started to decline due to 
several factors.  First, the transformation of the municipal government led to a reduction of the 
cafetaleros political power.  A proposal of president Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno (1910-1914) 
enabled local leaders –Gamonales- to hold more significant decision-making positions at local 
governments.  Since then, the Gamonales also increased their participation in national politics, 
enhancing diversity among national political elites (Stone, 1982).  Second, with the 
introduction of the enclave economy of banana production, and the increasing production of 
sugar cane, cacao and rubber, the State started to diversify their sources of income, thereby 
challenging the cafetaleros economic power (Barrantes-Zamora, Bonilla-Quesada, & Ramírez-
Cortés, 2001).  Third, the banana enclave and the First World War increased the external 
demand for food products (potatoes and sugar cane), and also boosted demand of a limited 
resource in the country: the agricultural labor force (peones agrícolas). For instance, the 
relatively higher salaries offered by the United Fruit Company promoted migration of peones 
agrícolas from coffee plantations to the Caribbean coast (Stone, 1982). Fourth, the inter-war 
period provoked a contraction of one of Costa Rica’s main coffee markets: Germany, that, 
together with the Great Depression drastically reduced coffee exports. International prices of 
coffee went from 0.60 cents per kilo in 1927 to 0.27 in 1932 (Paige, 1998; Stone, 1982).  Fifth, 
the international context around the 1929 Great Depression facilitated the emergence of social 
forces that opposed the agro-export model and the cafetaleros’ status quo, particularly the 
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3.2.2 The Industrialist’s Fraction 
 
The 1948 civil war produced a division among elites.  As the new presidential elections 
approached (1948), reformist forces led by José María Figueres aligned with the cafetaleros to 
support the presidential candidacy of Otilio Ulate.  José Figueres Ferrer, a middle-size farmer, 
and leader of an emergent group of intellectuals from affluent Costa Rican families used radio 
and newspapers to call for the end of Calderón’s government.  Also, Otilio Ulate, director of 
the conservative newspaper El Diario de Costa Rica, used his newspaper to expose frenzied 
critics to Calderón (Rojas Bolaños, 1980; Rosenberg, 1981).  The cafetaleros and Figueres even 
founded La Nación newspaper.  La Nación was born of the principal objective of “combating” 
the Calderón government, and would become an influential political actor to counter his 
“calderocomunistas” policies (Ovares & León, 1979).   
 
Ulate was declared the winner by the Electoral Tribunal, but the Congress, dominated by 
governmental and communist forces, declared null and void the elections (Lehoucq & Molina 
Jiménez, 2002; Rosenberg, 1981; Winson, 1989).  As a response, Figueres declared a war that 
he won six weeks later.  For 18 months, he ruled Costa Rica until he gave back the presidency 
to Ulate (Rojas Bolaños, 1980).   
 
Despite having united with Figueristas forces to fight back against “the calderocommunistas,” 
once concluded the war, the cafetaleros’ fraction was displaced from political power. Rather 
than promoting a conservative restoration, Figueres and his allies sought to implement a new 
economic model that benefited the displeased middle class through economic diversification and 
the strengthening of a new group of elites (Rovira-Mas, 1982).  To make the orientation of a 
new model clear, Figueres imposed different reforms that targeted the interest of the cafetaleros 
directly.  For instance, he imposed a property tax to the owners of largest land properties; 
nationalized the banks in the hands of the cafetaleros; nationalized Instituto para la Defensa 
del Café, set a price that beneficiadores must pay to small producers, and also implemented a 
policy for increasing salaries.  Figueres recognized the need of taking the bank sector out of 
the hands of Cafetaleros.  According to Figueres’s view, the strict cafetaleros control over 
banks had limited diversification of the economy and the strengthening of other groups 
(Brenes, 1990).  In these regards, bank nationalizations also came as a sign to dethrone a 
financial fraction that had been a safeguard of status quo (Brenes, 1990; Rovira-Mas, 1982).  
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All of these changes implied a rupture in the orientation of traditional economic model and a 
rupture with the cafetaleros that with few exceptions were in control of the government since 
mid-1850s.   
 
Additionally, to the bank nationalization, the Figueristas forces sought to have their own media.  
During this time, they founded or control media companies such as El Excelsior (newspaper); 
Canal 6 and Canal 11 (TV broadcaster), Radio Columbia and La Hora (radio).  To fund 
economically these media companies Figueres and other PLN politicians contributed to 
personal donations. Nevertheless, the main funds came from foreign political parties and 
politicians allied with Figueres such as Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SDP) from 
Germany; Acción Democrática from Venezuela and Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
from México (Ovares & León, 1979).  For the industrialist the new media was necessary to 
compete with media owned by the cafetaleros such as La Nación and Teletica (Vega-Jiménez, 
1990). 
 
In the 1960s the growth of industrialists was boosted by a new law that facilitated tax 
reductions, high tariffs against outside competition and subsidized credit to protect and finance 
industries (Industrial Protection and Development Act; 1959).  The above also included the 
incorporation of Costa Rica into the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1963, 
which opened new opportunities to expand business regionally (Martínez-Franzoni & Sánchez-
Ancochea, 2017; Vega Martínez, 1982).  For instance, during the period 1963-1975 more than 
100 industrial companies were established, and the annual profit rate grew by 19% between 
1962 to 1973 (Dunkerley, 1988, p. 611).   
 
The industrialists included politicians from recently founded PLN such as Figueres and 
members of his family, and an important percentage of comerciantes (Herrero & Garnier, 
1983).  Among the benefited families were Yankelewitz, Durmán, Dueñas, Nowalski, Chacón, 
Crespo, Garnier, San Gil, Llobet or Quirós (Franco & Sojo, 1992; Solís, 1983).  As a 
consequence the expansion of largest industries favored a concentration of industrial property 
in few families and foreign capital, mainly from the United States, but also, the bankruptcy of 
artisans (Herrero & Garnier, 1983).  
 
Despite of their differences, the late 1970s shaped a tacit agreement among the cafetaleros and 
the industrialists to oppose the increased participation of the State in the economy.  For Richard 
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Beck, a well-known industrialist and relative of Figueres, the State and its enterprises8 were 
playing in a field that belongs to private actors (Robles Rivera, 2014).  The agreement of these 
two fractions was that the increased role of the state in the economy jeopardized their particular 
interest.  For the first time, both elites’ fractions agreed on a common issue and from their 
particular positions tried to gain back the control over the economy and the government.  For 
instance in 1978 a group of prominent of members of both fractions and tied to PLN founded 
a think tank called Consultores Económicos y Financieros (CEFSA), where they sought to 
promote a major economic liberalization (Blanco Lizano, 2010).  The agreement among elite 
fractions came in time where the public arena was open to the ideas of State reduction and 
articulation of private sector.  As I demonstrate in the next section, those ideas helped the 
cohesion of elites. 
 
3.3 Shared Ideology: The Articulation of Private Sector 
 
The set of crises encountered by Costa Rica at the beginnings of the 1980s built a perfect 
scenario of agreement and community among elite’ fractions (the cafetaleros and industrialist).  
In the bordering country, Nicaragua, a revolutionary government had been installed, while in 
Guatemala and El Salvador revolutionary movements were looking to emulate Nicaraguan 
revolution (Torres-Rivas, 2011).  At the domestic level, the oil shocks, skyrocketing 
international interest rates, international decline of main exports (banana and coffee) and 
government incapacity to promote solutions produced among elites an increased need to 
articulate common efforts to retake control over the Costa Rican economy.  In the articulation 
of a sense of community among Costa Rican elites, the United States played a remarkable role 
providing economic aid, promoting anti-communist policies and political advisory (Clark, 
1997; Sojo, 1995; Vega-Martínez, 1984).  In doing so, the United States sought to strengthen 
the private sector in two areas: exports and banking and finance. 
 
The first task to strengthen elites sense of community was to reorient Costa Rican economic 
model (Clark, 1997; Sojo, 1991a).  To do so, international consultants and a group of Costa 
                                                 
8 Costa Rican Development Corporation (CODESA) was founded in 1972 with two central public objectives, 
first, to build public enterprises with the capacity to expand markets and second, to build companies to operate in 
sectors where private business was not interested (Vega Martínez, 1982).  In these regards, CODESA opened 
business companies in sectors such agro (CATSA and ALCORSA), chemicals (CEMVASA, CEMPASA, 
ALUNASA), and transport (FECOSA and TRANSMESA).  
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Rican businesspeople, intellectuals, media owners and a journalist were invited by USAID to 
discuss the causes of Costa Rican problems (Clark, 1997).  Despite its “non-partisan” agenda, 
the group included mostly businessmen and public figures closed related to PLN, and that 
shared what they considered anti-communist ideas.  Once US officials identified key public 
figures, that included media editors and politicians, and people in business, USAID endorsed 
different economic cooperation programs, such as the creation of a set of private and public 
institutions such as a private business-promotion center (CINDE), an university focused on 
tropical agricultural training (EARTH) and a new ministry of investments and exports (Clark, 
1997).  CINDE was the first experiment carried out by the United States in the region to 
promote the private business sector9.  CINDE helped to define the new economic model and 
most importantly to select people in business and political elites to lead it.   For the model to 
succeed, the United States through its agency -AID- allocated more than a billion dollars in 
loans and grants that were complemented with loans and grants made by financial institutions 
controlled by the United States such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
(see figure 1)(Sojo, 1991a). The work of CINDE focused on three main areas: promotion of 
















                                                 
9 CINDE idea as promotion of private business sector then was translated in El Salvador with the creation of 
FUSADES. 
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Figure 1. Foreign Aid received by  
Costa Rica (1980-1990 – millions of dollars) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Sojo (1991) 
 
Regarding the non-traditional export sector, CINDE lobbied during the Administration of Luis 
Alberto Monge (1982-1986) to open a new ministry dedicated to help and promote exports.  
The salaries of this ministry were paid during three years with AID funds (Clark, 1997; Sojo, 
1991a).  The main idea of CINDE officials was to transform the model of Capitalismo de 
Estado into an export-led growth model (Clark, 1997).  CINDE promoted the modification of 
exchange rates with the objective of garnering exporters with economic security.  Also, CINDE 
lobbied IMF, World Bank and Costa Rican Central Bank - whose president was one of CINDE 
founders- to constraint political interferences.  CINDE promoted the approval of Law 6955 in 
1983.  This law aided exporters with lucrative fiscal incentives known as CATs.  The CATs 
(tax-credit certificates) were worth up to 20% of firms’ non-traditional export sales and 
negotiable on the national stock exchange (Clark, 1997, p. 86).  The law improved drawback 
and export contract regulations (see table 4).  Due to these affluent fiscal incentives the model 
became itself a source of wealth accumulation for a reduced number of non-traditional 
exporters.  For instance, Franco & Sojo (1992) revealed that 50% of the funds provided by 
CATs were directed to 13% of non-traditional exporters and that the top eight of these non-
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period from 1988-1989, Del Monte’s pineapple subsidiary PINDECO received 10% of all 
CATs. 
 
In terms of the denationalization of National Banking System (NBS) the main goal was to 
create new financial elites that would grant credits to most dynamic business sectors in the new 
economic model (Sojo, 1995; Vega-Martínez, 1984; Wilson, 1994).  In  these regards in 1982 
Costa Rica and AID signed an agreement for a US$ 56 million loan and a grant of US$8 
million, that included, among other things, the reform on the banking sector (Wilson, 1994).  
Likewise, in the period 1982-1988 AID granted private banks with at least US$200 million in 
loans (Flórez-Estrada Pimentel, 2010).  Under the rule of AID’s director, Daniel Chaij, a small 
circle of people worked with AID closely to pass the reforms that at the end benefited them 
too.  This group included businessmen such as Samuel Yankelewitz, Ernesto Rohrmoser, Mario 
Rojas, Carlos Araya, Rodolfo Cortés, Guillermo von Breymann and Richard Beck and 
politicians such as Eduardo Lizano, Carlos Manuel Castillo, Fernando Naranjo, Federico 
Vargas, Jorge Manuel Dengo and Armando Arauz (Honey, 1994).  
 
It is also important to highlight in here the role played also by media in this juncture. Since the 
beginning of the 1980s, the media sought to articulate an anti-statist discourse in hand with the 
ideological framework proposed by AID (Soto Acosta, 1987).  For instance, during the debates 
about the NBS reform, La Nación played a crucial political role providing major access to the 
sectors in favor of the reform and producing and distributing news stories and editorials against 
NBS (Wilson, 1994). During the reform’s debate, La Nación publicly identified and attacked 
deputies who opposed it, and also accused the government of being leftist (Wilson, 1994).  La 
Nación also published an ultimatum of Chambers of Commerce signed by a thousand of 
businesspeople, in which those elites threatened to cease to support the PLN (Wilson, 1994, p. 
163).  The support from La Nación came not just because of its ideological closeness10 with 
the reforms but because of personal interest of its owners.  One of the families benefited from 
denationalization of NBS was the Jiménez family, that together with other industrialists and 




                                                 
10 Former editor in chief of La Nación, Guido Fernández, was one of the founding members of CINDE. 
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Tax exemptions in 
machinery and 
inputs 
100% 100% 100% 
Tax exemptions 
profits 
100% (8 years) 
50% (4 years) 
100% 100% 
Tax rebates None None Up to 20% of 
FOB value 
Customs benefits One-site 
inspections 
None None 
Local market sales Up to 40%, 
subject to 
approval 
None allowed No restrictions 
National value 
added and local 
requirements 
None None 35% minumun 
value added 
Source. Clark; 1997, p. 87 
 
I have argued that since 1948, the Figueristas forces and PLN promoted and allied with a 
fraction of industrialist elites, and that this alliance provoked a deep division with the 
cafetaleros.  However, the cafetaleros did not lose their economic capital.  On the contrary, 
since mid-seventies different political reforms allowed them to use their money to operate 
financial institutions (financieras).  In these regards, NBS reforms were crucial for these two 
elites’ fractions because it allowed them to put aside their political differences to invest together 
in private banks (see table 5).  In doing so, elites from both fractions started private banks until 
reaching six big banks in 1980 (BCT, Interfin, Banex, Cooperativo de San José, Comercio, 
Fomento Agrícola) to 16 in 1986, and 24 in 1995.  As described by Sojo, the social composition 
of the boards of banks (industrialist, cafetaleros, traders, farmers) denoted that the origins of 
private banks was oriented to produce wealth quickly (Sojo, 1991a).  The average life period 
of these banks was of about ten years (Robles Rivera, 2014).  The diverse composition of 
private banks also permitted elites to form business groups with a diverse sectorial interest.  
Banco Banex, one of the largest banks was formed by elites with different origins (cafetaleros 
and industrialist) and different sectorial investments (alcoholic beverages and media -Jiménez 
Borbón; chemicals products for construction -Beck; plastic industry -Yankelewitz).  
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In sum, the 1980s were a critical decade in the consolidation of a cohesive contemporary Costa 
Rican elites.  With the support of United States and media, the elites found in the new economic 
model a common ground of economic prosperity for both fractions.  For the first time, the two 
fractions formed a community of elites that agreed in the new economic model. The model 
opened opportunities for former cafetaleros to move to non-traditional agricultural exports 
motivated by fiscal incentives.  Also, a small group of bankers, which included members of the 
cafetaleros and industrialist fractions accessed funds provided by AID to start their banks.  The 
above enlarged economic diversification of Costa Rican elites thanks to their easy access to 
financial capital and new business opportunities to invested in sectors opened by the model 
such as tourism (Robinson, 2003).  The changes and the economic incentives helped to define 
a narrow range of social and economic policies elites supported.  As I will show in the next 
section, the community of elites created during these years will increase their active role in 
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Table 5:  Private Banks and Family Owners 
Bank Family owners 
B. San José Pellas (Nic.), Gurdián, Alonso, Crespo, Durman, Sancho, Aspinall, Kader. 
B. Interfin Liberman, Luckowiecky, Reifer. 
B. Banex Beck, Jiménez Borbón, Rodríguez Echeverría, Yankelewitz, Montealegre, 
Sánchez Méndez, Rojas, González González, Kissling. 
B. Continental Cañeros y bananeros 
B. Comercio Quirós, Uribe Montealegre, González Fonseca, Tanzi, Corvetti. 
BFA Rohrmoser, Peters, Pacheco, Orlich, Uribe Sáenz, Montealegre. 
B. Mercantil Aizenmann. 
B. Federado Cooperatives. 
B. Lyon Vallarino. 
BCT Baruch. 
B. Metropolitano Weisleder, Meltzer, fomal, Mainemer, Blau, Lang. 
B. Fincomer Sanyo Oil (Japan). 
B. CONFISA Zurcher, Urbina, Jiménez Echeverría. 
B. FINADESA Grupo Pujol. 
B. Cooperativo Cooperatives. 
Citibank USA 
B. Solidarista Asociaciones Solidaristas. 
B. Exterior Tennenbaum, Daremblum. 
Bancrecen Mexico 
Source: adapted from Sojo (1995) 
 
 
3.4 Homogeneity of Interest: Active Political Participation to Promote a 
Business Friendly-Agenda 
 
While during the 1980s elites’ fractions settled down disputes and formed a community, during 
the following decades wealth concentration and diversification of elites increased, but 
especially their cohesion.  The cohesion was shaped by a favorable political context and an 
active political participation of elites that helped them to coordinate and spread political 
influence taking advantage of their access, mainly, of PLN (Ancochea, 2005; Sojo, 1995).  
Also, with the emergence of a reduced number of diversified business groups with similar 
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interest, elites’ incentives to act together to defend their benefits increased.  As well as they 
gathered together to defend their positions in favor of CAFTA, they also acted in 2014 to fight 
the leftist candidate. 
 
Regarding the political context, during the 1990s a two-party system led by PLN and PUSC 
found its consolidation characterized by electoral victories that granted these two political 
parties possibilities to lead executive and legislative branches (Alfaro-Redondo, 2002). In a 
period of circa twenty years, the political dominance of these two parties reduced to a minimum 
the political participation of other parties.  Table 6 shows that at least during four electoral 
processes, Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) and Partido Unidad Social Cristiana (PUSC) 
exchanged political dominance.  This “bipartidista” political structure eased partisan 
consensus and agreements with elites. For instance, in 1995 a pact known as “pacto Figueres-
Calderón” and signed by former president Calderón Fournier (PUSC-1990-1994) and president 
Figueres Olsen (PLN-1994-1998) sought to legitimize the reforms proposed and supported 
since the 1980s by Costa Rican elites.  In this pact, elites, PLN and PUSC agreed on a national 
agenda to augment economic liberalization (Sojo, 1995).  In doing so, two of three structural 
adjustment programs with International Monetary Fund and World Bank, as wells as laws that 
granted fiscal incentives to local, regional and transnational elites were approved (Law of Free 
Trade Zones) and a complete liberalization of NBS (Vega, 1996).  
 
The stability of the political system was also protected by the media.  On the one hand, most 
important media companies were controlled by conservative families closely related to elites 
(Rockwell & Janus, 2003).  These political similarities favored that during electoral campaigns 
PLN and PUSC received significant donations in kind from these media outlets (Casas-Zamora, 
2005). On the other hand, media market was defined by a high concentration.  The Picado 
Cozza family (Teletica) that controlled 18% of the country’s advertising; Ángel González 
(Repretel) controlled about 30% and Jiménez family (La Nación) with 34% of the market 
(Rockwell & Janus, 2003, p. 121).  These two characteristics combined with an international 
context full of neoliberal and conservative ideas turned Costa Rican media in recalcitrant 
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Table 6: Party Vote Share in Elections for Presidency 
and Legislative, 1986-1998 (percent) 
Electoral year 1986 1990 1994 1998 
PLN-Presidency 52.3 47.2 49.6 44.6 
PLN-Legislative 47.8 41.9 44.6 34.8 
PUSC-Presidency 42.7 51.5 47.6 47 
PUSC-Legislative 41.5 46.2 40.4 41.2 
Others-Presidency 2 1.3 2.7 8.4 
Others-Legislative 10.7 11.9 15 24 
Source: own elaboration based on Alfaro-Redondo (2002) 
 
The two-party system structures also gave elites a more dynamic role setting public agenda.  
Revolving doors and electoral campaign finance allowed elites to intervene directly in the 
policy making process.  Regarding revolving doors, governments of PUSC and PLN 
incorporated into its cabinets an important number of empresarios politicos and technocrats 
that had pushed since the 1980s for an increased economic liberalization. Empresarios-
políticos and technocrats were named mainly in the ministries of finance, trade, economy, 
agriculture and Central Bank (Blanco Lizano, 2010) (see table 7).  Those public offices are 
precisely the ones where the rules of the economy and the policies that affect business are 
outlined (Crabtree & Durand, 2017).   Also, the weak control over electoral funding and 
political party’s dependence on private capital facilitated that elites funded indistinctly PUSC 
and PLN to secure its access to governmental institutions (Casas-Zamora, 2005).  
 
With the collapse of two-party system at the beginning of 2000s11, PLN took the lead of the 
business-friendly agenda. During two consecutive governments (2006-2010 and 2010-2014), 
PLN incorporated into its cabinet an important number of well-known people in business and 
technocrats who battled, among other things, to achieve the approval of free trade agreements 
with United States, European Union, and China.  For instance, the incorporation of these elites 
into cabinet turned public policy in favor of the approval of CAFTA.  The approval of CAFTA 
                                                 
11 At the beginning of the 2000s, a series of corruption scandals hit Costa Rican political arena. A group of public 
officials was accused of corruption and scam (Alfaro Redondo, 2006). Among the officials prosecuted three were 
former presidents, two governed under PUSC and one under PLN.  One of the consequences of these scandals 
was the collapse of the two-party system (bipartidismo) in presidential elections 2006.   
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constituted a cornerstone of the neoliberal reforms implemented in Costa Rica since mid-
1980’s (Molina-Alfaro, 2017).  In these regards, during the negotiations of CAFTA elites were 
incorporated into the discussion of several chapters.  For instance, Marco Vinicio Rúiz, who 
was later named by president Arias as minister of Commerce, was the leader of business 
chambers representatives, Consejo Empresarial, who participated in the “next-door rooms” 
during CAFTA negotiations.  This major incorporation of elites during PLN’s governments 
increased elite’s political affiliation in PLN.  For example, during those years, elites agreed on 
mostly finance the electoral campaigns of PLN.   Data from the Costa Rican electoral court 
reveled that elites allocated 48% (US$ 6 million) more money to PLN than to the other four 
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Table 7: Revolving Doors. 
Elites Appointed under Oscar Arias and Laura Chinchilla Administrations 









Agroindustry Minister of 
Production 
President of National 
Bank of Costa Rica 
Anabelle González CINDE - Minister of 
Commerce 
Francisco de Paula Different companies’ 
boards 
President of Central 
Bank 














President of Japdeva Minister of Public 
infrastructure 
Luis Liberman Finance  Vice-President 
Marco Vinicio Ruíz Industry.  Former 




Ambassador of Costa 
Rica in China 
Marcos Vargas Diaz Industry Minister of 
Institutional 
Coordination 
Minister Delegate at 
the Presidency 
María de los Ángeles 
Antillón Guerrero  
Industry. Former 




Minister of Economy 
Rodrigo Arias S. Agroindustry Minister Delegate at 
the Presidency 
 
Téofilo de Torre Industry - Minister of Energy, 
environment and 
telecommunications 
Tomás Dueñas Industry Ambassador of 
Costa Rica in 
United States 
Ambassador of Costa 
Rica in Brussels 
Source: author’ own elaboration. 
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In addition to the above political context, elites experienced changes regarding a major 
concentration of financial assets in foreign banks and the sale of flagship companies 
traditionally owned by them.  Concentration of capital in foreign hands and more capital 
available fostered the possibilities of a reduced number of elites to coordinate interest and to 
increase their political influence due to their largest sums of capital.  During the first decade of 
the XXI century, the private banking system reached a process that started in the mid 1990s: 
larger concentration of private financial assets in a minor number of elites. Following the 
bankruptcy of multiple banks (Germano, Elca, Solidario, Cooperativo, Weeden) private 
financial institutions went from 25 banks in 1995 to 12 banks in 2014 (Robles Rivera, 2014).  
This major concentration of financial assets can be explained by an expansion of regional banks 
(Banco Cuscatlán, Banitsmo, Aval, Davivienda, General), the arrival and retreat of 
transnational banks (Citi Bank; HSBC; GE Money, Scotiabank) and the unwillingness of elites 
to compete with larger financial players (Bull et al., 2014; Kasahara, 2012; Robles Rivera, 
2014).  As a result, three foreign banks BAC/AVAL(Colombia); Scotiabank (Canada) and 
Davivienda (Colombia) own 64.34% of private financial assets (Robles Rivera, 2014).  It is 
argued that the survival of the two private Costa Rican banks is characterized by their political 
ties with PUSC and PLN (Robles Rivera, 2014).  In terms of wealth concentration, the sale of 
banks garnered a reduced number of elites an important amount of capital.  For example, 
Scotiabank paid circa US$300 million for Banco Interfin in 2006, whose main two stakeholders 
were former vice president Luis Liberman (2010-2014) and Luis Lukowiecki (Robles-Rivera, 
2014).  
 
At the same time of these private bank changes, an important number of flagships companies 
traditionally owned by elites were sold to regional or transnational companies.  For instance, 
14 out of 25 largest Costa Rican companies enlisted by Sojo in 1995 were sold to regional and 
transnational companies by 2010.  These sales gave rise to a reduced number of portfolio 
business groups.  These business groups have learned to diversify as a strategy to reinvest in 
sectors where they can use political, friendship and familial nexus to make profits in the short 
term (Bull, 2014; Bull et al., 2014). Also, elites have started different types of alliances with 
regional and transnational capital (joint-ventures; franchises; strategic alliances) to increase its 
capital, acquired technology; be tradable internationally or to consolidate its market position 
(Bull et al., 2014).  These sales and alliances have increased the wealth of fewer elites (Robles-
Rivera, 2016).  For instance, according to Forbes the wealthiest Costa Ricans are Francis 
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Durman Esquivel and Ramón Mendiola12 (FORBES, 2017).  Francis Durman managed the sale 
of his family company Durman Esquivel to a Belgium Company Aliaxis.  With the new 
economic resources, Francis and his brother George began a portfolio business group, Grupo 
Montecristo, with investments in real estate, tourism, agro-export, pharmacies, and 
entertainment. Ramón Mendiola is the CEO of Florida Ice and Farm company (FIFCO).  
FIFCO sold 25% of its shares to Heineken in 2002 and since then has expanded its investments 
to the United States, tourism, real estate, agro, energy, and retail.   
 
The transformation of elites in the last two decades to diversified business groups facilitated 
them significant economic and political autonomy concerning traditional business associations.  
For instance, despite the lack of public participation of Durman Esquivel brothers in business 
associations, they have been particularly relevant donors of PLN and active members of 
business initiatives such as Alianza por el Sí and Alianza Costa Rica.  Besides, a new business 
model orientation augmented elites’ need to control governments because the sectors where 
they had invested (energy, real estate, commerce, and public infrastructure) depended on strict 
















                                                 
12 In Central America, Mendiola occupy the third and Durman the twelfth positions among wealthiest Central 
Americans (FORBES, 2017). 




When Costa Rican elites gathered together in December 2014 to contest the popularity of the 
Left-wing candidate, as I show in chapter five, they took advantage of their capacity to act as 
a cohesive group.  They share origins, interests and ideology.  This chapter shows that Costa 
Rican elites have depended on their control and access to government as a mechanism of rent-
seeking and social status.  Also, in the last two decades, they have relied on PLN to deliver 
their friendly-business agenda.  Under this context, the possible election of a Left-wing party 
in 2014 posed a double threat to elites.  First, the loss of access to the government and second, 
the displacement of PLN politicians out of the regulatory institutions.  That was their major 
threat in the last 30 years.    
 
Since the 1980s and with the support of the United States and media, elites reduced internal 
conflicts and promoted neoliberal reforms successfully.  Despite the sectorial differences, elites 
have agreed in a broader agenda.  Since the majority of elites have evolved together thanks to 
the reforms implemented and company’s modernization, it has been easy for them to organize 
and sustain groups to engage in political actions when their interests have been threatened, the 
CAFTA referendum or 2014 presidential election are two examples of it.   
 
Different from the case of El Salvador (Chapter 4), Costa Rican elites have not been challenged 
by ethnic differences.  The circulation of elites among a reduced number of families has 
resulted in the constraint of inter-elites’ conflicts.  Since mid 1980s elites have not faced 
competition, they have coordinated with political parties to deliver a business-friendly political 
and economic agenda.  During these years Costa Rican elites have played a double role, first 
as campaign donors of traditional political parties and second, as leading political figures of 
those parties too.  This direct political participation in the last thirty years increased among 
them enough trust to put money in different political campaigns and actions, such as, the 
operation of Alianza Costa Rica.   
 
Finally, the closeness among business groups have provided elites with easy access to lobby 
political leaders and also media owners.  The above proves the thesis of Mills (2000) that 
concentration of property and capital in big business groups led to a larger cohesion of elites.  
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For example, two prominent owners of largest business groups and members of Alianza Costa 
Rica were also former directors of the media holding, Grupo Nación. Those who lobby to 
capture the media in favor of elites are friends, family or business partners.  In the light of all 
of this, cohesion has secured elites’ capacity to engage in political actions in a coordinated way, 

































































   55 
 





“FMLN spent the double we spent during elections” recalled a top ARENA politician when I 
asked about how much money they paid during presidential elections 2014 (Politician six, 
2017).  That means the FMLN spent an estimate of between 68 million dollars13, although it is 
very difficult to know categorically how much money FMLN disbursed during the 2014 
electoral campaign.  However, the ARENA’s top politician comments shed light on a particular 
change among Salvadorian elites: the capacity of other actors to engage in political actions and 
mobilize large amounts of money to pay political campaigns. 
 
Historically Salvadorian elites have been able to maintain an undisputed hegemony on almost 
every aspect of the economy, politics and the media (Baloyra, 1984; Higley & Gunther, 1992; 
Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wolf, 2009).  This hegemony has been particularly relevant since the 
1980s, when a modernized fraction of elites took control of Salvadorian government, think 
tanks, business associations, and later on, banks (Segovia, 2002).  However, traditional elites’ 
influence started to fall apart in 2009, the year in which a center-left coalition, led by Mauricio 
Funes, won the presidential elections.  The coalition included the winner party, FMLN, and a 
selected group of businesspeople, academicians and former public employees (Secretaría 
Técnica de la Presidencia, 2013).  This was ARENA’s first presidential defeat in twenty years 
and provoked a rupture inside the party and among elites. Outgoing president Elías Antonio 
Saca, a populist president of Palestinian descent that focused more on national industries and 
taxed elites, was expelled from ARENA.  Saca founded a new political party, GANA, a center-
right party, that became a strategic political and a reliable partner of FMLN governments.  
                                                 
13 This top politician told me that ARENA spent around 34 to 38 million dollars in this campaign. 
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The above-mentioned context shows a fragmentation among what has been considered a 
monolithically elite (Koivumaeki, 2010; A. Schneider, 2012).  The context also suggests the 
emergence of new organized actors capable enough to dispute traditional elites’ influence over 
politics and society in general. 
 
In this chapter, I study and discuss the fragmentation among Salvadorian elites.  The 
fragmentation of elites caused that the elites’ engagement in political actions, such as media 
capture, turned into an arena of dispute.  In doing so, I address the issues of common 
background, shared ideology and homogeneity of interest of two different fractions of elites in 
El Salvador.  With this as the focus, I study a group of what I have called traditional elites. 
These elites have prevailed since XIX century thanks to their control of main economic sectors, 
social closure, anticommunist ideology and neoliberal policies.  Also, I study a group of 
counter-elites that gather together politicians and businesspeople that share ethnic origins, a 
common reject to traditional elites and the will of promoting new political and economic actors.  
Once counter-elites won elections in 2009, they were able to form a common front and increase 
their political and economic influence based on privileged access to public funds and funding 
from Venezuela through ALBA Petróleos.  It is argued that the fragmentation of elites since 
2009 augmented the competition among traditional and counter-elites to capture the media.  
Since then both fractions, as I show in chapter six, need to spend more time and resources, 
which at the end reduces the chances of elites to influence on society. 
 
4.2 Traditional Elites in El Salvador 
 
Historically Salvadorian elites have been extensively studied due to their impressive control 
over economic resources, land, army, media and people (Colindres, 1977; Dada-Hirezi, 1983; 
Johnson, 1993).  This powerful control over different resources was a product of an extremely 
cohesive elite.  In this section I explain how the cohesion of these elites has been defined based 
on the economic and ethnic origins of these families, the implications of war in defining a 
common threat to traditional elites and the successful policies they followed until 2009 to 
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4.2.1 Common Background: Coffee and Family Lineage 
 
Literature has highlighted the role of coffee as a root source of elites’ power in El Salvador 
(Paige, 1998).  Coffee allowed elites to articulate state institutions (government, banks, army), 
control over land and labor, accumulate and invest capital and weaved a closed network of 
family relations (Brignoli, 1983; Brokcett, 1988; Casaús-Arzú, 1992; Colindres, 1977; 
Dunkerley, 1988; Higley & Gunther, 1992; Paige, 1998; Torres-Rivas, 2011).  The country’s 
small size, the relative ease of access to ports, elites’ vertical control over all phases of coffee 
production (coffee planting; coffee harvest, distribution) and abundant low-cost labor garnered 
to a small group of Salvadorian families greater income profits since Liberal Reforms of 1879 
(Johnson, 1993; Paige, 1993).  The coffee sector founded in El Salvador the “truest oligarchy” 
in Latin America based on their firm grip over production, processing, and export of coffee 
(Johnson, 1993). 
 
The expansion of coffee enriched a small group of these families that accounted for a group of 
hundred, rather than mythical “fourteen families” (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987).  This small group 
shared a particular characteristic: their European origins (Casaús-Arzú, 1992).  Some of them 
came from colonial times, and others migrated from Spain (Belismelis, Sagrera, Llach, Daglio); 
Germany (Bukard, Freund, Mathies, Schwartz) and Italy (Cristiani, Daglio) between the end 
of nineteen century and the beginning of XX century (Colindres, 1977).  These common ethnic 
origins have shaped their politics, economic development, and social prestige from then on. 
They intermarried to bond their economic business, to reduce mixing with other social groups 
(indigenous, farmers, Palestinians descents – the pejoratively “turcos”) and to build power 
structures to maintain the status quo (Casaús-Arzú, 1992).  Also, these traditional elites 
assumed control over the State based on their privileged background.  Between 1898 to 1931 
they took direct control over government to protect their rule over land and labor (Beard, 2001; 
Paige, 1998).  Elites also took advantage of their strong relations and influence over the army 
to overcome the crisis of 1930’s (Casaús-Arzú, 1992).  Contrary to expectations based on 
Salvadorian dependency of the United States and European markets, the great economic 
depression of 1929 solidified elites’ power and control over the state, land, and people.  
Salvadorian elites were keen to transfer the economic consequences to the peasants and used 
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the army and favored dictatorial regimes whenever it was necessary to repress upheavals14 
(Casaús-Arzú, 1992, p. 91).   
 
Regarding economic development, this small number of families were all connected through 
family ties and ethnic origins, concentrating ownership over land and coffee production in very 
few families as it is shown in Table 8.  According to Johnson (1993), in 1950 thirteen families 
concentrated about 58% of all coffee exported.  Similarly, by 1963, 4% of the countries 
agricultural producers owned 37.7% of all cultivated land (p.50-52).   The concentration over 
coffee production was also parallel with wealth concentration among these reduced number of 
families (Colindres, 1977; Paige, 1993).  Regarding the reproduction of capital, there was 
limited access to a core group of families, who by that time were also the owners of banks in 
El Salvador.  Banks were privately owned by ten families: Guirola (Banco Salvadoreño); 
Dueñas, Regalado, Álvarez (Banco de Comercio), Escalante and Sol (Banco Agrícola 
Comercial); Borja, Álvarez and Alfaro (Banco Capitalizador), Hill and Aviles (Banco 
Capitalizador) (Colindres, 1977).  
 
The surplus originated in the success of their coffee exports and the direct access to foreign 
trade provided these elites with sufficient capital to invest in advanced technology, chemicals, 
fertilizers and extra capital to diversified their agro-investments (Colindres, 1977; Johnson, 
1993; Mahoney, 2001).  Cotton fiber and textiles were two of these new investments in times 
of a growing demand in world markets after Second World War (Colindres, 1977; Johnson, 
1993).  Nevertheless, the same concentration problem seen in the coffee sector was evident in 
cotton production: fifteen families represented 33% of all cotton exports in 1972 (Johnson, 
1993, p. 57).  The sugar sector and cattle production followed the same logic, with the same 
core families concentrating land, production, investments, and exports (see table 8) (Colindres, 
1977; Dada-Hirezi, 1983; Johnson, 1993).
                                                 
14 In 1932 an indigenous and campesino rebellion was suppressed by bloody army repression led by General 
Hernández Martínez. Hernández Martínez governed for 13 years (1931 to 1944) favoring coffee elites.  The 
alliance among Hernández Martínez and coffee elites end when the General raised import tax in 1943 (Lauria-
Santiago & Gould, 2009). 
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Table 8:  Elite families and economic investments (1969-1977) 
 
Source: Baloyra, 1984; Colindres, 1977 
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The investment opportunities opened in the context of Central American Common Market 
(CACM) and elites’ disposal of resources (land, money, technology) at the beginning of 1960’s 
favored also that traditional elites sold many of their fincas.  Traditional elites invested four 
times more in the industry than any other group and attracted 80% of capital invested in the 
country (Booth, 1988).  Johnson (1993) sheds light on the issue, stating that the new 
opportunities of CACM solidified the chances of traditional elites’ fractions to continue 
controlling other economic sectors such as the chemicals, textiles, energy, and transport 
sectors.  Besides the small size of the Salvadorian market, traditional elites’ control over banks 
and a more porous social relation among top businesspeople suggest that most of the industrial 
investments came from these traditional families.  It is also true that fiscal incentives of this 
period certainly opened up spaces for other families that would be later incorporated with 
traditional elites.  The majority of these new families shared a common European origin, 
families such as Kriete (transport), Poma (car dealership, hotels), and Sagrera (hardware, 
construction).  But it was also the first time in which the Salvadorian economy was opened to 
big business of Palestinian descents.  For instance: Simán (retail, construction, hotels), Zablah 
(car dealership and construction), or Hasbún (manufacturing, retail) (Colindres, 1977, p. 67; 
Johnson, 1993, p. 60). 
 
It was also during this time that elites started to secure the grip over the media.  Thanks to 
president José María Lemus a new law to promote radio and TV was approved in 1958 (Pérez 
& Carballo, 2013).  The law garnered the new media owners with fiscal incentives and easy 
access to TV and Radio frequencies.  One of the beneficiaries was Boris Eserski.  Eserski 
launched the first television network in El Salvador in 1959 (Rockwell & Janus, 2003).  Eserski 
came from a very wealthy and landowning family (Rockwell & Janus, 2003).  Since then, 
Eserski became a media mogul with investments in Radio and advertising companies and due 
to his loyalties to elites, he was able to kept competitors out of the market at least until the 
1990s (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 2014).  Additionally, other families closed related to elites kept 
control over the press.  For instance, Altamirano family an old coffee and cotton producers who 
owned El Diario de Hoy.  The Dutriz family, also an old coffee family who has been a 
distinguished conservative voice in the country who controls La Prensa Gráfica.  And the Borja 
Nathans family, that owned largest sugar estates and controls El Mundo (Bull & Aguilar-Støen, 
2014; Pérez & Carballo, 2013; Rockwell & Janus, 2003). 
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4.2.2 Share Ideology: Civil War, Right Wing Politics and Anticommunist Ideas 
 
The civil war (1980-1992) solidified the sense of community among elites and the 
anticommunism ideology that shaped traditional elites from then on.  The threat of a leftist 
guerrilla and the loss of power provoked by the economic reforms (sugar, coffee and banks 
nationalization) implemented by La Junta Cívico Militar in 1979 forced traditional elites to 
redefine their curse of actions with the foundation of a new political platform (ARENA) and a 
think tank to legitimize their ideas/ideology (FUSADES) (Segovia, 2002).  
 
The political arena that granted traditional elites with benefits for many years was contested at 
the beginning of the 1980s by two forces: revolutionary force (FMLN) and reformist force in 
nature (PDC, the United States and parts of the army) (Johnson, 1993).  As some of the 
traditional elites realized, the terrorist strategies they have implemented until then, such as mass 
killings, only earned them opposition inside El Salvador and internationally, even in the United 
States (Baloyra, 1984). As a countermeasure, elites sought other channels, such as establishing 
a political party as a start.   
 
ARENA was founded by extreme-right wing army officers, traditional elites, and professionals 
who found in the political context of the early 1980s the perfect opportunity to take back control 
over the state (Zamora, 1998).  Among these actors, there was the idea of confronting the 
reforms due to their “communist spirit” and because they stood to lose the most from the 
reforms (Johnson, 1993).  It was not necessarily a spontaneous political movement, on the 
contrary, it was the end of a process that primarily started in the seventies after the first 
reformist attempts started (Koivumaeki, 2010; Russell, 1984).  The founders shared a group of 
core values (individualism, free enterprise, nationalism, and anticommunism) that allowed 
them to build a strong party identity (Artiga, 2014; Johnson, 1993, p. 175; Koivumaeki, 2010).   
 
ARENA successfully participated in the 1982 elections to form an Asamblea Constituyente.  
For this occasion, Roberto D’Aubuisson15, a retired army official and founder of ARENA was 
chosen as president.  Only four months after its foundation and with 29.5% of the votes, 
ARENA installed itself as the second political force of El Salvador.  Despite this electoral 
                                                 
15 D’Aubuisson lead paramilitary forces and death squads during the eighties.  He was held responsible for the 
assassination of Archbishop Arnulfo Romero in 1980. See Dada, 2010 and Naciones Unidas, 1993. 
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success, D’Aubuisson was seen with caution and concern inside El Salvador, but especially in 
the United States regarding his pasado escuadronero (paramilitary past) (Lungo Rodríguez, 
2008).  This forced ARENA to rethink their political strategy.  During presidential elections in 
1984, D’Aubuisson decided to step back and let Alfredo Cristiani led COENA, ARENA’s 
central committee.  Alfredo Cristiani Burkard came from a traditional elite family that in the 
seventies occupied the 24th place among the 30 largest coffee producers in El Salvador, and the 
12th position among the largest 30 exporters16 (ICEFI, 2015).  In 1983, Cristiani led the 
creation of a think tank finance by United States, called FUSADES,17 to promote a new 
economic model and build social support (Segovia, 2002, p. 27).  ARENA lost the 1984 
presidential elections, but with Cristiani’s leadership, ARENA started to change its radical 
anticommunist discourse, not so its politics, to a more moderate one, with a modern business 
accent.  For the 1988 elections, ARENA took control of Parliament with 48.1% of the votes, 
claiming 31 seats out of 60 and then, with George Bush’s support, Cristiani (and not 
D’Aubuisson) ran as a presidential candidate in 1989.  Arena won those elections with 53.82% 
of the votes (see table 9). 
 
Table 9:  Electoral results of ARENA during the eighties 
Year Type of election Votes 
(percentage) 
1982 Asamblea Constituyente  402.304 
(29.53%) 
1984 Presidential 376.917  
(28.76%) 
1985 Parliament 286.665  
(29,7%) 
1988 Parliament 447.696  
(48.1%) 
1989 Presidential 505.370  
(53.82%) 
Fuente: (Lungo Rodríguez, 2008, p. 82) 
                                                 
16 He married Margarita Llach, daughter of a wealthy catalán family which at the time was the one of the largest 
coffee producer and coffee exporter in El Salvador. (ICEFI, 2015). 
17 From 1984 to 1992 FUSADES received  more than US$100 million from the United States (Baloyra, 1984; 
Segovia, 2002) 
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ARENA’s victory led by Cristiani marked, as described by Segovia (2002), the recapture of 
Salvadorian State by traditional elites.  Once in power, traditional elites found in FUSADES18 
a strategic partner for developing economic policies to strengthen industrial and commercial 
sectors, especially those related to non-traditional exports, such as maquila, foods, plants and 
light industry, fruits, flowers, etc. (Johnson, 1993; Segovia, 2002).  During these years, 
FUSADES increased its institutional and technical capabilities to influence and support elites, 
particularly those with business in industry and manufacture.  FUSADES was also able to reach 
out members of the elite through different training and support programs for technicians, 
business people and leaders of business associations such as ANEP or ASI (Johnson, 1993; 
Koivumaeki, 2010).  Also, leaders of these organizations took part of FUSADES executive 
committees facilitating knowledge, information and technic exchange.  Regarding policy-
making, FUSADES also provided ARENA with an economic and social program that helped 
the party to reduce political confrontation, moderate their discourse and increased their political 
viability (Booth, 1988; Johnson, 1993; Koivumaeki, 2010).  In 1985 FUSADES designed a 
proposal to solve Salvadorian economic crisis in the short and medium term.  The document 
elaborated by the United States contained the major concerns about the need to transition from 
an agro-export based model to a more diverse economy and the promotion of non-traditional 
exports.  During the 1980s, FUSADES’ project made traditional elites see the practical side of 
policymaking, which helped them to attract votes (Koivumaeki, 2010). Once elected president, 
Cristiani implemented a set of measures identical to FUSADES’ plan promoted years before 
(Johnson, 1993; Segovia, 2002).  It is worth noting that the main difference between ARENA 
and FUSADES is that ARENA was founded by landowners, coffee producers, and former army 
officers opposed to any reform, while FUSADES was founded and led primarily by 
industrialist and manufacturers who considered the reforms as lesser threat than revolution 
(Johnson, 1993).  
 
In sum, Salvadorian elites found in the creation of a political party and think tanks their sources 
of community.  Through those associations, they started a legitimate and institutionalized 
mechanism to defend their interest and fight the guerrilla movement.  Those institutions 
became a meeting point where the divergent interests were solved.  With the support of media, 
                                                 
18 Seventeen members of FUSADES were named in Cristiani’s government to lead his economic cabinet (ICEFI, 
2015).  
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they were also a vehicle of promotion of elites’ policies.  This sense of community was crucial, 
as I show next, for the negotiation of peace and the implementation of the neoliberal agenda.   
 
4.2.3 Homogeneity of Interest: Peace and the Neoliberal Victories 
 
For a young generation of traditional elites leading the government, think tanks and business 
associations (FUSADES; ANEP; ASI), the civil war was a missed opportunity to implement 
the reforms they have been working on since approximately 1983 (Rettberg, 2007, p. 470).  
Within elites’ neoliberal and technocratic way of thinking, peace was a prerequisite to 
transforming El Salvador into a safe place for investments, obtaining the final surrender of 
FMLN and having a door open to access the global economy (Rettberg, 2007; Segovia, 2002, 
2005).  In these regards, elites actively participated in the negotiations, design, and subscription 
of the Peace Accords in order to secure their policy agenda (Rettberg, 2007).  Major interests 
behind the peace agreement, such as the privatization of public banks, brought elites together. 
For example, traditional elites’ political platform (ARENA), think tank (FUSADES), and 
business association (ANEP) were fundamental actors providing control over the decision-
making process, as well as, business, ideological and technical support during the negotiations 
(Rettberg, 2007; Wade, 2016).  While peace accords allowed some political concessions 
(FMLN political participation; the dismantling of structures of repression in the army and the 
police and changes in the judiciary system), it also ensured the economic model these elites 
envisioned: neoliberalism (Rettberg, 2007; Wade, 2016). 
 
During the 1990s elites were able to articulate a state building project suitable to their interest 
(A. Schneider, 2012).  The new economic model emphasized on changing the bases of the 
economy from land possession to maquila industry and control over financial institutions and 
services (Segovia, 2002).  The implementation of the reforms that lead to this new model 
resulted in major shifts in the country’s economic structure.   Traditional exports that during 
the seventies and eighties represented around 60 to 63% of total exports declined to 12% at the 
end of 1999 (Robinson, 2003).  Maquila increased its GDP participation from a 1.7% in 1990 
to 11.2% in 1999 (Segovia, 2004).  Similarly, the economic model emphasized the privatization 
of public assets related to the old model, such as “sugar institute” -INAZUCAR- and coffee 
institute -ICAFE- (see table 10).  Also, elites demanded privatization of public institutions such 
as pensions or telecommunications, and once these institutions went to the market to be sold, 
they were bought by companies associated with these elites.  One example: after pensions’ 
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privatizations, 4 out of 5 new companies were bought by these elites (Confía; Previsión, 
Porvenir, Máxima) (Paniagua-Serrano, 2002).  
 
Also, under the 1991 Law of Banks, Cristiani sold the national banks to closely allied elites 
(Albiac, 1998).  Nine banks included Banco Cuscatlán whose control came under Cristiani 
himself were privatized between 1991 to 1994.  The new law imposed a limit of 5% of 
ownership per shareholder, which was circumvented by Salvadorian elites through the use of 
prestanombres, false names (Segovia, 2002).  This restriction over shareholders caused limited 
attention among foreign banks to participate in the process, which at the end garnered 
Salvadorian elites with an incredible financial advantage (Kasahara, 2012). As Alfredo Mena 
Lagos, a former minister under Calderón Sol, described: it was the creation of private 
monopolies from state monopolies (quoted in Wade, 2016).  The privatization of public banks 
was a strategic step to strengthen a dominant cohesive fraction of financial elites (A. Schneider, 
2012). Privatization allowed these elites to use their assets and resources to multiply their 
investments in other economic sectors and also to regionalize their investments in Central 
America (Segovia, 2002).   
 
While historically banks were controlled by coffee elites’ families, their privatization during 
Cristiani’s government open the door for other elites.  As mentioned before, these elites came 
from a mixture of agro, industry and services sectors. Among these new bank family owners 
were Dutriz, Baldochi Dueñas, Cristiani, Poma, Kriete, Belismelis, Sol, Araujo and Palestinian 
descent families such as Simán, Bahaia, Zablah and Salumé (Paniagua-Serrano, 2002). Bank 
privatization allowed families of Palestinian descent, for the first time, to control financial 
assets and to participate in this selected circle of power: the bankers.  
 
Also, during this time elites were able to secure, design and implement a fiscal and monetary 
structure from which they benefited (ICEFI, 2015; A. Schneider, 2012; Segovia, 2004).  
Regarding fiscal policy, between 1987 to 2001, 12 fiscal policies were approved that to some 
extent or another gave elites fiscal benefits (elimination or reduction of income taxes, tariff 
reduction, elimination of property tax, etc.)(ICEFI, 2015, p. 168).  During these years, fiscal 
policies tended to preserve and increase a regressive tax structure that was strengthened by 
elite’s’ capacity to block any attempt to tax their economic activities (A. Schneider, 2012). 
Also, regarding monetary policies, since Calderón Sol, these elites were able to promote first a 
convertibility plan that pegged the Salvadorian colón to U.S. dollar at a fixed rate of 8.75 to 1.  
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Later, in 2001, they passed a Law of Monetary Integration that introduced a de facto 
dollarization in El Salvador (see table 10).  These monetary policies were issued to benefit 
bankers and importers reducing exchange risk and benefiting bankers with loans abroad (Arias-
Peñate & Sol-Pérez, s.f.; Segovia, 2002). 
 
Media support of all these policies proposed by elites was crucial to sustain elites’ project.  As 
has been discussed in the literature  (Becerra et al., 2009; Hughes & Prado, 2011; Rockwell, 
n.d.; Segovia, 2004; Wolf, 2009; Zamora, 1998), elites controlled the media agenda and public 
debates without any opposition. The property structure of media, its high concentration, family 
ties and private publicity created a situation in which media marginalize any dissident voices 
and alternative ideas about social and economic policies (Wolf, 2009).  Media control also 
allowed traditional elites to build and reproduce a negative frame about the FMLN.  In the eyes 
of the traditional elites, and hence the media, the economic improvements gained in the last 
decade would be lost in case of an electoral victory on the Left.  This threat, as pointed out by 
Schneider (2002), increased elites’ cohesion during these years. 
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Table 10: Reforms implemented by ARENA’s governments (1989-2009) 
 
Source: Adapted from Wade (2016) and Schneider (2012) 
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4.3 Counter-elites: Disputing Elites’ Rule  
 
A particular characteristic of counter-elites is that they share ethnic origins and social class 
backgrounds.  They also share a common rejection towards traditional elites’ politics and 
power.  Historically, as I showed above the control over economy and government was in the 
hands of traditional elites.  While other groups were socially, and politically excluded due to 
their ethnic origins or class.  Both of these aspects, traditional elite’s rejection and exclusion 
shaped a fragile but reliable alliance of actors with different interest and political perspectives, 
named in here as counter-elites, in order to electorally defeat traditional elites.  Once this group 
defeated electorally traditional elites in 2009, they were able to control regulatory institutions, 
mobilize money, and jointly organize different political actions.  Thanks to the emergence of 
these counter-elites, media capture started to be a disputed political action in which counter-
elites bought, censored and legibly influenced media content on their favor.  
 
4.3.1 Common Background: Ethnic Origins 
 
Among counter-elites, there is an important group of migrant descents, mainly of Palestinians 
and Syrians origins19.  They formed in El Salvador a community dedicated to commerce and 
small businesses.  These economic activities were seen with disdain by traditional elites.  For 
traditional elites, these activities were considered socially degrading and dishonorable that, at 
the end, opened up a gap in the market which these newcomers could take advantage of.  Also, 
traditional elites’ control over banking system blocked them the entrance to other sectors and 
swayed them to work in economic activities that did not require social ties with traditional 
elites, such as commerce (Bukele Kattan, 2012).  For instance, according to Bukele Kattan 
(2012), in 1944 the majority of these families were dedicated to commercial activities (30%), 
tiendas –stores-(38%), industry (19%), professional activities (6%), other activities (4%) and 
itinerant sales –vendedor viajero (3%).  As their “tiendas” grew from small to medium stores 
and distribution companies, these families were able to expand their business by selling their 
products in other parts of the country and running trading companies and small factories.  A 
                                                 
19 The first Palestinians in El Salvador arrived in the port of Cutuco19 in 1890’s (Foroohar, 2011; Marín Guzman, 
1997) 
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small fraction of these families also invested successfully in textile, clothing and the 
pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Due to traditional elites’ scorn and stereotypes about these families -pejoratively called 
“turcos”-, they were excluded from traditional elites’ circles: social clubs, politics, which at the 
end increased their social closure too.  This led Palestians to inter-marry with other Palestinian 
families (Paniagua-Serrano, 2002, p. 677).  For them, family ties played a crucial role in their 
social and economic development. For example, the “tiendas model” was started by the 
patriarch, and then passed down onto their male children, who thus played a crucial role in 
business strategies.  The Simán Family is a case in point.  J.J. Simán opened his first store in 
1921, until it became the biggest department store in Central America, Almacenes Simán, in 
the seventies.  The Palestinian parents sought to provide sons with greater opportunities to 
study in El Salvador, in Israel but especially in the United States.  It seems that, at that time, 
the parents’ education development was not priority, but that of the sons and grandsons was 
considered crucial: they must have a university degree (Bukele Kattan, 2012). 
 
The economic growth of these families in a context of incipient industrialization since the 
1940’s gave them social prestige and important economic returns.  Four of these successful 
families were Simán (dry goods store and construction); Safie (textile factory); Hasbún (retail) 
and Zablah (retail) (see table 11).  Since the 1970s, they established more and more business 
relations with traditional elites.  As an example, in this period Molinos de El Salvador 
(MOLSA) was established.  Adolfo Salumé and Salvador J. Simán shared the board of directors 
with Enrique García Prieto, Roberto Llach Hill, and Miguel Dueñas Herrera, prominent 
members of traditional elites (Paniagua-Serrano, 2002).  Later, some representatives of these 
families became dominant actors within food industry, wholesale, media and pharmaceutical 
sector (see table 11). 
 
The war represented a critical juncture in their lives.  While the reforms implemented by the 
Military Junta at the beginning of the 1980s were designed to cut key sources of traditional 
elites’ wealth accumulation, the Junta also approved tax and fiscal incentives to the maquila 
industry where most of these families had investments  (ICEFI, 2015; Segovia, 2002). This 
juncture, not unlike what happened in the 1920s and 30s, opened a market gap for the Arabs.  
Nicolás Salumé Barake, one of the most prominent members of these families, put it this way: 
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Nosotros crecimos durante la guerra. Lo que hicimos fue comprar propiedades y 
construir varios restaurantes tanto Biggest, Mister Donut y Nash... Durante la guerra 
no nos fuimos, ni sacamos el dinero del país, la invertimos aquí y ahí están los 
resultados. Muchas personas me criticaban por arriesgar tanto (Hernández, 2009).  
 
The remittances also played a crucial role in the consolidation of these families.  As a 
consequence of the war, thousands of Salvadorians were expelled from the country, including 
most of the elites’ families.  These massive migrations flows shaped the Salvadorian economy 
and constituted a new source of wealth accumulation in the country (Rocha, 2013).  While the 
annual value of remittances in 1980 was about US$20.8 million, in 1999 it was a staggering 
US$ 1.373.8, and US$4.576 in 2016, circa 20% of PIB (Banco Central de Reserva, 2017; 
Segovia, 2002).  For the Salvadorian Palestinian families, the remittances have stimulated their 
economy in two ways.  First, it garnered private banks, some of which were under their 
ownership, autonomy regarding agro-exports, especially since the 1990s, when most of these 
money flows were channeled through the banking system (Segovia, 2002, p. 69).  Second, 
those resources allowed an internal market and consumption expansion in El Salvador in 
sectors such as retail, restaurants, department stores where these families were main investors 
(Segovia, 2002).  
 
Also, families’ common origin was crucial for the guerrilla forces and for some of these 
wealthiest families during the civil war.  Family ties and common background garnered FMLN 
with money and security houses thanks to the Palestinian origins of FMLN leaders such as 
Shafik Handal and Francís Hato Hasbú.  As a reward to the wealthiest Palestinian families, the 
FMLN’s reduced its economic sabotage on their businesses and companies.  The family ties 
among FMLN militants and Palestinians descents also secured, since, the times of war an 
important space in media for the voices and ideas of FMLN.  To illustrate that, in 1984 Jorge 
Zedán, another Palestinians descent, founded Canal 12.  This channel during the civil war took 
a different political stance from the one’s elites had.  During many years, Mauricio Funes had 
in Canal 12 the most popular morning interview program.  Due to Zedán political views, 
Chanel 1220 suffered multiple economic boycotts from elites and government, and it was also 
accused of favoring communist ideas.  He survived as pointed out by Rockwell & Janus (2003) 
for thirteen years until Eserski wore him down.  Also, in 1998 two members of these families 
                                                 
20 Mauricio Funes started his successful career as journalist in Canal 12. Zedán is considered a tutor of former 
president Funes.  During 1990s, Canal 12 disputed TCS ratings until it was sold to TV Azteca in 2001 for US$7.9 
million(Dada et al., 2012; Pérez & Carballo, 2013). 
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founded the first online media in Latin America: El Faro.  Carlos Dada and Jorge Simán had 
the idea that post-peace accords there was necessary to have different types of the media in El 
Salvador.  Since then, El Faro became the most critical voice against traditional elites.  El Faro 
investigations revealed several cases of corruption during ARENA governments and also 
multiple investigations about the role of elites in Salvadorian human rights violations and 
violence. 
 
4.3.2 Share Ideology: Modifying the Structures of Power 
 
The glue that knotted together counter-elites was their desire to dethrone traditional elites.  
Despite the political differences on the most leftist views of FMLN, the center right ones of 
former president Saca and the others Salvadorian Palestinian descents, those actors agreed on 
the need to form an alliance to modify the structures of power that historically had benefited 
traditional elites.  A key moment that would define counter-elites’ sense of community against 
traditional elites was the elections of 2009, when traditional elites lost for the first time in 
twenty years their control over the government.  It was also the first time that actors who 
opposed to traditional elites during war and during democracy have real chances to boost the 
changes of a major distribution of wealth and power, as they promised.   
 
For 2009 elections and against elites will, outgoing president Antonio Saca appointed 
ARENA’s president and vice-president candidates: Rodrigo Ávila as presidential candidate, 
his chief of national police and Arturo Zablah21, as vice-president candidate, a Palestinian 
descendent businessman.  In the other front, FMLN designated an outsider to run the 
presidency, a popular journalist in El Salvador, Mauricio Funes.  Funes won elections with 
51% of the votes and Antonio Saca was expelled and blamed of the electoral defeat of ARENA.   
ARENA’s electoral defeat outlined the beginning of a new era after twenty years of traditional 
elites’ undisputed hegemony.  While remaining dominant, elites suffered a division among 
fractions: a fraction of elites -G20- with a more transnationalized business interest lead by 
Ricardo Poma and Alfredo Cristiani and other fractions led by Palestinians, such as Salumé, or 
Saca with a more national business interest (Bull, 2013; A. Schneider, 2012).  This fraction 
shared with the new government of Mauricio Funes the idea that those at the top of the 
                                                 
21 Zablah was an outsider leading a political movement “Alianza por el Cambio” to oppose ARENA, while 
advocating for ending dollarization, and an increase on pensions and minimum salary (Sanz, 2011). 
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Salvadorian economic structure had been benefiting disproportionately from Salvador’s 
economy without sharing any of the benefits.  As pointed out by one of Saca’s close adviser, 
the main problem was that these elites were used to manage El Salvador like their su propia 
finca (Businessperson one, 2015).  In fact, the administration of Antonio Saca started a new 
model, that Saca used to call “market social economy”  (Wade, 2016, p. 135).  As it can be 
seen in table 10, Saca did not continue with privatizations or with massive dismissals of public 
workers from previous administrations.  While he supported CAFTA and tried to keep the best 
relations with the United States22, he also embraced antipoverty programs (FOSALUD, Red 
Solidaria, Jóvenes, Microcrédito) and reforms that taxed traditional elites directly. 
 
Saca, 12 deputies and dozens of leaders left ARENA to start another political party: GANA.  
Despite being launched as a political platform for the center-right political spectrum in El 
Salvador, GANA became a strategic and reliable ally for leftist FMLN government and an 
opposing force of ARENA.  Funes, as commented above, was joined by a closed group of 
businesspeople, academicians, former public officials and FMLN militants.  This group of 
people have shared an historically opposition to traditional elites’ politics.  Some fought 
traditional elites’ politics during the war in the guerrilla, other like Funes, fought elites in public 
arena.  
 
Counter-elites, as I show in chapter six, also share the idea that to change the structures of 
power in El Salvador, they must control media.  The case of Antonio Saca is exemplary.  Saca 
became a Radio mogul since the beginning of the 1990s.  This media control allowed him to 
first lead the most important association of media companies (ASDER), then ANEP, ARENA 
and the government of El Salvador.  Following Saca’s success counter-elites started to buy or 
fund new media companies such as Salume Family with the online media diario1.com  
 
In these alliances, the counter-elites formed a community with access to government, economic 
resources and contacts with other elites.  The diversity of actors from the left and the right, and 
from social movements to businesspeople garnered counter-elites with spokespeople 
(interlocutores) that moderate their political project national and internationally.
                                                 
22 Saca sent troops to Iraq war in 2004 as way to ingratiate with US government. 
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Table 11:  Prominent Palestinian descent families in El Salvador 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Bull, 2013. 
*In here are included Tony Saca, his uncle José Luis Saca and his cousin Herbert Saca.
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4.3.3 Homogeneity of Interest: Promoting New Economic Actors 
 
Counter-elites were aware that despite having won the elections, the power structure in El 
Salvador was intact and that in order to produce a change they would need to promote new 
economic policies and new actors.  In fact, they acknowledged that the economic power of 
traditional elites had been strengthened in the last decades (Secretaría Técnica de la 
Presidencia, 2013).  Also, they recognized that it was imperative to form alliances with local 
and international actors to modify the correlation of forces (Secretaría Técnica de la 
Presidencia, 2013). 
 
In order to implement their project counter-elites pumped millions of dollars to closely related 
political militants and, in some cases, businesspeople (Enrique Rais; MIDES; Miguel 
Menéndez23) to dispute the elites’ economic hegemony at that time.  Counter-elites realized 
the need of having economic muscle. In this regard, the alliance between ALBA Petróleos and 
FMLN government became strategic too.  In April 2006 ENAPSA, an association formed by 
Salvadorian mayors from the FMLN, and the Venezuelan oil company –PDVSA- funded a 
joint venture called: ALBA Petróleos.  ALBA was born with the main purpose of providing 
hydrocarbons at subsidized prices. In doing so, ALBA must pay back to PDVSA 60% of their 
products between one to three months, while, the rest, 40%, it is financed in payment periods 
of 17 to 25 years. These privileged financial advantages have garnered ALBA Petróleos with 
an important amount of money to invest in other sectors. It was reported that ALBA Petróleos 
in 2014 had US$800 million worth of assets (Negroponte, 2014).  ALBA Petróleos allowed 
counter-elites to mobilize resources for key governmental projects, such as the revival of 
agricultural production projects, and for top party politicians and closely related 
businesspeople.  On the other hand, ALBA received government support and privileged access 
to investment projects (solar energy).   
 
ALBA Petróleos became a crucial government ally for policy development since Funes’ 
electoral victory.  This did not necessarily mean that he agreed 100% with ALBA Petróleos, 
but this reflects the multiple and complex alliances counter-elites made in order to curb elites’ 
                                                 
23 Rais and Menéndez have been accused in El Salvador of fraud and money laundry.  Rais left the country and 
Menéndez has been accused of money laundry. 
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influence.  For instance, in promoting a revival of agricultural production, ALBA alimentos, a 
company founded in 2012, provided agricultural inputs, credits, equipment and technical 
training to small and medium-sized farmers.  Between 2012 and 2014, ALBA alimentos 
provided credits to 35.558 farmers for a total amount of US$34.5 million (Abrego Hernández, 
Herrera Reinosa, & Osorio Blanco, 2016).  
 
Economically, ALBA Petróleos tried to dispute elites’ hegemony with the creation of at least 
16 other companies (see table 12).  One sector in which they have been successful is fuel 
distribution.  ALBA Petróleos went from representing 0.23% of fuels market in 2006 to 23% 
in 2014 (Lemus, 2014). Similarly, it entered the crucial market of airline companies.  
Historically, in El Salvador, aerial transportation has been controlled by a top family among 
traditional elites: Kriete (TACA/AVIANCA).  Early 2014, a new company was created, and 
granted with governmental licenses to operate in El Salvador international airport: Vuelos 
Económicos de Centroamérica (VECA24).   
 
ALBA Petróleos also took advantage of their closeness with Funes government to have 
privilege access to investment plans.  For instance, in 2012 Funes’ government signed an 
agreement with a Taiwanese company, Seedtech Energy specialized in the design and 
manufacture of LED lighting powered by solar power (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de 
El Salvador, 2012).  The government’s plan was about to stimulate foreign direct investment, 
promote technological transfer and the production of solar plants in El Salvador.  In this 
context, seven months after the deal was signed, in May 2013 ALBA Petróleos and Taiwanese 
investors founded Albatech Green Energy, a company with an investment of US$21 million to 
produce solar panels in El Salvador (Lemus, 2014).  
 
ALBA Petróleos money fueled at least 87 investment projects for a value worth US$88.5 
million (Lemus, 2014).  Among ALBA investments, they invested US$ 16 million in real estate 
projects in Nuevo Cuscatlán (Inversional Valiosas S.A.); in Gas (ALBA GAS); media 
(GenteVE); microfinance (Tu Solidaria); energy (Termopuerto); waste handling (MIDES); 
medicaments (ALBA medicamentos); and electronic payments (SUBES) (Lemus, 2014) (see 
table 12).  Later on, the money of ALBA Petróleos also fueled the presidential campaign of 
                                                 
24 ALBA Petróleos controlled 60% of VECA shares through shelf companies in Curacao and Panamá.  According 
to press reports, ALBA lend US$14 million to VECA’s CEO to start operations and then US$33.4 million through 
a shelf company, El-Dia Corporation, in Curacao (Lemus, 2017). 
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FMLN in 2014 as I show in chapter six.  The money invested by ALBA Petróleos in media, 
was also a tool to keep counter-elites together.  
 
Counter-elites realized that in order to dispute traditional elites’ power, they would need to 
form strategic partnerships.  In these strategic partnerships the common ground was settled not 
just on political views but on their common rejection of traditional elites. The latter was based 
primarily on social and political exclusion and on racism that had shaped the politics of counter-
elites.  Likewise, counter-elites were more interested in a new economic model that emphasized 
national market and capital.  In this regard, ALBA Petróleos played for counter-elites the role 
banks had with elites after privatization.  ALBA Petróleos became a financial pump for 
counter-elites with millions of dollars to be invested in other companies and sectors.  The access 
to public funds also created conditions of reciprocity and loyalties with some businesspeople.  
ALBA Petróleos and public funds garnered counter-elites a financial muscle they never had, 
which at the end increased their capacities to dispute elites’ economic hegemony.  
Nevertheless, as I will comment on the conclusions of these research, the dependence on public 
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Table 12. Companies Owned or Related to ALBA Petróleos 
Name Sector Description 




Aerial transport Low-cost airline founded in 
2014. It went bankrupt in 
2017 
Arrocera El Alba Agro-industry Commercialization and 
distribution of basic grains 
Tu Solidaria  Finance Micro credits to small and 
medium business people. 
GenteVe Media TV Broadcaster 
ALBA Tech Green Energy Energy Production and 
commercialization of solar 
panels 
Maya Green Power Energy Solar energy 
ALBA Gas Fuels Commercialization of 
liquefied gas 
SUBES IT Electronic payments system 
used in public 
transportation. 
ALBA Fertilizantes Agricultural-inputs Commercialization of 
fertilizers 
SODICO Real Estate Gas stations administration 
Inversiones Valiosas Real Estate Construction of residences. 
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4.4 Conclusions  
 
With the electoral victories of the FMLN since 2009, and the international economic support 
received from Venezuela, a group of mostly Palestinian descents and leftist actors (FMLN 
politicians) became a powerful movement of counter-elites.  While traditional elites maintain 
the largest sums of capital, the existence of these counter-elites have fostered the disputes 
among elites and counter-elites when engaging in political actions such as media capture.  The 
ideological differences, racism and divergent interest among those fractions hindered to find 
and sustain common fronts.  On the contrary, each fraction act in their own interest to dethrone 
the other. 
 
Despite the fact that traditional elites maintain an internal cohesion shaped by common roots, 
social, business and political closure, as well as a neoliberal mindset, they lost privilege access 
to government and to public funds.  The above caused elites to require more resources and time 
to engage in political actions.  This was so due to the emergence of actors that dispute their 
hegemony in the ideological, political and the economic arena.  This also meant a cost increase 
in the political actions of traditional elites.  For example, currently there are more actors willing 
to pay or bribe media for their own benefit.  Counter-elites have spent large amounts of private 
funds (ALBA Petróleos) and public funds to capture the media.  Thus, for example, counter-
elites built their own media outlet with funds of ALBA Petróleos (Genteve), but also, paid 
counter-elites’ political campaigns through the use of public funds, as I will insightfully show 
in chapter six.  Moreover, the expulsion of Antonio Saca, a radio mogul, from the traditional 
circles reduced the property over media outlets controlled by traditional elites, but garnered 
counter-elites with the largest radio holding.  For the first time, counter-elites possess their own 
media outlets.  This situation has resulted in an increase of their incentives to actively apply 
ownership strategies to change the content of the information. 
 
The case of Palestinians descents shows that the cohesion of elites can be defined not only by 
economic interest or ideological affinities but also by personal backgrounds and racism. The 
above allows us to understand that elites are not always as monolithically as they have been 
studied.  There are triggers of rupture and dispute among elites that transcend the 
macroeconomic interests, such as personal disputes.  These ruptures can be positively 
channeled towards more progressive political actions, alliances, institutions and policies.  
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Different from Palestinian descents, actors tied to FMLN have been in a historical dispute 
against traditional elites.  These actors who are FMLN top politicians, have tried, with limited 
success to dispute markets concentrated in traditional elites’ hands, such as airlines and finance. 
Nevertheless, their privileged access to hydrocarbons distribution, economic resources from 
abroad and access to the State has allowed them to consolidate economic and political capital.  
A major problem is that in the long term, counter-elites have favored a type of politics FMLN 
were historically against: cronyism/patronage (clientelismo).  Nonetheless, counter-elites are 
dependent on a fragile political coalition.  First, some of the leaders (Saca and Funes) are in 
jail or left the country to avoid corruption charges. Second, their access to resources from 
abroad has been limited due to the Venezuelan crisis since 2014. Third, their dependency on 
electoral victories.   
 
Finally, despite the fact that traditional elites have lost members as well as some of their 
economic leverage, their cohesive structure remains solid.   This help traditional elites to re-
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In the burgeoning literature on the media studies, there is agreement about how the media 
capture can be explained mainly through the concentration of media ownership (Besley & Prat, 
2006b; Corneo, 2006; Prat, 2014; Anya Schiffrin, 2017; Strömbäck & Kaid, 2009).  Put simply, 
this literature establishes that the media is more likely to be captured when there are few large 
media owners that control TV, Radio or press (Prat, 2014).  Nevertheless, in Latin American 
countries in general, and in Central America in particular, the media are always extremely 
concentrated in  few media groups (Becerra & Mastrini, 2017), and variations in media capture, 
I argue here, can also be explained by the relational structures created by the networks of media 
owners.  That is, networks built among media owners and media owners and elites.   
 
This chapter proposes the media networks as another variable to explain the differences within 
media capture.  Focusing exclusively on media concentration runs the risk of losing track of 
the media’s possible contradictions and differences.  In contrast, focusing on the media 
networks unveils ties that unite or differentiate media interests and exposes variations in the 
networks.   Literature has shed light on two main kinds of networks (Cardenas, 2012).  A first 
type, named elitist networks, is characterized by a high degree of network unity and a 
significant number of ties among elites.  This type of networks promotes unity and the 
articulation of interests among actors that are a part of them.  Also, they have a powerful “inner 
circle” that facilitates the creation of alliances.  The second type, pluralist networks, is 
characterized by a low level of cohesion that, as a result, promotes individual actions instead 
of collective collaboration.  The dispersion of these second type of networks results in the 
creation of different centers of power.  This situation increases the competition among actors 
(Cardenas, 2012; Cárdenas, 2014). 
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This chapter maps and discusses the networks that are created when media owners share two 
or more companies (interlocking ownership) and when media owners serve on the board of top 
elite companies (interlocking directorates).  When media owners share the ownership of 
companies with others, they form a business liaison that fosters social cohesion, 
communication and control (Borgatti, 1998; Cárdenas, 2016a; Mizruchi, 1992; Useem, 1984).   
Generally speaking the interlockings are relational indicators that allows us to analyze how 
elites and media owners are connected and form networks among them (Cárdenas, 2016b).   
 
This chapter is based on the proposition that differences found in media capture in Costa Rica 
and El Salvador in chapter six and seven can also be explained by the relational nature of 
networks built by media owners.  This is so because this two type of networks (elitist or 
pluralist) enables elites to act as a block or, on the contrary, as dispersed groups in pursuit of 
their interests (Cardenas, 2014a; Chu & Davis, 2015; Kocks, 2016; Mizruchi, 1992).  In the 
case of elitist-media networks, particularly where media owners and elites share business 
interest, a group of elites has more chances to coordinate media capture to obtain vociferously 
representation of their specific economic and political interests.  The opposite occurs in the 
context of pluralist media networks.  In this case, the dispersion among elites reduces their 
incentives to articulate agreements.  Due to this dispersion, elites need more resources, but 
especially, the use of more constraining actions to modify what is reported.   
 
In this chapter Social Network Analysis (SNA) is employed, which is a methodology that 
studies, measures and maps social structures, and is a powerful tool to uncover power 
hierarchies and varieties of elite networks (Cárdenas, 2012).  
 
5.2 Connecting Interests: Analysis of Media Owners’ Networks  
 
Based on primary data collection, an original dataset was constructed to uncover how media 
owners and elites are connected.  There is a consensus that media owners "constitute an 
important part of elite networks" (Freedman, 2014a; Herman & Chomsky, 2010b; Mayerhöffer 
& Pfetsch, 2018; Miliband, 1969b; Mills, 2000; Segovia, 2005; Waisbord & Segura, 2016), but 
there is only very scarce empirical evidence to sustain this.  By employing SNA, this research 
takes an important step further by focusing on media owners’ networks.  One of the main 
advantages of SNA is that it allows to scrutinize the invisible relational structure woven 
between different elites (Mizruchi, 1992; Zeitlin, 1974).  At the heart of SNA is graph theory, 
  83 
employed to measure cohesiveness, identify communities and elucidate central actors 
(Borgatti, 1998). 
 
In this research, networks are composed of media owners that are tied to 1) each other or 2) to 
top elite companies by sharing the ownership of one or more companies.  Specifically, in this 
research I focused on the components of the networks.  A component is a part of the network 
where all nodes are connected by direct or indirect ties.  The structure of the network is defined 
by a large connected component or different disconnected parts.  Component analysis allows 
us to measure the levels of unity or dispersion among the networks or parts of the networks.  In 
detail, the networks were examined through the analysis of components to detect internal 
communities and cohesion among networks.  Analysis of components in network analysis is a 
technique to graphically represent and analyze the level of integration or dispersion between 
different components.  In figures 2 and 3 nodes represent media owners, and ties are jointly 
owned companies.  In figures 4 and 5 nodes are top elite companies and media companies, and 
ties represent shared directors.  The results show a visualization of patterns of relations among 
elites and media owners in each country, which allows an analysis of the varieties of the 
existing networks.(Cardenas, 2014a).  It also illustrates to what extent media owners’ interests 
are diversified and the different types of networks built by media owners in both countries.   
 
5.3 Methods and Data 
 
The following analysis was carried out in two parts.  First, I analyze the direct ties among media 
owners due to shared companies (interlocking ownership).  Second, the analysis includes the 
ties among shared directors between media companies and the top economic companies in each 
country (interlocking directorates).  A systematic and laborious procedure was followed to 
identify these interlocks.   
 
First, for the interlocking ownership, it was necessary to identify the media companies in each 
country.  For this analysis, 48 media companies were studied, 25 in Costa Rica and 23 in El 
Salvador.  Due to the absence of a media authority in both countries, media companies were 
chosen based on previous works (Becerra et al., 2009; Pérez & Carballo, 2013; Robles-Rivera 
& Voorend, 2011; Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Segovia, 2005).  Specifically, the inclusion criteria 
consisted of market and publicity share and, most importantly, of data availability on the 
composition of the companies’ board of directors.  Second, I identified who the media owners 
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of these companies were according to Registro Nacional in Costa Rica and Centro Nacional 
de Registro in El Salvador.  Third, I identified and systematized the information about the 
companies where these media owners participated according to Registro Nacional in Costa 
Rica and Centro Nacional de Registro in El Salvador.  In total, the boards of 1060 companies 
were collected in Costa Rica and of 397 companies in El Salvador.  Fourth, I identified the 
companies where media owners shared ownership ties.  Fifth, I built a relational matrix where 
media companies and media owners were visual and clearly differentiated. This relational 
matrix created in Excel was analyzed in UCINET, the software for SNA.  Sixth, I analyzed the 
networks using component analysis to uncover how embedded media owners are. 
 
For the interlocking directorates a similar process was followed.  First, I identified media 
companies.  Second, I identified largest companies in each country.  For this, directors of 231 
companies in Costa Rica and El Salvador were selected based on Cárdenas & Robles (2017).  
From that list, media companies and companies without public data were removed.  In total, 
the work is based on 114 companies in Costa Rica and 117 in El Salvador.  In the case of Costa 
Rica, the companies were selected based on the ranking of EKA 2012, a well-known Central 
American Business magazine, which organizes the ranking based on company’s revenues.  In 
the Salvadorian case, the ranking of the Industrial Association of El Salvador (ASI) based on 
revenues, was used.  Financial companies were added to this list. These companies would not 
necessarily show up in the ASI ranking, because of the nature of their business, they have more 
assets than revenues (Cardenas, 2014a).  Third, for each country I identified the directors of 
each company.  Fourth, I identified directors of media and top companies that share more than 
one board.  Fifth, I built a relational matrix in Excel where companies were ubicated in 
columns, and directors in rows.  The Excel file was analyzed in UCINET, the software for 
SNA.  Sixth, I analyzed the networks using component analysis to uncover how embedded 
media and top business companies are. 
 
5.4 The Networks of Media Owners in Costa Rica and El Salvador 
 
A component analysis was used to determine the main characteristics of Costa Rican and 
Salvadorian media networks.  A component is a set of connected nodes within a network.  In 
this case, the nodes are media owners that are tied to each other through their shared ownership 
of one or more companies.  The size of the components indicates the number of nodes that 
make up each community.  The higher the number of nodes in the components, the higher the 
  85 
cohesion of inclusion. The main component is the one with the largest number of nodes 
(Cárdenas & Robles, 2017).  In the extreme case of resulting in only one component, this means 
all nodes are connected, thus more integration within the network.  In contrast, the larger the 
number of components, the more dispersed the media network is. (Cárdenas, 2014, 2016b). 
 
In Figure 2 and 3, the results of the component analysis of media owners’ networks are shown 
for Costa Rica and El Salvador, respectively. The results show that Costa Rican networks are 
the most integrated media network of the two.  In the Costa Rican case, we found four 
components, and the main component consists of 106 media owners (82%; see figure 2).  Due 
to the higher number of media owners in this community, it is more likely for these media 
owners to contact and pressure each other easily.  It also means that this specific group of media 
owners can monitor almost the whole media network (Fennema & Heemskerk, 2002).  A 
particularity of this community is that the media owners integrated into this component are 
proprietors of the largest media outlets in Costa Rica: La Nación, La Extra and La República 
on the press; Teletica on TV, Columbia, Omega, CRC, Musical on radio; CRhoy in web and 
Telecable on cable.  In figure 4 media owners are colored in red and shaped as triangles to give 
a better visual representation of them.  The high share of Costa Rican market of these 10 
companies would imply that when these companies act together, their demands resonate on 
media with the largest audiences.  The other components formed by three to six nodes 
correspond to family media companies, such as the online website AmeliaRueda.com, or 
transnational companies such as Telefonica.  These two examples suggest that Costa Rican 
networks tend to exclude transnational companies and mainly online media companies such as 
the case of AmeliaRueda.com.  This also implies that; those two types of media companies are 
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Figure 2. The Networks of Media Owners in Costa Rica 
 
 
Source own elaboration.  Green and red nodes are media owners tied to each other through  
their shared companies. Red nodes are the owners of main media companies in Costa Rica 
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In El Salvador, the picture is quite different. The media network of El Salvador is built by 12 
different components, and the largest component consists of 27 media owners (22.75%; figure 
3).  The high number of components in the media network of El Salvador suggests that the 
level of dispersion among Salvadorian media networks is higher than in Costa Rica.   First, in 
the main component (red triangle nodes) the four largest media companies of El Salvador are 
connected together (TCS; El Mundo; El Diario de Hoy; La Prensa Gráfica).  Second, the 
majority of media outlets of El Salvador do not have any businesses in common.  The red 
community confirms the idea that traditional media have been united regarding historical and 
familial ties, but also that the unity comes for sharing economic interest and investments.  Also, 
the network shows that despite the ties among largest media, the majority of media companies 
in El Salvador are less likely to be controlled or dependent on these four companies due to the 
lack of economic ties among them.   
 
Network analysis unveils a more unified network of media owners in Costa Rica than in El 
Salvador.  Considering the properties granted by networks, Costa Rican media owners are more 
likely to share contacts, information, and knowledge, at the same time, that they are more likely 
to exclude opposing voices, ideas and actors.  Likewise, since in Costa Rica the largest media 
owners are all connected, their capacity to move the public debate in their benefit is higher.  
The opposite may occur in El Salvador where networks are mainly knotted among a limited 
number of media outlets that have historically shared ideological, economic and political ties.  
The major dispersion of Salvadorian networks also facilitates that opposing voices have access 
to media outlets out of elites’ control.
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Figure 3.  The Networks of Media Owners in El Salvador 
 
 
Source own elaboration.  Green and red nodes are media owners tied to  
each other through their shared companies. Red nodes represent the media owners of largest componen
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5.5 Media Owners and Elite Companies 
 
Concerning the analysis of networks among media owners and top elite companies, the data, 
figures 4 and 5, suggests remarkable differences between Costa Rica and El Salvador, such as 
economic diversification of some media companies and dispersed business interest in El 
Salvador and a core of media owners that are embedded in a powerful business community in 
Costa Rica. 
 
In El Salvador, figure 4 shows that the media is highly disconnected of each other and mainly 
organized around business sectors privatized during the last decades such as insurance and 
pensions sector.  The above allowed media owners to diversify their investments within 
different companies.  The broadening of investments led to the creation of diversified business 
groups that included media outlets.  For example, El Mundo (press-1967), which appears tied 
to the company Aluminio de El Salvador and Banco de América Central, is part of a diversified 
business group named Grupo Borja with local and regional investments in energy, retail, 
telecommunications, real estate and agro-industry.  Megavisión (TV, 1992) is tied to an 
insurance company named Seguros del Pacífico.  Seguros del Pacífico was funded by 
Megavisión’s owner, Oscar Safie Hasbún, and controls 4% of the insurance market with assets 
of around US$12 million (Seguros del Pacífico, 2016).  TCS (TV, 1956) is connected to 
pension funds (Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones Crecer).  El Diario de Hoy (press, 
1936) has expanded its investments in El Salvador and Panamá through an editorial company 
(ALBACROME).  It also has ties to a transnational company (Holcim) and a beverage 
company (DIPRISA) through the board of directors.  That situation is also evident in La Prensa 
Gráfica (press, 1914), which is tied to its own editorial company (Impresora La Unión).  One 
of its board directors is also connected to an insurance company (Aseguradora Agrícola 
Comercial) that controls 13% of insurance market and has assets of US$30 million 
(Aseguradora Agrícola Comercial, 2017)
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Figure 4. The Networks of Media and Elite Companies in El Salvador 
 
 
Source: own elaboration.  The ties are created by sharing directors.  Green nodes are top elite companies. 
Red nodes are media outlets.  Orange nodes are the main component 
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Figure 4 of El Salvador also shows that media owners that form these interlocks are the ones 
that belong also to the largest and most traditional media firms.  The above suggests that they 
have been capable of accumulating important economic capital to invest in other companies.  
At the same time, a reduced number of them have strengthened their social presence within the 
wealthy club by incorporating in its boards, directors from other companies.  The networks 
also unveil that the Salvadorian media owners do not necessarily share a business interest, on 
the contrary, they even have a competing interest outside media market.  This is the case of La 
Prensa Gráfica and Megavisión, both companies compete in the insurance market. Despite the 
regional investments of Grupo Borja, the majority of the media companies are still nationally 
based, which increased its dependency on local markets and State publicity. Finally, media 
owners in El Salvador, as opposed to the Costa Rican case, are not connected to the inner circle 
of elites, which is almost exclusively dominated by banks (orange nodes’ community). 
 
In Costa Rica, the interactions among media owners and elites, presented in figure 5 are shaped 
by three different dynamics: i) media outlets owned by regional capitals (Albavisión) that only 
share ties among them (Repretel, Central de Radios, Sky);  ii) different media outlets that have 
ties among them due to their shared boards of directors in radio (Cadena Musical, CRC and 
Radio Centro); and  iii) a selected group of media outlets that share business in the inner circle 
of the network: Columbia (Radio; national); Millicom (telecom; transnational); Cable and 
Wireless (telecom; transnational) (all of them are colored in green), and Grupo Nación  (La 
Nación, Prensa Económica press; Grupo Latino de Radiodifusión, radio, nodes colored in 
orange).  This inner circle ties together the most central and powerful firms in the network.  In 
fact, this main component tied together the largest economic interest and elites in Costa Rica, 
such as Florida Ice and Farm, the largest national company with investments in Central 
America and the United States.  Furthermore, when we look closer at this inner circle, it reveals 
the role played by the companies owned by Jiménez Family (Prensa Económica, Grupo Latino 
de Radio Difusión, La Nación, Florida Ice and Farm and Vical).  These companies work as a 
bridge that gathers together interest from retail, investment funds, finance, auto distribution, 
concrete products and telecom companies.  The Grupo Nación companies exposed a group of 
media owners that constitute a fundamental part of elites’ networks.  Regarding the fact that 
networks constrain the social action of their members (Cardenas, 2014b; Cárdenas, 2016b), 
media and business interlocks in Costa Rica suggest that there is a group of media owners 
whose interests are constraint by the interest of largest capitals in the country.  Another 
difference in comparison with El Salvador is that Costa Rican media-elite  networks are built 
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by more transnational and regional companies (Cable and Wireless-UK, Lafise -Nicaragua, 
Aval- Colombia, Millicom-Tigo-Luxemburg, Holcim-Switzerland, Cemex- México, Abonos 
Agro-Guatemala).  The above can be explained due to more openness to regional and 
transnational capital in Costa Rica than in El Salvador, including media. 
 
In sum, media owners in El Salvador are more likely to have their own firms and do not 
necessarily share investments with other media owners or elites. In Costa Rica in contrast, a 
group of media owners corresponds to the owners of the largest media who also share 
businesses with the most powerful elites.  These differences would suggest that in Costa Rica, 
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Figure 5. The Networks of Media and Elite Companies in Costa Rica 
 
 
Source: own elaboration.  The ties are created by sharing directors.  Blue nodes are top elite companies.Orange and green nodes are media 
outlets.  The orange nodes represent companies of Grupo Nación in the main component 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
In contrast to earlier work, I find that the media in El Salvador is more open to opposing voices 
than the media in Costa Rica.  In El Salvador, opposing voices have more chances to use media 
to defend their views and ideas, whereas in Costa Rica media system is constrained to a limited 
number of voices that share common views and values with top elites.  This finding is 
significant because it suggests that in El Salvador elites may need more time and resources to 
capture the media.  It also suggests that media owners in El Salvador are less powerful than 
understood before.  Two main explanations would help us to understand why media networks 
are so different in each country: changes in media and political changes. Since 2000, El 
Salvador has experienced the emergence of new media, and for the first time, a leftist 
government was elected in 2009 (chapter 4), though, in Costa Rica media and the political 
system remained almost the same (chapter 3).  
 
This chapter also demonstrated the importance of new methodological and theoretical 
approaches such as network analysis to understand media capture.  While most studies of media 
capture have focused on ownership indexes, those indexes lack of portraying the traces of 
possible and important differences within media and media owners.  The sole existence of few 
media owners does not necessarily explain differences in media capture, neither does it explain 
why in countries like in El Salvador with higher concentrated media market, media capture was 
more disputed than in Costa Rica whose concentration is lower (see next chapters).  Media 
owners are not homogeneous structures of power.  In this respect, one central argument of this 
research is that, besides focusing on concentration ownership measures, research on media 
capture must also address the relations media owners intertwined. 
 
This chapter also unveiled how different media owners fostered relations among them and with 
top elite companies in Costa Rica and El Salvador.  In fact, the relational nature of these 
networks defined significant differences among them.  Unified networks among media owners 
and networks that connect elites with similar views, interest, and information suggest the 
existence of an elitist media network (Costa Rica).  In Costa Rica the situation of elitist media 
networks constrains pluralism and garners the emergence of a small group of powerful elites 
with more resources.  The fact that important media companies are part of a larger business 
community imposes constraints to opposing voices.  In this regard, when elites need to capture 
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the media there are non-competitive actors that threaten their access to produce and concertedly 
send common messages.  Elitist media networks, as I will show in chapter six, helped elites to 
coordinate the production and distribution of information about the allegedly communist threat 
that the leftist party Frente Amplio meant to Costa Rican democracy during the 2014 
presidential elections. 
 
On the contrary in El Salvador a situation of disperse networks suggests more plural media, 
more competitive political currents and corporate interests among media owners, thus, defining 
pluralist media networks.  In El Salvador, the diversity of actors, agendas, and objectives 
reduce the chances of a particular group to coordinate media capture in a single direction. 
Hence, the conflict to produce messages –the communists versus the corrupt- limit the 
influence of a single group and increases the disputes to capture the media.  Likewise, as I will 
show in chapter seven, the small number of business ties woven between media companies and 
top businesses secured limited control of elites over particular and traditional media.  That 
limited control opens up access to other media companies for counter-elites.  The ones they 
built or bought.   Pluralist media networks for the first time, as I will show in chapter seven, 
openned up a space in public debates counter-elites. 
 
In the next two chapters, I show how cohesion or fragmentation among elites and also the type 
of media networks increased elites’ chance to coordinate or dispute media capture during the 
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6 Coordinating the Capture:  The 
Strategies of Elites to Capture Media 
in Costa Rica 
 “Pero si René es amigo nuestro, nosotros fuimos a hablar con René y le dijimos:  
René, pero qué es la mierda hijueputa. 
Deja darle tanta pelota a este hijueputa de Villalta.   
Playo, sólo eso hablas, todo el día de ese hijueputa.  
Ignacio parece que fuera  
cabro de este hijueputa solo de ese mae habla.   
Hablá de cualquier otra picha, de otro mae, sólo esa mierda hablas” 




From December 2013 on, the media were covered with headlines such as "Frente Amplio 
expressed sympathy with Hugo Chávez’s revolution” (La Nación, 13.01.2014); “José María 
Villalta assures he is not communist” (CRHoy, 15.01.2014); “José María Villalta defines 
himself about communism, Venezuela and the future of the country” (Repretel, 5.12.2013). 
These were not times of Cold War but rather the first time a left-leaning politician was leading 
the polls. On December 1st, 2013, a poll published by Costa Rica’s most important newspaper, 
La Nación, surprised the country.  Frente Amplio (FA) was ahead by 22% of total voting 
intention, followed by the officialist party, the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN) at 19%, and 
the right-wing party, Movimiento Libertario (ML) at 14%. As noted by an elite, those news on 
a Monday morning set elites’ alarm, 
Pero cuando estos chamacos (business leaders) encuentran un lunes al igual que yo 
que aparece en La Nación que el FA tiene el 31%25 del voto y que Liberación tiene 
el 33, que el PUSC tiene el 3 o el 4, el PAC está por debajo del factor de error, 
entonces usted dice, wow. “because these guys are real”. Y si estos carajos ganan. 
                                                 
25 The real poll numbers are the ones indicated at the beginning of this section. 
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Empaque y vámonos. No es el Partido Socialista, es el Partido Comunista. 
(Interview, Businessman nine 2015)  
 
In the last four decades, elites in Costa Rica rarely faced political turmoil as I showed in chapter 
three.  The political context in Costa Rica has allowed elites to quietly manage friendly relations 
with political parties and governments.  Since the mid-1980s, most of the political agenda has 
turned into pro-business agenda (Bull et al., 2014; Sánchez-Ancochea, 2005; Sojo, 1991b).  
Elites have chosen to support political parties indistinctly as an insurance policy (Casas-
Zamora, 2005).  However, 2014 presidential elections produced a new framework for elites, 
one that could result in losing access to influence government due to a potential electoral 
victory on the left.  Access to government means contracts, resources and, to some extent, a 
competitive advantage against transnational elites (Bull et al., 2014).  
 
For Costa Rican elites, the left-leaning party, FA, meant a threat to democratic values of private 
property and liberty, and a direct path to what they called the "castro-chavization" of the 
country.  A letter circulated among26 them explained the following: 
 
“El propósito de esta carta es pedir su apoyo y facilitarle información para que pueda 
realizar una labor educativa en el seno de su empresa. Como bien sabe, nos 
encontramos frente a una coyuntura delicada, dado el creciente respaldo a opciones 
alejadas del tradicional centro democrático que hemos elegido históricamente para 
guiar el Gobierno de nuestro país. Creemos que esto se da, principalmente, por falta 
de entendimiento de las serias. implicaciones de implantar en Costa Rica un 
gobierno comunista. 
Son conocidas las posiciones del Frente Amplio respecto de la empresa privada, el 
Estado, el control de los medios de comunicación, la educación, la economía y otros 
temas de igual relevancia, expresadas en su plan de Gobierno y en la Asamblea 
Legislativa, y constituyen señal inequívoca de que, de acceder al poder, este partido 
destruiría las bases fundamentales de nuestro modelo democrático y, muy 
particularmente, a las empresas privadas. Igualmente son conocidos los ligámenes 
que este partido político tiene con los regímenes nefastos que hoy imperan en Cuba, 
Venezuela, Nicaragua y otros países (Alianza Costa Rica, 7.01.2014, italics FRR). 
 
                                                 
26 I received this letter by email three weeks before elections.  The letter was leaked by someone that received it 
in its email by error. The letter was attached together with other documents such as a power point presentation 
and manuals.  
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The unprecedented electoral popularity of a left-leaning party in Costa Rica and its unexpected 
emergence as a real political option to govern Costa Rica for four years was a result, according 
to elites interviewed, of an extremely positive media coverage.  A common mindset among the 
interviewed elites was that the media were responsible for a positive and continued exposure 
of left-leaning candidate.  In the elites’ eyes, there was a certain kind of media positive-
obsession with José María Villalta and his ideas that at the end benefited his political campaign.  
The quote that opens this chapters is an example of this feeling among elites. The alleged help 
from the media to a left-leaning party was new in Costa Rica, where literature has shown how 
the media has played a major role defining the scope of policies and supporting key neo-liberal 
reforms and elites in the last three decades ( Sandoval García, 2008; see also chapter three).  
 
This chapter seeks to explain how a cohesive group of elites captured media during 2014 
elections in Costa Rica.  It is shown that strategies used for Costa Rican elites to capture the 
media were shaped by their given capacity to organize and form a common block.  Elites were 
able in a very short period of time to collect money, gather information, lobbying and pressure 
media owners to frame FA and his candidate as a “populist/communist” threat to Costa Rican 
democracy, liberty and freedom of press.  For media owners it was not just political affinity 
with elites, but also a matter of access to money and a privilege status among the upper circles. 
 
As it follows, I first describe and characterize the elites who sought to capture the media and, 
second, I analyze the strategies elites utilized to transform the production and distribution of 
information about the leftist party during the electoral campaign in 2014. 
 
6.2 Elites: Alianza Costa Rica 
 
Two months before the elections, aware of the limited time left, elites from different sectors, 
companies and political parties formed an unprecedented alliance in December 201327:  
Alianza Costa Rica.  Alianza Costa Rica integrated a group of Costa Rican elites that included: 
Tomás Dueñas (PGH Limited Group); Francis and George Durman Esquivel (Grupo 
Montecristo and Aliaxis), André Garnier (Garnier & Garnier), Carlos E. González (Grupo 
Pelón), José A. Jenkins (El Viejo), Javier Quirós (Grupo Purdy), Guillermo Alonso 
(Automercado), Jack Loeb (Pacuare Lodge), Diego Artiñano (Mabe), Manuel Terán Jiménez 
                                                 
27 During the referendum process to approve CAFTA in 2007, another group "Alianza por el Sí" brought together 
economic and political parties.  In this case, the leader was the former Minister of Agriculture, Alfredo Volio.  
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(La Laguna), Javier Prada López (DIOPSA), among other well-known businessmen in Costa 
Rica. This group included largest investors from tourism, health, real estate, commerce, retail, 
pharmacy, agribusiness. The group was independent of political parties or institutionalized 
business associations.  It was led by a well-known businessman, former minister of commerce 
and labor, as well as a former ambassador to the European Union and Washington, Tomás 
Dueñas.   
 
The elites that gathered together in Alianza Costa Rica share similar characteristics.  They have 
common educational backgrounds.  For instance, some of them were classmates in the 
Humboldt Schule or at the University of Costa Rica, and most of them went to the United States 
to study master programs related to business administration.  They have actively participated 
in politics supporting mainly two political parties (PUSC-PLN) and a friendly business agenda. 
Some of them were recruited into past government administrations and others have been well-
known private campaign donors.  Also, they have business in common, some are part of 
interlocking directorates, others have invested in common projects.  They also agree on the 
need of intervening in the public debate based on four main reasons.  First, the risk of a left-
leaning victory could represent for business elites in Costa Rica.  Second, what they understood 
as a media biased in favor of the left-leaning candidate.  Third, what interviewees recalled as a 
lack of knowledge of Costa Rican voters about the communist risk hidden behind FA that at 
the end propelled his popularity.  And finally, elites assumed that Costa Rican democratic 
system was under peril, and they should act as “democratic guardians”. As stated in the same 
letter circulated by Alianza Costa Rica among employees affiliated to their companies: 
"Como empresarios, tenemos un deber ciudadano de llamar la atención de nuestros 
trabajadores para que formen un frente común en la defensa del sistema 
democrático, mediante una mayor comprensión de las características de la propuesta 
del Frente Amplio y la amenaza que representa.” (Alianza Costa Rica 7.01.2014) 
 
Costa Rican elites first met at the beginning of December 2013 to define a route of action. The 
first task was to collect money and information.  According to two interviewed elites, the 
money collected counted around half million dollars. This is not a small amount of money if 
we take into consideration that it represents an amount equivalent to one third of the total 
private funding of the five main political parties during this electoral campaign (Cárdenas & 
Robles-Rivera, 2017).  The money elites have given to Alianza Costa Rica was directed to 
finance the operations of the group.  For instance, they recruited people to gather information 
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in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba on personal and political bios, discourses, 
political meetings, policy proposals, and op-eds that could demonstrate links between FA’s 
politicians and, what they called, the “Castro-Chavista project” (see figure 6). 
 
Based on the gathered information, and building on support from marketing and publicity 
experts, the Alianza Costa Rica prepared, designed, and distributed among businesspeople 
letters, guidelines, flyers, presentations, leaflets and press releases with their main concerns 
about FA.  Among these concerns, Alianza Costa Rica focused on economic instability, 
communism, poverty, loss of freedoms and private property.  As stated by Alianza Costa Rica 
in a letter to its fellows: 
 
Dado que el tiempo es corto, nos hemos permitido preparar para usted un paquete 
informativo que facilite la comunicación con sus trabajadores y que incluye posibles 
mensajes a emplear, una presentación que podría servir de apoyo a reuniones y un 
volante, en caso de que quiera imprimirlo y distribuirlo. (Alianza Costa Rica 
7.01.2014)
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Figure 6. Frente Amplio shows sympathy for “revolución chavista” 
 
 
Source: La Nación, 6.12.2013 
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However, this campaign was suspended by Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones28, in order to study 
an electoral complaint that argued that managers were manipulating their employees’ voting 
decision, something prohibited by Costa Rican electoral law. Also, elites tried to pressure 
political parties.  According to interviewees, they had meetings with the major political parties, 
such as PLN, PUSC, ML as well with Christian political parties.  The meetings were set to 
provide political parties with the information the Alianza Costa Rica had gathered and that 
could be used to defy FA in debates or advertising. As an “exchange of support”, politicians 
were asked to “denounce FA”, as the “common enemy of our democratic system”, as pointed 
out by an interviewee (Businessman two, 2015).  As figure 7 shows, PLN’s ads followed elites’ 
messages.  Furthermore, in private meetings with the other two leading candidates according 
to the polls, Johnny Araya (PLN- center right) and Otto Guevera (ML -right), elites tried to 
pressure them to stop attacking each other, and to focus on pressuring on Jose María Villalta, 
their common enemy.  However, as noted by an interviewee, 
Nosotros tratamos de ponerlos en paz, no se ataquen entre ustedes, den sus 
programas de gobierno... Ustedes no han entendido que ustedes están jugando con 
fuego. Hagamos una paz, dejen de atacarse públicamente ... Entonces la empresa 
privada tratamos de meternos a que hubiera paz entre ellos, que no se atacaran y que 
fuera un tipo de política más limpia.  Llegamos a lo mismo. De aquí sentados, sí así 
va a ser. Sale el programa de televisión. Hachas, y bombas, y dinamita, entre ellos. 
(Businessman seven 2015). 
 
Despite the capacity of elites to organize, mobilize resources and define a common strategy to 
address what they consider a threat, their capacity to influence was curbed by institutional 
constraints -TSE- and elites’ incapacity to trust politicians. With a limited amount of time, 
elites were aware that in order to reach a broader public they needed to capture the media.  In 
the next section, I explain the strategies elites used to capture the media to mobilize public 




                                                 
28 At the end of January 2013, days before elections, TSE settled that the campaign did not violate any rule of 
Costa Rican electoral code. 
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Figure 7. PLN electoral advertising 
 
Source: La Nación, 12.01.2014 
Message in add: “If I vote to the left, communist ideas of FA will risk my job and the job of 






   105 
 
6.3 Elites Strategies to Capture the Media 
 
When threatened by the possibility of an electoral victory on the FA, elites urged to capture the 
media to influence voters. In this section I explain how Costa Rican elites captured media by 
organizing and gathering information, allocating money and censoring reports. 
 
6.4 Political Strategies 
 
Political expertise among Costa Rican elites led them to form a “lobbyist force” seeking to 
change the positive framing media had about FA.  For elites, media was “playing with fire” 
(Businessman seven, 2015), and had favored FA campaign without taking into consideration 
the possible consequences for the country (Businessman two, 2015).  Elites lobbied media 
owners and provided media with information they have gathered to damage the electoral 




The lobbyist force included lawyers, marketing, and design thinking advisers, political experts 
and polling firms.  The leading group included the expertise of businessmen who in the last 
decades have been recruited for different government positions, lead important business groups 
in the country or were directors of media companies.  Alianza Costa Rica set in motion three 
core actions: gathering information, lobbying and a public relations campaign to capture the 
media. In doing so, lobbyist force was first entailed to find out “elements of truth” about the 
communist and populist ideas of FA (Businessman nine, 2015), second, they sought to define 
a short and simple message to be communicated (the risks of communist/populist threat) and 
third, put pressure for a change in the news coverage according to the information they have 
provided to the media. 
 
In finding what the elites called “elements of truth”, a group was entailed to investigate in Costa 
Rica and in other countries information about the backgrounds, declarations or actions political 
leaders of FA have taken regarding Nicaragua and the sandinistas, as well as in Venezuela and 
Cuba (Businessman nine 2015).  As pointed out by elites interviewed, the main point of 
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gathering this information was to let the media know that their concerns about FA were true 
facts, based not just on FA’s political program, but also on its political past and linkages with 
Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua.  And that these concerns would threat also media in the near 
future. 
 
With time running out quickly, a very small group of elites took their materials and information 
and went directly to lobbying media.  A group of three to four top elites was in charge to visit 
and meet with editors in chief, political commentators and even a radio comedy host “to reach 
the largest number of people” (Businessman nine, 2017).  The small size of the group was 
decided in order to do not anticipate any movement and to constraint leaks of information.  The 
easy access of these elites was given thanks to their long-lasting networks with media owners, 
media-advertisers, business in common and the reputation of elites. As commented by an editor 
in chief: 
 
“Bueno, aquí llegan tres de los empresarios más importantes de este país, y nos 
preguntan que qué vamos a hacer con el peligro de José María Villalta.” (Interview, 
editor in chief three, 2015) 
 
In these meetings, elites, using the information they had, pressured for tougher grip of media 
owners over the content produced.  For them it was necessary the intervention of media owners 
to build a new frame about FA according to their particular concerns.  As expressed by an 
interviewed elite: “I went to Channel 7 and Channel 6 (largest Costa Rican TV broadcasters).  
Give me half an hour and I will explain why. We showed them pieces of news, comments, 
tours of the candidates, interviews, everything” (Businessman seven, 2015).  For elites, their 
mission was to inform media and people about the real meanings of a radical left party, so the 
people can decide if they want to live under that regime with its consequences and benefits 
(Businessman two, 2015).  The frame proposed by elites was one in which FA should be 
presented as a populist threat to Costa Rican democracy, free press, private business, and 
employment (see for example figure 8).
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Figure 8: “Populist Program”, La Nación´s editorial (17.12.2013) 
 
Source: La Nación 17.12.2013. 
 
When elites were asked about how media reacted to their lobbying- campaign, elites expressed 
that some media understood their messages better than others.  Media companies that were 
responsive to elites demands, and media that required a special pressure through media owners.  
As pointed out by an elite “Encontramos desde medios que lo entendieron muy bien, como 
Repretel, lo entendieron y manejaron muy bien, pero también algunos con los cuales se recurrió 
a hablar con los dueños…” (Businessman nine, 2017).  It is worth noting that Repretel is a 
media holding group owned by the media mogul, Ángel González, that in Costa Rica has 
mainly supported conservative politics from center-right, such as PUSC.  Ángel González has 
been known by his capacity to adapt to different political contexts and economic demands. 
While in Costa Rica, Ángel González allied with elites to defeat a left leaning party, at the same 
time in El Salvador Ángel González negotiated with a left-leaning government his access to 
the TV’s market (see chapter seven).   
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How the framing of elites was incorporated into media is perfectly accounted by an editor in 
chief, when asked about the role played by La Nación during the campaign. As it follows: 
“La Nación cumplió su papel de decirles a los votantes, esto es el Frente Amplio. 
Si por eso nos quieren adjudicar pues una inclinación partidaria bueno, adelante. 
Pero yo no creo que una oferta electoral deba disfrazarse o servirle de disfraz. 
Ahora, la que fue y votó fue la gente. Pero votó sabiendo que el Frente Amplio tiene 
una relación muy estrecha con el gobierno bolivariano, con Nicaragua y con todo 
eso" (editor two, 2016) 
 
Elites agreed that in the case of the other companies -Teletica for example, they had to talk 
with media proprietors with whom they could have more leverage considering businesses in 
common, family and advertisement ties. For elites, in media companies such as Teletica, editors 
in chief have took the media as their own personal property and have been guided by an 
“excessive” freedom of press (libertinaje de los periodistas).  In the section of ownership 
strategies, I analyze further these actions.  
 
6.4.2 Public relations 
 
During their public relations campaign, elites sought to promote their actions positively through 
interviews, press releases, and conferences while trying to elude public confrontation and the 
publicity of its members.  This was tacitly accepted by most media companies who did not seek 
to investigate about Alianza Costa Rica. As stated by Tomás Dueñas, spokesperson of Alianza 
Costa Rica, in a press announcement that was entirely reproduced by media,  
 
Alianza por Costa Rica es una organización cívica surgida del interés de miles de 
costarricenses comprometidos con el fortalecimiento del modelo democrático, la 
búsqueda de la paz social y la construcción de un país próspero y esperanzador para 
todos los ciudadanos. Alianza Costa Rica no respalda a ningún candidato, pero sí 
promueve la elección de un candidato que garantice la permanencia del sistema 
democrático (Soto, 2014). 
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Elites discourse, which was carefully elaborated, was designed to project their actions based 
on moral, democratic and social concerns, so they could be difficult to contradict. This strategy 
was tacitly supported by the media.  The media focused on reproducing elites concerns and 
political views without questioning the messages and their purposes (see figure 9).  Sooner 
rather than later, the political debate during the last month of the campaign changed from 
structural problems such as insecurity and inequality to debating about the filiations of FA with 
the governments of Cuba and Venezuela and the threats to Costa Rican democracy portrayed 
by a left-leaning party. 
 
The political strategies employed by elites allowed them to connect their particular interests 
with popular concerns about democracy. When elites lobbied media, they were looking for 
legitimacy and for wider channels of communication among voters and other social actors. 
Elites’ campaign changed media coverage by introducing the information they gathered and 
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Figure 9: Businesspeople advise employees about Villalta 
 
Source: La Nación, 13.01.2014 
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6.5 Ownership Strategies 
 
Costa Rica is well-known for its high standards of freedom of expression, ranked as a “free 
country” with a score of 91 out if 100 by Freedom House (2015). To some extent, Costa Rican 
media and journalists had been able to enjoy a privilege situation that allowed them to be 
critical of political and economic spheres.  Nevertheless, that was a problem for Costa Rican 
elites.  For them, media coverage was irresponsible and played positively in Jose María 
Villalta’s favor.  In this regard, when political strategies were not enough to satisfy elites’ 




For elites, media owners have lost grip of their companies as a result of an excessive freedom 
of press among journalists (libertinaje periodístico).  As noted by two elites interviewed, the 
historical separation among business management and editorial control in Costa Rican media 
led to, what these elites considered, a dangerous situation in which journalists were not 
fulfilling media’s “values and interests”.  This situation headed to the hesitancy of some 
journalist to follow elites’ pressures.  In order to tackle this problem, elites exercised direct 
pressure over media owners to censor or restrict media content that could be beneficial for the 
electoral aspirations of FA.  Nevertheless, this was not an easy task, it was a minefield, as 
pointed out by an elite interviewed: 
 
La situación era crítica, porque si se nos acusaba de manipular los medios de 
comunicación, se nos acusaba de intimidarlos… por ello todo tenía que realizarse 
por medio de negociaciones, a puro convencimiento (Businessman nine, 2017) 
 
In Costa Rica, media outlets have delegated the control over information production to editors 
in chief, loosening their grip. As a consequence, ownership strategies were conducted through 
more informal actions (private reprimands, theme selection, headlining), but also through 
suppressing news.  These informal actions were strategically used by editors in chief to 
leverage information and to promote a “scissors-in-the-head” effect or self-censorship among 
journalists (Stetka, 2012). Through censorship, the media reduced, or augmented salience of 
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specific reports based on the convenience to veto positive information about FA.  This is well 
explained by a journalist: 
 
hubo un día  en que hubo una crónica de un seguimiento a José María Villalta, que 
lo hizo una compañera y ella llegó contando de cómo la gente se estaba volviendo 
un poco loquita con Villalta, loquita en el buen sentido, emocionada y que llegaba 
y que tal y que una foto y el selfie (…) y que en los mercados no lo dejaban (…) y 
ella lo conto así y eso no se publicó, no se quería demostrar que había un entusiasmo 
popular genuino, más allá de los círculos de sindicatos, los círculos de la universidad 
(…) (Journalist one, 2015) 
 
Nevertheless, these unspoken actions were not enough. Elites and media owners went on 
suppressing news that could be beneficial to FA.  That was the case of a journalist project called 
No Voto a Ciegas of La Nación.  
 
The awarded Equipo de Investigación in La Nación collected during eight months prior to the 
elections a bulk of data about the all candidates running to Congress and the executive. The 
data included among others: lawsuits, sanctions, records as Congressmen, state sensitive public 
information that private business and business candidates have with the State, as well as 
personal bios as accounted by interviewees with access to the platform (Journalists five and 
eight).  The main objective was to let the voters know the background of every candidate to be 
elected in 2014.  With a web platform and an app, people would have access to all records and 
information, as well as to compare political parties and candidates according to their electoral 
district.  A great civic and journalistic project supported by the board of directors and editors 
in chief of La Nación during at least 8 months before elections.  
 
However, in electoral contexts were elites feel threatened, good ideas are not always the best 
ones.  According to interviewees with knowledge about the project, the final comparison results 
indicated that parties with less legal records and problems were, in first place, FA, in second 
place PAC, and so on, PLN, PUSC and ML.  Those comparisons made FA a more reliable 
party for Costa Rican voters.  With this in mind, and just weeks before elections, the platform 
was launched.  But the platform was modified to satisfy the interest of media owners as 
accounted by a journalist (Journalist 8).  The platform suffered also strategic cuts of 
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information, for example, the possibility to compare among political parties through different 
graphs was eliminated.  None of the journalists who prepared the info of No Voto a Ciegas 
signed any published report.  A couple of weeks later, the leading journalist of Equipo de 
Investigación wrote an op-ed, in which she stated that the spaces to make independent 
journalism in La Nación had been reduced and limited.  She resigned immediately afterwards, 
and with her, a couple of weeks later, the rest of Equipo de Investigación. 
 
This capacity of elites to act as a block which included family members, well-known 
businesspeople and advertisers facilitated a channel to operate ownership strategies over media, 
even though, there were journalists that do not agree with the capture.  This was also possible 
because at the top of the upper-circles, elites and media owners shared concerns about the risk 
of electing a left-leaning political party.  
 
6.6 Economic Strategies 
 
Electoral campaigns are crucial for the media.  They bring significant money-flows in a short 
period of time from publicity.  These money-flows in a context where there is a limited number 
of advertisers increased the chances of capture the media.  Aware of these situation, Costa 
Rican elites seek to place money on political parties that supported their campaign (see also 
chapter three).  They supported their publicity campaigns on the media and used the influence 
of large advertisers to pressure on media owners. 
 
6.6.1 Campaign Finance 
 
Elites agreed with PLN and ML, parties that shared their political and ideological positions, to 
have an “exchange of support” to stop the common threat that FA represented. In this exchange 
these political parties received money to invest mainly in the media, and in exchange, these 
politicians were asked to “denounce FA”, as the “common enemy of our democratic system”, 
as pointed out by an interviewee (Businessman two, 2015).  Data from the Electoral Court 
shows that elites donated private money mainly to two political parties, PLN (US$1.3 million) 
and ML (US$300.000), the two political parties who also invested more money in the media 
during the campaign, the PLN with US$2.3 million and ML with US$ 1.8 million respectively.  
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Also, data about party expenditures on advertising shows that political parties focused their 
investments in four particular media holdings.  Six out of every ten dollars were spent on four 
media holdings: Repretel (TV, web and radio), Teletica (TV, web and paid-tv), Grupo Nación 
(press, web and radio) and Grupo Extra (press, web radio and TV) (see table 13). Three out of 
these four companies (Repretel, Teletica and Grupo Nación) were central companies on elites’ 
capture strategies due four main reasons.  First, these three companies are the ones who 
concentrate market shares and audiences.  Second, there are business ties among elites and 
these media owners in sectors such as tourism, real estate, industry, energy.  This is the case of 
Grupo Nación especially (see chapter five).  Third, media owners of these three companies 
shared with elites a common familiar and political background.  Fourth, these were the media 
that, according to elites’ interviewees, better understood the risks they were facing with the 
political popularity of FA.  In this sense, data suggest that the expenditure of political parties 
in the media tend to favor companies where elites have more ties -familiar, business, political 
ones.  The above prove the role of interlocking networks in the production of the information 
as I discussed in chapter five. 
 
However, this was not the case of Grupo Extra. Grupo Extra was founded by non-elite 
journalist at the end of the seventies, and it is currently run by his daughter, Iary Gómez.  Unlike 
the other Costa Rican media owners, Gómez is a businesswoman (first difference) with a 
middle-class background, who pursued a modest education, drives her own car and is not a 
prominent figure among upper rich circles.  The business model of Grupo Extra is not based 
on advertisements, but on ventas al pregón (daily sales).  The Grupo Extra is a media group 
that has not invested in any other economic sector.  Due to his familial control over the 
company the ties with elites and political parties has been reduced.  All of these characteristics 
reduced elites’ access, political similarities and incentives to capture Grupo Extra.  When the 
elites were asked about their relations with Grupo Extra, they expressed that they found 
differences in the way La Extra wanted to press their campaign.  According to interviewees, 
Grupo Extra wanted to expose the people behind Alianza Costa Rica and confronted them with 
FA.  This was something elites tried to avoid in order not to expose elites’ campaign as a 
“something of the rich against the people’s candidate”, as recalled by interviewees.  To some 
extent, the differences among elites and Grupo Extra confirms the idea that the media networks 
are indeed mechanisms that can or cannot facilitate media capture.  
 
 
   115 
 
Table 13. Media income paid by political parties  
during electoral campaign in Costa Rica 2014* (US$) 
Media 
Holding 




REPRETEL - 8,068.20 1,903,987.22 179,172.72 2,091,228.14 30 
LA EXTRA 202,173 - 184,965 3,439 390,577 7 
TELETICA - - 1,946,176 - 1,946,176 28 
GRUPO 
NACIÓN  
297,714 7,498  66,446 371,658 5 
Source: Data from Electoral Court. Own elaboration. 
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6.6.2 Advertisers Influence  
 
Alianza Costa Rica was a group where largest media private advertisers overlap with largest 
advertisers from supermarkets to cars and real estate companies.  This economic influence was 
strategically used to pressure the media towards elites’ direction.  According to interviewees, 
in a short period of time they organized meetings with every single media outlet.  This reflected 
their capacity to access media owners.  In each meeting, elites organized strategically a group 
of spokespeople who to influence on media owners, based on their advertising quota. As stated 
by an-elite:  
 
“Con qué delegación se le puede presentar uno a equis persona, (a René Picado29). 
Vamos a escoger a este, este y este, que me conocen, que tienen influencia y que 
por otra parte, que pauta. Este es el guión, porque son 5 personas que mueven 
opinión, que mueven pauta, que mueven esto y el otro, ta, ta, ta… No le vamos a 
decir, mira René no queremos que pongás la bandera de equis partido, pero puta por 
favor bájame el volumen”. (Businessman nine, 2017, highlighted FRR) 
 
The meetings were used to show media which interests were under threat, and whose side the 
media should pick.  They also allowed elites to portray themselves as a unified group with a 
common agenda, reflecting similar political interests and concerns.  They showed media 
owners that they would act collectively to any threat to their interests, including pulling their 
money out of the media.  In countries where elites are in one way or another tied to each other, 
elites’ pressure was not just a matter of threatening the media’s economic dependence.  But 
also represented a situation in which their privileged position in the upper-circles was under 






                                                 
29 Owner of TELETICA, most popular TV Costa Rican broadcaster. 




In Costa Rica, electoral studies show that since mid-December 2013 positive electoral 
preferences towards the FA and its candidate started to decline.  The downfall coincided with 
the time when elites started capturing the media and with it, the increase in negative reports on 
FA.  For instance, Alfaro-Redondo & Gómez-Campo (2014b) found out in a panel study that 
at the beginning of the electoral campaign, FA had the highest electoral support base (base de 
apoyo electoral) with around 25%, followed by PLN with 22%,  PAC 7% and ML 4%.  
Nevertheless, after December 2013 the political support received by FA was radically reduced 
in comparison with other political parties.  This is also complemented with information they 
provided regarding the political support for candidates.  They show that the support that Jose 
María Villalta gained between October to December (4.38%), when the coverage about FA 
was mainly neutral, declined in January (-4.1) and before the elections (-4.35) when political 
coverage was predominantly negative.  At the end, in the first round Frente Amplio was third 
with 17.4% of votes, PLN second with 22.2% and PAC, first with 30.6%. 
  
Elites did not face any kind of competition, they coordinated the capture of the media.  With 
limited time, less than 8 weeks before elections, they took advantage of their networks and 
their strong capacity to organize and engaged in a common front to defeat FA.  Despite the 
sectoral differences among elites or even the institutional constraints imposed, they agreed on 
the risks of a common threat, “los comunistas” and the need to engage it politically.  Elites 
formed an informal association outside of political parties or business associations. They used 
the networks that tied them with media owners to capture the media.  They shared the fear of a 
leftist government threatening not just private property but also freedom of press. 
 
The Costa Rican case shows that it was more strategic for elites to focus the capture on 
particular media groups. These media groups were chosen based on business, personal, political 
or advertisement ties among elites and media owners.  As I showed in chapter five, it was the 
media companies embedded in powerful business communities such as the case of Grupo 
Nación.  The capture of Grupo Nación gave the Costa Rican elites a major leverage and salience 
on the newspapers with the highest level of readership, resources and with a privileged position 
in the elite’s networks.  This was advantageous for elites.  The communist frames and elites’ 
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concerns were echoed by less resourced media companies, who replicated the information 
produced by Grupo Nación. 
 
Elites’ cohesion and networks with media owners explained why countries such Costa Rica 
had experienced a type of coordinated media capture.  The interlocking nature of these elites 
had allowed them to reach a common consensus about country’s development and barriers 
towards their particular interest.  When threatened, elites and the media have agreed on the 
mobilization of capital and media power to defend the status quo.  The concentration of capital 
and media power in few people had reduce the possibilities of other actors to dispute elites and 
the media’ interest.  In addition, since media owners and elites share a common interest that 
not necessarily is shared by most people; media capture in hands of a few jeopardizes 
democracy.  It concentrates definitional power in hands of those with access to capture the 
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7 Disputing the Capture:  The Strategies of 
Elites and Counter-Elites to Capture the 
Media in El Salvador 
 
“…la pretensión de la izquierda en El Salvador de tener sus propios medios o de crear un  
nuevo polo mediático que introduzca competencia y una mirada diferente sobre lo que ocurre 
en nuestro país y en el mundo entero no sólo no es una idea descabellada que atente contra la 
democracia, sino que, lejos de ello, es un proyecto necesario e indispensable para el 
fortalecimiento democrático.” 
Mauricio Funes,  
First leftist president of El Salvador (2009-2014) 
 
“(…) nosotros tuvimos muchísimo éxito en cobertura de los medios tradicionales en el 
sentido de que todos los días teníamos algo, es decir que noticia nuestra va a salir mañana, 
entonces teníamos concentraciones, teníamos mensajes, 
 teníamos actividades y ahí sí teníamos una buena cobertura de esos medios tradicionales” 





At the end of November 2013 during an extensive TV interview president Mauricio Funes of 
El Salvador leaked documents that revealed that former president of El Salvador and ARENA’s 
chief of campaign -Francisco Flores- had diverted a Taiwanese donation of 15 million dollars 
to his personal bank accounts.  The 15 million dollars were supposed to relieve the impacts of 
2001 Salvadorian earthquake. The scandal was pressed in the TV show with the largest 
audience in El Salvador “Debate con Nacho30".  However, this corruption scandal was not the 
only one prompted by Funes in media before presidential elections 2014.  In fact, long before 
                                                 
30 Debate con Nacho is a TV show hosted by Narciso Castillo.  According to an investigation carried out by the 
public prosecutor in El Salvador, Castillo would have received money during Antonio Saca and Mauricio Funes 
administrations in an exchange of positive media coverage. See Lemus & Martínez, 2018. 
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November 2013, Funes had sought to capture the media to hurt the electoral support of 
ARENA.  
 
This attempt of capture by a leftist president was unprecedented in a country where the media 
have been particularly criticized for being highly concentrated, its staunch defense of elites 
political and economic interest, censoring criticism, reproducing elites’ discourse and for 
favoring an electoral authoritarism (Becerra et al., 2009a; Guzmán, 2009; Pérez & Carballo, 
2013; Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wolf, 2009).  Historically, Salvadoran elites have benefited 
from their personal, economic and ideological ties with media owners to produce consent about 
their political and economic project  as commented in Chapter four (Pérez & Carballo, 2013; 
Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wolf, 2009).  Nevertheless, some of these pacts changed when Funes 
was elected president of El Salvador in 2009.  In control of government resources and 
institutions a new group of actors, defined in here as counter-elites, took advantage of their 
privileged positions in Salvadorian society and tried to change the relations of power that have 
benefited elites.  In this path to change El Salvador, counter-elites knew that they would require 
control over the government through electoral victories.  Facing presidential elections, counter-
elites sought to capture the media.  Counter-elites organized, produced and disseminated the 
frame “los corruptos”, founded media companies, restricted negative reports about the 
government performance and increased governmental propaganda.   
 
Nonetheless, counter-elites were not alone in their pursuit to capture the media.  In fact, there 
was a dispute among two fractions.  While counter-elites were trying to keep control over the 
government, elites were trying to take it back.  Elites were trying to restore the oligarchy’s 
dominant position they hold during many years through electoral politics and a firm grip over 
the media (Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Segovia, 2002; Wolf, 2009).  In these regards, elites tried 
to gain influence producing and censoring information and publicizing a frame about the 
possible threat FMLN represented to the country regarding politic and economic ties with 
Cuba, Venezuela and FARC-EP (Colombia). 
 
This chapter seeks to explain how elites and counter-elites disputed to capture the media during 
2014 presidential elections.  It is shown that the dispute to capture the media reduced the 
capacity of elites to influence, despite of their economic muscle.  In fact, counter-elites were 
able to gain public opinion thanks to the capture of main TV broadcaster that has been 
historically associated with elites (TCS), the different media companies they built and their 
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indisputable capacity to bribe journalists and media owners.  The above allowed counter-elites 
to won public debate before elections, in which they framed ARENA, elites’ party, as a group 
of corrupt politicians.  
 
This chapter continue as follows.  In the first part it is discussed who the elites and counter-
elites were, as well, as their motivation to capture the media.  In the second part the different 
politic, economic and ownership strategies followed by counter-elites and elites are 
comparatively described and analyzed. 
 
7.2 Elites and Counter-Elites in El Salvador 
 
Elections 2014 took place in a particular context where two groups were facing crucial 
challenges.  On the one hand, elites who encountered the possibility of losing, for the second 
time, their privilege access to the State.  On the other hand, counter-elites who were fighting to 
maintain the continuity of their political project.  The elites got organized in an informal 
association called G20 and the counter-elites organized themselves around a center-left alliance 
led by president Mauricio Funes (left) and former president Antonio Saca (center-right). 
 
7.2.1 Elites: G20 
 
In May 2013 the wealthiest person in El Salvador, Ricardo Poma, organized a meeting31 to 
analyze the critical situation of the elite’s political party, ARENA.  Norman Quijano, current 
mayor of the capital San Salvador and ARENA’s presidential candidate, was facing a decline 
in his popularity.  His approval ratings felt from 64% in August 2012 to 34% in November 
2012 (Labrador, 2013).  The meeting on Francisco Callejas’ house, largest Salvadorian retails 
mogul, was intended to redirect ARENA’s presidential campaign.  In this meeting G20 defined 
how much money they would give (US$ 20 million) and how the money may be used during 
the campaign.  They also defined that former president Francisco Flores should lead the party’s 
campaign (Publicist one, 2015). 
 
                                                 
31 A year before elections these meetings were quite common as recalled by an elite interviewed.   
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For Salvadorian elites the 2014 presidential elections implied a threat they have overcome for 
many years: the possibility of the election of a former guerrilla commander.  In the perspective 
of Salvadoran elites, a government led by a former guerrilla commander would involve a more 
radical version of FMLN.  For elites it was the FMLN with historical relations with FARC-EP 
of Colombia and with the leftists’ governments of Venezuela and Cuba.  It was the threat of 
the “narco-castro-chavistas”.  Most importantly, it was also a chance of losing for five more 
years the direct access and influence over the government. 
 
G20 is an informal association among Salvadorian tycoons. The majority of them are part of a 
modernized generation of businesspeople who have led largest family companies since mid-
eighties (Segovia, 2002).  Also, they are, as I commented in chapter three, a part of a generation 
of business people associated with the foundation and political development of ARENA in the 
1980s (Koivumaeki, 2010), the peace agreements in the 1990s (Rettberg, 2006), the 
development of regressive tax system (A. Schneider, 2012) and the transnationalization of 
Salvadorian economy (Bull, 2013; Segovia, 2005).  Ideologically, the threat of a leftist guerrilla 
during the eighties contributed to nurture a radical anticommunist sentiment and an open 
support for neoliberal policies (Beard, 2001).  
 
The common interests among G20 has provided Salvadorian tycoons with a strong political 
muscle to pressure ARENA.  For instance, G20 has appointed ARENA’s party directors, 
congress and presidential candidates and decided ARENA’s electoral founding (Politician one, 
2015).  The G20 includes prominent elites such as Tomás Regalado Dueñas (Compañía 
Azucarera Salvadoreña), Alejandro Dueñas (Grupo Dueñas), Ricardo Sagrera (Grupo Hilasal), 
Roberto Kriete (Avianca-TACA), Ricardo Poma (Grupo Poma), Jorge Zablah (Philip Morris), 
Juan Federico Salaverría (Publicidad Commercial), Francisco Calleja and Carlos Calleja 
(Grupo Calleja), Ricardo Simán (Grupo Simán), Raúl Álvarez Belismelis (Coex), Carlos 
Enrique Araujo (Banco Azul), Saúl Suster, and Roberto Murray Meza (Grupo Agrisal) 
(Labrador, 2013).  G20 also included media owners such as Enrique Altamirano (El Diario de 
Hoy) and Juan Carlos Eserski (TCS) (Labrador, 2013).  Taking into account their capital, some 
of these elites were included by president Funes in the National Growth Council to promote, 
mobilize and secure private investments (Bull et al., 2014).  
 
For G20, this was the first electoral campaign in which they were not in control of the 
government and its resources.  Since the mid-eighties, elites associated with G20 have been in 
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control of Salvadorian institutions without dispute as I commented in chapter three.  At first 
with the support of the United States, they organized and mobilized resources.  They placed 
money, but also prepared people, policies and promote a neoliberal project.  FUSADES, an 
associated think tank, has been, as I showed in chapter four, a critical actor providing elites 
with an economic roadmap, ideological plan, reports and information.  G20 also have the 
expertise of managing the media, specifically, the use of the media to mobilize the 
“anticommunist” voters against FMLN during the former three presidential campaigns 
(Guzmán, Peraza, & Rivera, 2006).   
 
But 2014 presidential elections were different for elites concerning three main reasons.  First, 
months before the election Funes started to press several corruption scandals that impacted the 
honorability and electoral support of ARENA.  This has to be stopped.  Second, due to the 
electoral presence of GANA, elites needed the media to portray ARENA as the unique center-
right alternative to oppose FMLN.  Third, elites urged the media to counter attack corruption 
scandals.  In doing so, they needed to reproduce a frame that connected Sánchez Cerén, the 
presidential candidate of FMLN, with human rights violations during the civil war, with FARC-
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Figure 10: Photo of FMLN presidential candidate, Salvador Sánchez, 
with the guerrilla commanders of FARC-EP 
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7.2.2 Counter-Elites: Funes and Strategic Partners 
 
Once elected in 2009, Funes was aware that to pursue a process of structural and institutional 
change, as he promised in his campaign, a necessary step was to consolidate a coalition with 
different political and economic actors.  These actors included his advisors -the group “Amigos 
de Mauricio”32, the FMLN and ALBA Petróleos, the army33, some Salvadorian Palestinian 
descents, and Antonio Saca and his party GANA.  This coalition among different actors, in 
here known as counter-elites, granted them with different strategic resources.   
 
With the incorporation of Saca, counter-elites added the support of the largest radio holding in 
El Salvador, Grupo Samix.  The pact also secured political support from GANA in Congress 
and opened access to media mogul Boris Eserski, owner of the largest TV broadcasting 
company (TCS).  Eserski was a supporter of Saca before and during his presidency (2004-
2009).  Saca and Funes share some similarities that, to some extent worked for keeping counter-
elites united.  Both were social communicators.  Saca, a radio presenter, turned into Radio 
mogul in the 90's and Mauricio Funes, one of the most critical TV anchor voices since mid-
eighties.  Apart from shared interest in the media, Funes and Saca -as opposed to previous 
presidents Alfredo Cristiani, Armando Calderón Sol and Francisco Flores- were not born or 
raised in traditional elitist families.  Saca, was a Palestinian Salvadorian descent.  Also  despite 
being elected on elites’ political platform –ARENA, he followed to some extent his own 
political path: representing national based elites and advancing in some progressive tax reforms 
such as taxing alcohol34 to provide essential health services (A. Schneider, 2012).  Funes, on 
the other hand, became the first left-wing president elected by means of elites opposing political 
party: FMLN.  Funes also promoted significant fiscal reforms that taxed elites (Menkos, 2012). 
 
As suggested from the above, counter-elites combined actors ideologically different from the 
left, center and center-right of Salvadorian political spectrum.  Some actors have developed a 
                                                 
32 This group included businessmen, right-wing politicians, academicians, and army generals.  The list included 
Miguel Menéndez, Gerardo and Francisco Cáceres, Luis Lagos, Franzi “Hato” Hasbún, Luis Menéndez, and 
General David Munguia Payés.  
33 Even though peace agreements modified and restricted the role of the military in politics, the current crisis of 
gangs' violence has turned Salvadoran army again in a key political actor.  The alliance between Funes and General 
and Defense Minister David Mungía Payés was crucial in these regards.  To see further impacts of political elites 
and army alliances in El Salvador: Martínez-Vallejo, 2017. 
34 At that time, alcohol industry was in hand of two elite families Regalado Dueñas and Murray Mesa.  These two 
families have also been main ARENA's supporters.  
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political career first in the guerrilla.  Others, like Saca came from ARENA, and others have 
developed a career in civil society or the academic organizations. With the exception of three 
to four businesspeople, the majority of counter-elites belong to middle-upper classes in El 
Salvador.  Despite the ideological differences among them, they shared the idea that to produce 
significant changes in El Salvador it was necessary to curb the power of elites.  For counter-
elites, the unequal relations of power have exclusively benefited elites in El Salvador.  In these 
regards, a primary goal was to maintain government control through electoral victories 
(Secretaría Técnica de la Presidencia, 2013). 
 
In term of resources, these counter-elites offered a variety of political and economic resources.  
For instance, ALBA Petróleos provided counter-elites with millions of dollars that came as 
donations or concessional loans from Venezuela. These resources were used to pay publicity 
or to subsidize social policies.  Also, the control over the government allowed Funes to 
mobilize money to secure pacts with media owners. 
 
The media, for Funes and one of his principal advisors and media expert, Franzi Hato Hasbún, 
was a central scenario of dispute to change relations of power and to win elections.  They were 
also aware, according to a Funes’ advisor, that they were going to find a portion of 
businesspeople, including the media, highly radicalized against their center-left political 
project.  For example, El Diario de Hoy, and another portion of media owner open to negotiate 
public advertising in an exchange of positive media coverage, such as TCS (Politician two, 
2015).  In this regard, counter-elites sought from the beginning of Funes’ administration to 
capture the media to promote government policies and to reduce political confrontation, 
negative coverage and maintain social support (Politician two, 2015). 
 
7.3 The Strategies of Elites to Capture the Media 
 
In El Salvador, it has been long discussed the role of the media in favor of elites interest (Pérez 
& Carballo, 2013; Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wade, 2016; Wolf, 2009).  Class and ideological 
similarities among media owners and elites, the strict control of media owners over 
information, media owners’ advocacy to participate in politics and a highly concentrated media 
market have been crucial factors that have granted media protection to the interest of elites.  
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Nonetheless, the above changed due to the existence of other actors willing to dispute and 
capture the media.  Sometimes using the same strategies, sometimes differing. 
 
7.4 Political Strategies 
 
In the disputes for capturing the media, elites and counter-elites battled to secure their access 
to and to influence what was reported in the media. On the one hand, elites took advantage of 
their lobbying influence and capacity to produce information and knowledge. On the other, 
counter-elites sought to modify what was reported regarding public control over TV and radio 
frequencies and contracts. 
 
7.4.1 Legal Favoritism 
 
Media owners are highly dependent on governments.  TV and radio owners still depend on 
government control over TV and radio frequencies and in general, media outlets depend on the 
different contracts with the government.  However due to the political costs, governments are 
quite reluctant to make changes over the media frequency control or the media contracts 
(Kitzberger, 2016).  Nevertheless, what counter-elites found possible in order to capture the 
media was to modify the control of old frequencies and blackmail media owners with 
government contracts. 
 
The biggest media moguls, Angel González and Boris Eserski, signed a gentlemen’s 
agreement35 about Salvadorian TV market in the 1980s.  The pact blocked González to enter 
into Salvadorian market.  El Salvador was the only country in Central America where González 
did not presence.  As an exchange Eserski would buy to Alba Vision (González’s company) 
the entire content produced by his companies (soap operas, football matches, etc.).  This 
gentlemen’s agreement was broken in 2011.  According to interviewees the pact was shattered 
because FMLN and Funes offered González a better deal.  The deal included frequencies and 
public advertisement in an exchange of a positive coverage about the government.  In 2011 a 
González’s relative, Juan Carlos González Sáenz, bought three radio stations (YSCE 680 AM; 
                                                 
35 According to a businessman on media and publicity since the 80's; there was an agreement among Central 
American TV moguls to limit TV business investments in the region.  "This gentlemen pact" prohibited a TV 
mogul from one country to invest in another one.  The pact helped Central American TV moguls to open an office 
in Miami where they jointly negotiated together to buy the US and foreign contents (Businessman one, 2015).   
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YSOA 94.9 FM, YSSR 92.5 FM) and a TV Channel (Canal 37-UHF) for US$3.8 million 
(Romero, 2014).  However, in order to make the TV frequency more lucrative some legal 
changes and political appointments had to be made. 
 
In 2014 the new president of Superintendencia General de Electricidad y Telecomunicaciones 
(SIGET), the regulatory body for broadcast media, was appointed:  Ástor Escalante, former 
Deputy prosecutor, and an ally of Antonio Saca.  Once in office Escalante issued multiple 
resolutions that changed the map of frequencies in El Salvador allowing Ángel González to 
operate in frequencies with better quality and national reception (Valencia & Guzmán, 2014)36.  
Since then, with two TV stations and radio, González formed a new media conglomerate called 
Red Salvadoreña de Medios. 
 
In addition to the above, counter-elites in control of the government blackmailed media owners 
with canceling public contracts.  That was the case of El Mundo newspaper.  El Mundo is a 
newspaper that belongs to business holding Grupo Borja of Borja Nathan family.  Borja Nathan 
family is an old elite with diversified investments in multiple sectors, such as coffee, energy, 
real estate, industry, telecommunications and technology.  In the technological sector, Grupo 
Borja owns SERTRACEN, the Salvadorian company in charge of issuing Salvadorian driven 
licenses and auto plates.  According to a businessman interview (Businessman one, 2015), 
Funes used these contracts with SERTRACEN to put pressure on El Mundo to change from 
time to time the negative coverage about the government.  Through phone calls president Funes 
threatened to cancel SERTRACEN contracts if they did not change or modify the negative 
coverage about the government. 
 
7.4.2 Lobbying and Public Relations 
 
A particularity of Salvadorian elites is that since 1980s they have been successful actors 
shaping policies, defining a common ideological framework and securing an electoral 
hegemony (Koivumaeki, 2010; Wolf, 2009).  In doing so, Salvadorian elites have been able to 
develop a lobbying strategy that turned their particular demands in news reports.  The internal 
                                                 
36 Due to the pressure of Eserki’s family and other media owners the change of frequencies was declared 
unconstitutional.  TV Red appealed that decision and TV Red was allowed to continue using channel 11 until a 
final verdict was reached (Freedom House, 2016). 
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organization of their demands (G20), the control over central business associations and think 
tanks, as well as, their installed capacity to produce information and media access granted elites 
with resources and several legitimized voices.  These multiple voices have provided the media 
with information produced by elites and also sources that for many years allowed them to 
control public debate. 
 
As I stated before, G20 organized multiple meetings in which they defined and agreed on the 
threat of having another government lead by FMLN.  The meetings were also useful to collect 
money and defined the strategy to counter-attack the campaign of FMLN.   With the advisory 
of J.J. Rendón, a famous political strategist in Latin America, elites also set the main arguments 
and targets of the campaign: ALBA Petróleos, corruption, human rights violations during the 
civil war, crisis and ties with FARC-EP, Venezuela and Cuba.  In the meetings some media 
owners were included according to an interviewee.  As he notes: 
Si usted me pregunta si hubo digamos una, hubieron (sic) muchas reuniones de 
empresarios. Pero lo que le quiero decir es que en esas reuniones ya estaban los 
medios de comunicación, o sea no había que hacer reuniones de empresarios para 
convencer a los medios de comunicación, muchos medios de comunicación ya 
estaban también preocupados, estaban siendo partícipes de esas reuniones 
(Businesman three, 2017). 
 
In addition to these meetings, elites used business associations and think tanks under their 
control to tailor negative stories and information about FMLN.  These were the cases of ANEP, 
CASALCO, ASI and FUSADES.  These institutions organized multiple conferences, published 
hundreds of critical documents, and issued reports about FMLN’s government performance 
and on the negative economic perspectives of El Salvador under a second FMLN’s 
government.  Likewise, representatives of these organizations actively participated in media 
debates and interviews defending the idea of an urgent political change, as well as, the 
implications of the crisis in Venezuela for El Salvador.  Elites used reports, press releases and 
interviews to capture the media with their particular views on how to cut the electoral support 
of FMLN.  To illustrate that, in October 2013, Javier Simán37 president of ASI denounced that 
ALBA Petróleos was a threat to the industrial sector and medium and small companies.  For 
Simán, ALBA Petróleos has proportionated funds to those who have promoted fear and class 
                                                 
37 Javier Simán is a retails and real estate mogul.  He was ARENA’s presidential candidate.  He was defeated by 
Carlos Callejas, another member of G20 in April 2018. 
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division with the main goal of maintaining political power (see figure 11).  Also, FUSADES, 
an elite-related think tank, was a common source that provided the media with different reports 
questioning Funes transparency, insecurity, corruption and the use of public funds to promote 
FMLN campaign.  Figures 11 and 12 illustrate media reporting on ASI and FUSADES 
campaigns to attack on ALBA Petróleos projects and government. 
 
Figure 11: ASI: Alba uses public funds to political businesses 
 
 
Source: El Diario de Hoy, 5 de octubre de 2013 
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7.5 Ownership Strategies 
 
Freedom House (2016) has pointed out that in El Salvador, due to the lack of economic 
resources media outlets and reporters often exercise self-censorship to avoid offending media 
owners, editors, and government officials.  Elite’s firm grip over the media has been the most 
common characteristic that has allowed them to capture it.  Following the above, counter-elites 
founded new media companies, especially online, in which the agenda was defined by their 
particular interest.  Meanwhile, elites sought to restrict the information that may hurt the 




As a result of peace agreements signed by Salvadoran government in 1992, the FMLN, recently 
turned into a political party, obtained six radio frequencies (3 in FM and 3 in AM), and two 
TV frequencies (Pérez & Carballo, 2013).  The two TV frequencies were never used and due 
to the rupture among different fractions inside FMLN, the majority of radio stations were 
sold38.  The above and the limited access to financial resources and technology in El Salvador 
constrained for almost two decades the voice of FMLN in public debates39.  That was about to 
be changed.  Funes has been an outspoken advocate of a new polo de medios (Funes, 1995) 
and was also aware that to modify power relations, they needed their own media.   
 
With the control over regulatory institutions and public funds, access to private resources from 
ALBA Petróleos and favored by a decline in technologies prices, counter-elites started their 
own media companies, one of them GenteVe.  Jorge Hernández40, former news anchor of TCS, 
                                                 
38 A radio and TV frequencies were sold to a famous Christian church in El Salvador: Iglesia Elim (Pérez & 
Carballo, 2013).  
39 Historically there has been just one newspaper close to the left: Diario Co Latino. 
40 The media business among Funes and Hernández increased exponentially once Funes left the government. In 
2015 Hernández bought for US$ 800.000 La Página an online media.  Journalist reports have suggested that 
Hernández acted as a front man -testaferro- of Mauricio Funes, the real owner of La Página. In addition to La 
Página, Herndández started a TV channel (Orbita Tv) and a radio station (Orbita FM) in 2015.  Jorge Hernández 
has been accused of money laundry and has been incarcerated since November 2017.  He is accused of monthly 
receiving US$ 10.000 receiving from public funds. In February 2016, Mauricio Funes was accused of illicit 
enrichment. Among the money Funes has been questioned by Salvadorian General Attorney, there is payment of 
US$ 121.500 made by Multimedia SA.CV., whose owner is Jorge Hernández. 
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bought two TV frequencies in open television, one to Jorge Zedán41 in 2005 and the other in 
2009.  In 2012 a group of Radio Farabundo Martí founders led by an FMLN leader, Wilfredo 
Zepeda, bought one of those TV channels to Hernández, Canal 2942.  The money came from 
ALBA Petróleos, as a loan, as suggested by an interviewee (Editor two, 2015).  It was the origin 
of the first TV channel controlled by FMLN.   
 
Funes and the FMLN also put special emphasis on launching online websites such as 
Transparencia Activa, an online platform controlled by the presidency and oriented to publicize 
government achievements.  Also, closed-related to FMLN, different civil organizations 
founded Voces Diario Digital in 2009.  This project included press and online resources (radio 
and website).  One of its objectives was to be a counterweight of the mainstream media.  The 
media project of Funes included his own TV show.  In July 2012, Mauricio Funes started with 
Conversando con el Presidente43 (see figure 8).  The program used a public radio station, Radio 
Nacional, and it was also broadcasted by 41 radio stations and seven TV channels related to 
Asociación de Radios Comunitarias de El Salvador (ARPAS) and by five stations of Grupo 
Samix.  The main idea was to answer direct questions made by Salvadorian citizens.  This 
objective was accomplished during Conversando con el Presidente first year.  For instance, 
according to Peña (2014), from January to June 2013, Funes used most of his time to answer 
questions from people.  But everything changed radically since July 2013, nine months before 
the elections, when Funes dedicated only around 16 minutes to answer Salvadorian questions 
and the rest to politically attack, what he calls, the corruption of ARENA.  Peña (2014), shows 
that a month before elections, Funes used between 82 to 100 minutes of his program (120 
minutes) to attack ARENA and its politicians.  Through his radio programs, Funes made public 
several denounces related to Taiwan funds or the case of CEL-ENEL44.  Conversando con el 
                                                 
41 Jorge Zedán Salvadorian businessmen owner of Canal 12.  Zedán was a protector of Mauricio Funes. In 2001, 
Zedán sold Canal 12 to Ricardo Salinas Pliego, owner of TV Azteca.  The Mexican media mogul paid US$ 7.9 
millions for Canal 12. See (Dada et al., 2012)   
42 Journalist reports suggest that because of this Jorge Hernández was separated from TCS (Arauz, 2012). 
43 The idea of this program came from the company Polistepeque. This is a company own by Brazilian publicist 
Joao Santana. Nicknamed „maker of presidents” for helping in the political campaigns of Lula da Silva and Dilma 
Rousseff in Brazil, and Hugo Chávez in Venezuela.  Santana is now serving 8-year prison sentence for million-
dollar payments from bribe money in the sprawling “Lava-Jato” graft investigation. See (“Brazilian says 
Venezuela’s Maduro made illegal payments in 2012 Chavez campaign,” 2017) 
44 In 2002, the Comisión Ejecutiva Hidroeléctrica del Río Lempa (CEL), who ran the Salvadorian Geothermal 
Company (LaGeo), signed a contract with Italian Company Enel. In the agreement, the Italian company became 
a strategic partner to explore and to exploit geothermal wells and allowed Italian company to become a majority 
stockholder of LaGeo.  To Funes, but also to Antonio Saca who during his presidency rejected an investment of 
a US$100 million of Enel to capitalize its control over LaGeo, the contract signed was prejudicial for Salvadorian 
state because allowed a transnational company to take control over State resources. The perpetrators for this 
unfavorable deal were, according to Funes, CEL’s board of directors who were named by ARENA and former 
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Presidente gave Funes an incredible salience on Salvadorian public opinion and debates, 
especially months before elections 2014.  While mainstream media (TCS, El Mundo, La Prensa 
Gráfica and El Diario de Hoy) were silent on the accusations against Flores for diverting 
money, Funes was sharing in his programs and in media companies captured by counter-elites 
classified information that revealed how Flores diverted Taiwan’s donations to his private bank 
accounts.  
Figure 13: Conversando con el Presidente advertisement 
 
Source: El Diario de Hoy, 8.03.2014 
 
                                                 
president Francisco Flores.  Following Funes accusations, CEL’s board and Francisco Flores  were accused of 
graft charges.  Among one of the suspects was Jorge Simán, former CEL president and founder of El Faro, an 
independent media (Lemus, 2013). 
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One of the online media allied to counter-elites was Diario1.com.  Diario1.com was officially 
launched in September 2013, five months before the elections. It was founded by Adolfo “Fito” 
Salumé45, an agribusiness tycoon.  In the political horizon, the main goal of Diario1 was to 
support the political aspirations of Salume and the political party founded by him Democracia 
Salvadoreña.  Diario1.com together with president Funes were the first media that prompted 
the corruption scandal that involved the chief of campaign of ARENA.  Funes and Diario1.com 
were the only ones who had the classified information that demonstrated how former president 
Flores had diverted US$15 million in contributions for earthquake victims to his personal 
accounts (see figure 14).   
 
The ownership of Salvadorian largest radio holding was also fundamental for counter-elites.  
Grupo Samix is owned by Antonio Saca.  Through Grupo Samix, counter-elites could have 
access to the largest radio broadcaster.  On the one hand, Grupo Samix allowed Funes to 
broadcast weekly his radio programs “Conversando con el Presidente".  And on the other hand, 
the radios were a crucial tool to promote UNIDAD, the political party led by Saca during the 
elections.  According to a businessman close to Saca (Businessman one, 2015), Grupo Samix 
stations used to press three times more the political ideas of Saca than what they pressed about 
other parties.  For example, weeks before elections, Saca held a “Marathon” on his thirty radios 
across El Salvador to promote his candidacy.  In the pact among Funes and Saca was 
understood that regarding the popularity of Saca and his center-right wing ideology, 
GANA/UNIDAD would take votes from ARENA, not FMLN.  A significant cast of votes for 




                                                 
45 The relations between Salumé and Funes started with Salume’s father, Nicolás Salumé Barake.  Salumé’s is 
among very influential families of Palestinian origins in El Salvador known as “los árabes."  Nicolás Salumé was 
a very closed friend and a financial sponsor of Antonio Saca.  Nicolas Salumé Jr. was appointed by Antonio Saca 
in CEL’s board, a position that he kept under Funes government.  The beginning of Funes relation with Nicolás 
started with a donation of US$3 million dollars to Funes’ electoral campaign. Also, Salume lent Funes a house in 
an exclusive area in San Salvador.  Nicolás Salume was named by Funes as "designated president", acting  as 
president of El Salvador between July 31th and August 7th in 2011(Andréu & Peña, 2014).  
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The traditional media in El Salvador are in hands of few families with close ties to elites as I 
showed in chapter three.  Historically this fierce ownership control has helped elites to silence 
negative information that could undermine their interest (Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wolf, 
2009).  This is what happened with the corruption scandals that link a number of politicians of 
ARENA, such as the cases of  CEL-ENEL and Taiwan funds. As recalled by a top ARENA’s 
politician “…I can tell you that at some point they did us a favor (traditional media), they did 
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not press anything that could affect us” (Politician six, 2017).  For elites and media owners 
interviewed, the corruption charges against the politicians of ARENA were unfair and 
politically driven to hurt ARENA’s electoral support.  Considering the above, the actions taken 
by elites was to restrict the publication of information related to those corruption scandals.  For 
example, when in December 2013, Francisco Flores was called to appear in Parliament to 
declare about the donations from Taiwan, the press decided not covered as recalled by a 
journalist (Journalist one, 2015).  However, when the public and the counter-elites’ media 
pressure was unbearable, owners of the traditional media decided to support Flores. Also, they 
tried to reduce the salience of the information about the scandals.  To ilustrate that see figures 
15 and 16.  As pointed out by an ARENA’s politician “(…) aunque los medios tradicionales 
dijeran de alguna manera no decían (…)” (Politician six, 2017).   
 
Media owners were aware that once they informed about the corruption scandals, the campaign 
of ARENA would be harmed.  An ARENA politician remembered, that he was advised by a 
media owner to separate Francisco Flores of the campaign.  As he recalled from his 
conversation with the media owner “(…) si me permitís darte un consejo aparta a Paco Flores, 
porque te está haciendo mucho daño (…)” (Politician six, 2017).  Press also questioned the 
impartiality of general attorney and the allegations, and even denounced the influence of 
president Funes over the case.  The framing that the traditional media gave to the stories was 
the one where the privilege voices were the politicians questioned.  For instance, in the cover 
of El Diario de Hoy from December 2013, the headline reads about Flores questioning Funes 
to prove his accusations (see figure 15).  Likewise, in a report from January 2014, La Prensa 
Gráfica granted president Flores with an important coverage to defend himself arguing that 
there were not investigations against him in El Salvador neither the United Stated about the 
funds from Taiwan (see figure 16). 
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Figure 16:  Flores: Neither the General Attorney or United States 
have a judicial inquiry about the case of Taiwán 
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7.6 Economic Strategies 
 
The 2014 electoral campaign was different for elites.  As it was recognized by elites 
interviewed during this time the ones with the stronger economic muscles were counter-elites.  
Despite G20 united largest capitalists, counter-elites were in control of State advertisement and 
had access to funds from ALBA Petróleos.  In here I explain how elites and counter-elites 
sought to allocate money in the media to change or modify the information they were producing 
in their own benefit. 
 
7.6.1 Advertisement Influence 
 
As it has been explained before, Funes was an experienced journalist with a career of at least 
twenty years in Salvadorian media.  He was also advised by Hato Hasbún, a well-known leftist 
politician, and media expert.  Both knew whom they should talk to, and which buttons to press, 
one of them being public advertising.  Salvadorian state is one of the largest media advertisers. 
(Freedom House, 2016; Pérez & Carballo, 2013).  A first and very successful move made by 
Funes was to pact with media owners yearly public advertising in an exchange of 
positive/neutral coverage.  These non-written pacts allowed the government to exercise control 
over information. 
 
One of these pacts was signed with largest Salvadorian television holding: Tele Corporación 
Salvadoreña (TCS).  TCS is run by Eserski family, Boris and his son, Juan Carlos. The 
company owns three of the five national television networks, channel 2, 4 and 6 and at least 
eight stations more under control of Frontmen (testaferros) (Valencia & Guzmán, 2014).   
 
Due to TCS privilege position on Salvadorian TV market, as asserted by a Salvadorian 
politician, TCS was a key player on the strategies of counter-elites to capture the media.  The 
pact included annual programs of public advertising in exchange of a less negative coverage 
and the promotion of government policies. The pact was based primarily on economic terms, 
as pointed out by a politician closed to Funes. Also, the pact included some ideological 
affinities with the owners of TCS regarding some changes in the country.  As a politician 
observed: 
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“(…) con el gobierno del presidente Funes, se estableció una alianza que duró los 5 
años, entre la presidencia de Funes y TCS, con los dueños de los medios, en el 
sentido de esa alianza para que TCS apoyara al gobierno, por lo menos no atacara 
tan brutalmente al gobierno, etc., etc. ¿Y en base a qué está montada esa alianza? 
Esa alianza se monta en función económica, el gobierno obviamente se compromete 
a la pauta, pero también en temas ideológicos (…) Claro, eso no significa que la 
relación en esta alianza fue contradictoria, en tiempos electorales, TCS siempre en 
sus noticieros le cargaba, le hacía el favor a ARENA y ayudaba al proyecto de 
ARENA; y entonces ahí venía las luchas y los conflictos que teníamos con TCS. 
Pero en general, en los 5 años, hubo una alianza entre el gobierno, entre la 
presidencia y TCS para que se tratara mejor el gobierno y las políticas de gobierno” 
(Politician two, 2015 ).  
 
Regarding the conflicts with TCS, the interviewee continues explaining: 
 
“el presidente agarraba el teléfono y llamaba directamente a los Eserski y les decía: 
“¡¿miren, qué paso?!, ¿y nuestra alianza qué pasó?, ustedes me están pasando en el 
noticiero 10 minutos de propaganda de noticias de ARENA ¿y a nosotros no?, 
estamos violando la alianza (…)“ok, entonces les quitamos ya la publicidad a 
ustedes si no dejan eso…” (Politician two, 2015). 
 
TCS owners let president Funes know that it was a problem of miscommunication with editors 
in chief and that they should fix the problem.  This pact is not a minor fact taking into account 
that literature on Salvadorian media has historically characterized TCS and its owners as an 
significant factor in elites defense and hegemony (Bull et al., 2014; Pérez & Carballo, 2013; 
Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wade, 2016; Wolf, 2017).  To academicians and journalists 
interviewed, the pact might have been also negotiated with the other main TV broadcaster, 
Megavisión.  Owned by Oscar Safie, Megavisión was the only media that opened its doors to 
Funes and Hato Hasbún when Funes was expelled from Channel 12 in 2004.  During almost 
seven years Funes had his program in Megavisión.  Also, Safie was a close ally of Antonio 
Saca.  According to journalist closed to Megavisión:  
“Megavisión ha crecido muchísimo y Megavisión creció mucho en los últimos años 
del gobierno de Tony Saca y con el gobierno de Mauricio Funes” (Journalist five, 
2016). 
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The public advertising pacts were also used to reduce opposition in online media.  For instance, 
journalist reports suggest that Funes used to pay monthly publicity of around US$20.000 to 
online media La Página, the most read Salvadorian news website (Diario1, 2017).   
 
In addition to government’s spending in advertising, counter-elites received a lot of financial 
support from largest private advertiser: ALBA Petróleos.  According to the Media Fact Book 
of El Salvador, ALBA Petróleos is the most prominent advertiser with an annual investment of 
circa US$3 million (Starcom Mediavest Group, 2015).  Journalists reports showed that ALBA 
Petróleos invested approximately US$5.3 million during 2013, and the majority of this money 
was served to pay advertising and publicity to promote its social programs and FMLN 
candidates (El Mundo, 2014).  A controversial issue was that during elections’ day, ALBA 
Petróleos paid to TCS a very uncommon publicity:  a huge ALBA sticker under TCS helicopter 
and publicity on microphones used by journalists during elections coverage46.   
 
Elites tried to use their advertising muscle too.  G20 brings together largest fortunes in El 
Salvador. Three of them, Ricardo Poma, Francisco Callejas and Roberto Murray control one-
third of Salvadorian GDP (Bull et al., 2014, p. 180).  They are also among leading advertisers 
that include supermarkets.  Supermarkets, that is mainly Wal-Mart and Super Selectos 
(Callejas’ family), invest yearly around US$6.457.310 in advertising. Also Excel Automotriz, 
one of the multiple companies owned by Ricardo Poma, invest yearly in advertising around 
US$645.220 (Starcom Mediavest Group, 2015).  For the campaign G20 collected circa US$28 
million according to a top ARENA’s politician (Politician six, 2017).  This was the largest 
amount of money in ARENA’s history, in which at least a third was dedicated to the media as 
recalled by an ARENA’s politician.  Due to the economic muscle of elites and their ties with 
media owners, the traditional media offered exclusive discounts to ARENA.  For example, 3 
for one, so if ARENA paid for one advertising on radio, television or in the press, they received 
three ads instead of one.  Given the lack of control on these in “kind" donations these 
millionaire discounts provided ARENA with some competitive advantage and allowed them to 
save and reallocate resources.  But this time elites were facing a problem, as accounted by elites 
interviewed, politicians and media owners.  Although they had plenty of funds, their economic 
muscle was feebler in comparison with the counter-elites.  As stated by an ARENA’s politician: 
                                                 
46 ALBA Petróleos was sanctioned by TSE (ca. US$ 1.500) for advertising TV spots that promoted FMLN’s 
candidate during election silence (veda electoral). 
 
   143 
 
Lo que pasa es que lastimosamente, nosotros no éramos el partido que más plata 
íbamos a meter, entonces andábamos ahí como rogando (a los medios -FRR). No es 




In El Salvador the use of public money to pay media outlets and journalists for positive 
coverage is popularly known as mentas (mints).  Historically,t hese mentas have been paid with 
money elites and counter-elites allocated from secretly public funds.  These public funds are 
known as partidas secretas (discretionary funds).  These discretionary funds have been 
allocated by Salvadorian presidents to pay a variety of activities and services from 
communications and publicity to intelligence services.  According to data available from Casa 
Presidencial, the Salvadorian presidents who spent the most on partidas secretas were Funes 
(US$351 million) and Antonio Saca (US$301 million; see table 14).  Despite the limited 
information available about these funds, some data suggests that Salvadorian presidents used 
to allocate from these partidas secretas specific payments to media, publicity and 
communications.  For instance, ARENA’s presidents Calderón (1994-1999), Flores (1999-
2005) and Saca (2005-2009) allocated around US$65 million  to a category they called 
“communications” (Arauz & Alvarado, 2017).  
 
Funes did not reveal details on how his administration spent las partidas secretas, but journalist 
reports found out that he continued using these resources to pay monetary bonuses to his 
cabinet and the media (Arauz & Alvarado, 2017; Lemus, 2018).  In one occasion questioned 
by a journalist about money transfers made from his administration (partidas secretas) to bank 
accounts of former president and radio mogul Antonio Saca, Funes responded vía twitter that 
“Mi gobierno no transfirió recursos a cuentas privadas del expresidente Saca. Lo único que 
hicimos fue contratar servicios de publicidad en radios” (Arauz & Alvarado, 2017).  Antonio 
Saca has been accused of misusing public funds while in public office.  One of the accusations 
concern to the use of circa US$7 million from partidas secretas to pay publicity in its on radio 
stations (Labrador & Arauz, 2018).  Also, Jorge Hernández reveled to prosecution authorities 
that he used to work as intermediary between the government of Funes and the media 
(journalist and media owners) (Lemus, 2018).  According to Jorge Hernández he used to pay 
in cash US$ 6000 to US$ 23000 to journalists, media editors and media owners to grant Funes’ 
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government a positive coverage.  The money came from partidas secretas as revealed by the 
Public Prosecutor. 
 
Table 14: Discretionary Funds of Salvadorian Presidents 
and money allocated to media (1994-2016) 
President Partidas Secretas 
(discretionary funds) of 
Salvadorian Presidents 
(millions) 
Money allocated to media 
(millions) 
Armando Calderón Sol US$58.25 US$1.9 
Francisco Flores US$144.59 US$ 21 
Antonio Saca US$301.38 US$ 32 
Mauricio Funes US$351.02 - 
Salvador Sánchez-Cerén* US$101.44 
 
- 
Source: own elaboration based on (Alvarado, 2017). 






























In a post-electoral survey, 66.3% of the people considered that the accusations of corruption 
against Francisco Flores affected negatively the vote for ARENA (IUDOP, Año XXVIII n.o 
3).  In the same survey, 41.4% of the people expressed that the image of FMLN improved 
versus 15.8% that expressed the same about ARENA.  Likewise, in terms of negative opinions 
38.2% expressed that the image of ARENA worsened, versus 19.5% that expressed the same 
about FMLN.  Sánchez Cerén (48.9%) won first round of the Salvadorian elections, followed 
by Norman Quijano (38.9%) and Antonio Saca (11.4%). 
 
Media capture in El Salvador was disputed.  At least one year before the elections both fractions 
started with different actions to capture the media.  They required more money, as I argued, at 
least circa 70 million dollars for the campaign and also more time.  While historically media 
capture was in hand of elites, the emergence of counter-elites turned media capture in an arena 
of disputes.  Counter-elites’ access to government and private economic resources gave them 
enough political and economic muscle to implement different types of actions.  Counter-elites 
used contracts and money to pact with media owners to reduce negative information and to 
reproduce a frame - “the corrupts”- with the main goal of hurting electoral aspirations of 
ARENA.  They were also keen in founding new media.  These new media gave back counter-
elites the opportunity they lost after peace agreements: the possibilities of having their own 
media.  The media outlets in hands of counter-elites broke gridlocked media environment that 
used to benefit elites.  The pacts counter-elites signed with some media owners, including 
former allies of elites such as TCS, granted them with media salience when traditional media 
were reticence to inform in favor of counter-elites political project.  The pacts also allowed 
counter-elites to form a more diverse ideological group of actors.  The public debate was 
opened to voices from the left, center and right of the political spectrum.  
 
Elites on their side used their ties with traditional media to suppress information when 
necessary.  They also organized with business associations and think tanks the production of 
negative information about the performance of the first FMLN government. This was 
distributed as such by traditional media.  Despite the fact that elites gathered the richest 
Salvadorian businesspeople, their money disposal was lower in comparison with the disposal 
of money of counter-elites.  Money also revealed that despite that the traditional media have 
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shared ties and political affinities with elites, for some of them money comes first.  In sum, 
while counter-elites used more political and economic strategies, elites preferred the use of 
ownership strategies.  Each of them used the strategies that had more leverage. 
 
For many years, the historical and undisputable hegemony of elites shaped the ways elites saw 
the media.  They saw the media as a necessary tool to influence the public, but they did not 
worry about having their own media.  For instance, when asked elites discarded the possibilities 
of having their own media companies.  They were sure that the business and family ties would 
secure them and guarantee control over the information produced. They were wrong.  On the 
contrary, for counter-elites the cornerstone of their survival and influence has been the creation, 
control and possession of media. 
 
Finally, the rivalry among elites - and counter-elites to influence policies and the control over 
the government, and the weakened capacity of elites to capture the media reduced elites 
influence over the State and has facilitated progressive policies such as the tax reforms of 2009 
and 2011.  Progressive institutions or changes may be favored by a situation where elites 






















The influence of elites on society depends on their capacity to capture media.  When media is 
captured, elites secure a public arena where the information and ideas that circulate can be 
filtered to reduce threats to the status quo.  Instead of assuming that elites always control and 
manipulate the media, this research critically analyzes how and to what extent elites capture 
the media when they perceive a direct threat to the status quo during electoral campaigns.  In 
what follows, I first summarize the most significant findings of this research, after which I 
discuss some of the possible avenues of future research.  
 
8.1 Empirical findings  
 
The findings of this research suggest that in capturing media, elites may face one of two 
scenarios. In the first, media capture is coordinated and the chances to influence on society are 
higher. This is the case of Costa Rica.  In the second, media capture is disputed, and elites’ 
influence is curbed. This is the case of El Salvador. 
 
As demonstrated in the case of Costa Rica, a coordinated media capture occurred when elites 
were cohesive, and the type of networks woven by elites and media were elitist.  Cohesion 
allowed Costa Rican elites to engage politically and to form an informal organization called 
Alianza Costa Rica in a couple of weeks. The members of Alianza Costa Rica were elites who 
have long sought to implement a business-friendly political agenda.  They shared a common 
background that contained inter-elite conflict. Their capacity to organize into a common front 
and their shared ideology increased their economic and political influence over other actors, 
including media owners.  Alianza Costa Rica brought together the largest private advertisers 
and business groups in the country.  Also, elitist media networks got to work to ensure that 
media and elites were embedded in a small community of powerful economic interests.  These 
types of networks not only restricted opposing voices but also allowed elites to share money, 
information and contacts for campaign financing and the organization of media campaigns 
suggesting the ties Frente Amplio might have with Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua.  These 
networks allowed elites to mobilize the existing media power to their benefit.  Cohesion and 
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elitist networks also increased elites’ trust in media owners.  Elites and media owners in Costa 
Rica have known each other for a long time and have common business interests.  The trust 
among them increased elites' incentives to pursue a narrow range of economic and political 
strategies.  In a short period of time and with relatively few resources invested, elites were 
unchallenged in their ability to frame the leftist party as a communist threat to the Costa Rican 
democracy, which in the end scared Costa Rican voters away from voting for that party (Alfaro-
Redondo & Gómez-Campos, 2014). 
 
In contrast, the fragmentation of Salvadorian elites since 2009 and a dispersion of networks in 
El Salvador turned media capture into an arena of dispute among actors. A group of elites that 
gathered together massive fortunes in the country, the so-called G20, sought to capture media 
framing the Left-wing El Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FLMN) as a 
“narco-Castro-Chavista” threat at least one year before the elections. However, another group 
of “counter-elites”, were similarly trying to capture the media in an attempt to frame the elites 
as “corrupt”.  The privileged access of counter-elites to state institutions and private funds from 
abroad garnered them more economic and political resources to build their media network and 
to put pressure on media owners to suppress negative information. Salvadorian elites weaved 
a different, pluralist type of media network, which enhanced the odds of different interests and 
voices being heard in the public arena.  These pluralist media networks implied only limited 
access to a reduced number of media companies, which in the case of the traditional elites 
meant access to traditional media.  This, in turn, gave counter-elites more opportunities to 
capture non-traditional media in TV, radio, and the Internet to spread the word about ongoing 
corruption scandals within the elite’s party, la Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA).  
At the end of the campaign, the electoral debate in El Salvador was shaped by the corruption 
charges against ARENA (Marroquín, 2015).   
 
Competition among actors also influenced the preferred strategies for media capture.  The fact 
that elites and counter-elites preferred actions related to ownership strategies shows that those 
strategies are the only ones that offer them some guarantees over the information produced. 
The TCS case is emblematic. Although this television company was a historical ally of elites, 
those ties were broken when counter-elites offered the company advertisement privileges and 
money.  In this regard, fragmentation of elites accounted for a major number of actors willing 
to bribe media, but also, actors willing to use their media to influence public debates.  The 
above allows us to rethink the media not as monolithic structures, but rather as a more complex 
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and contradictory actor, that may, especially in the case of bribery or public contracts, act 
against the interest of elites. 
 
In this research, I also provide original data on how elites sought new forms of organization to 
influence the public and policy outside of more traditional business associations.  The 
formation of elite interest groups, such as the G20 and Alianza Costa Rica, shows that even 
though elites may be part of significant business national associations such as Asociación 
Nacional de la Empresa Privada (ANEP) in El Salvador and Unión de Costarricense de 
Cámaras Empresariales (UCCAEP) in Costa Rica, they preferred to engage in political actions 
directly.  Through their direct participation in these types of organizations, they overcame 
bureaucratic and institutional constraints allowing top economic actors to make the decisions 
directly.  As I demonstrated, those decisions were based on the resources they had (money, 
political access, control over regulatory institutions) and the context in which they were 
immersed.  Elite strategies shed light on the reactive nature of these actions.  While political 
and economic strategies seem to be the strategies usually preferred by elites in both countries, 
the focus changed towards ownership when they felt competition or threats.  Likewise, the 
increasing interest of elites around the world on buying media (ownership strategies) can be 
explained not just by their interest in having their voices in the public arena, but also, because 
they feel more threatened now than before.  Elites lost confidence in media owners and political 
parties.  Finally, violent strategies seem to be the last option elites might employ.  Nevertheless, 
in countries such as Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras that have higher levels of impunity, 
violent strategies can be regularly employed due to the lack of probability of prosecution.  For 
elites the game it is not anymore about consent building but censorship. 
 
The case of El Salvador also reveals significant changes in the hegemony of elites since 2009.  
The electoral victory of FMLN allowed for the first time a leftist government to support actors, 
business people or politicians closed related to the FMLN but also increased the odds of some 
business people breaking ties with elites.  That was the case of some families of Palestinians 
descent such as Saca, Salumé or Bukele.  Although they are Salvadorians and their families 
have been able to accumulate wealth since the 1920s, they have been treated with disdain and 
racism by Salvadorian elites.  Social closure among elites that claimed to share a European past 
blocked the full entrance of these families of Palestinians descent into the upper circles.  This 
confirms the thesis that ethnic origins and ideological differences can trigger other actors to 
gain influence and to replace those at the top (Rovira, 2018; Espinoza, 2014).  Similarly, the 
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Salvadorian case shows that there are triggers of rupture among elites that transcend 
macroeconomic interests, such as personal or familial disputes.  However, in the case of Costa 
Rica, social homogeneity among elites has led to lower levels of circulation of elites.  In 
general, since at least 1948, ruling elites have come from two major fractions: the cafetaleros 
or the industrialists. This lower circulation, as I argued in the previous chapters, has reduced 
the level of political confrontation in the country. 
 
Finally, one of the significant findings of this research is that to better comprehend media 
capture, research should look at its relational nature.  Rather than prioritizing the focus on 
ownership, as the literature has done predominantly until now, the focus on media capture 
through the lens of network analysis allows for an understanding of elite and media 
composition and strategies that can boost or constrain political currents and economic interests.  
Those ties gave elites opportunities to access and share information with media, as with the 
lobbying actions in Costa Rica, but also increased the opportunity to censor information.  The 
findings of this research, in contrast to previous studies (Rockwell & Janus, 2003; Wolf, 2009), 
suggest that the media in El Salvador tends to be more democratic than the media in Costa 
Rica.  This is the case because in El Salvador, opposing voices have more chances to use media 
to defend their views and ideas, whereas in Costa Rica media is constrained to a limited number 
of voices that share common views and values with elites.   
 
8.2 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 
The results of this research also speak to larger debates in the international literature.  First, the 
literature on media capture.  In the current discussion of #fakenews that has overtaken the 
public arena, my research provides insightful information for understanding that media capture 
is not a process that necessarily occurs every day when media owners conspire with elites to 
produce #fakenews for their mutual benefit.  On the contrary, I demonstrated that media capture 
is a more complex process where elites debate when they should modify or censor the content 
of information and how best they can do it.  Media capture happens at critical junctures when 
in the public arena elites perceive a threat to the status quo, such as fiscal reform, the election 
of a anti-elite political party, during the negotiations of a trade agreement or peace talks.  In 
Latin American countries, where there has been an historical concentration of media ownership 
in the hands of a few groups, ownership must be understood as one of several different 
strategies that elites have at their disposal when they seek to capture the media.  While most of 
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the literature has focused on media ownership to explain media capture, this research advocates 
for a more detailed and precise description and analysis of the networks at play and the different 
strategies elites may use when they feel the need to shape public opinion in their favor.  
Furthermore, by developing the concept of counter-elites this research encourages a more 
comprehensive view of media capture, one that demonstrates that not only elites can benefit, 
but also opposing actors. 
 
Likewise, in order to be successful, media capture may not always require the capture of all 
media companies.  In some cases, media capture requires focusing all the resources and actions 
on one or two media companies, typically the ones with the largest market shares and 
audiences, because this limited number of companies are the ones that played the primary role 
in shaping not just public debate, but also the media coverage of other companies on the radio, 
in the press and on the Internet.  The above, and particularly the case of El Salvador, opens up 
the debate about whether media capture can be considered undemocratic in the short term.  On 
the contrary, in countries with a high concentration of media ownership and wealth in a reduced 
number of business groups, media capture could be a useful tool to promote more redistributive 
policies to reduce elites influence and to broaden public debates.  I have demonstrated that in 
El Salvador, despite controlling the government, counter-elites needed to capture media to 
advance their progressive policies.  Media capture first broke with a historical silence and 
second garnered counter-elites with social legitimacy.  For the first time in the history of 
Salvadorian media, top media companies shared with the counter-elites some basic agreements 
on the need to change the power structure in El Salvador.   
 
Nevertheless, the historical influence of elites on the media imposes conditions on the ability 
of achieving a type of media capture with redistributive ends.  For instance, money is required 
to keep the good will of owners, as well as a shared agenda.  Counter-elites may need to offer 
media owners policy changes that do not affect them, but that may increase some wealth 
distribution, such as fiscal reform.  But as other studies have shown (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008; 
Anya Schiffrin, 2017), media capture by political elites has the potential to give rise to 
authoritarian governments that through the capture of the media produce their own facts and 
news, which in the end turns the public arena into a polarized war between facts and #fakenews.  
This is an area of research for which Central America offers an interesting research scenario 
with multiple cases, experiences, and important findings. 
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The second body of literature to which my research contributes is on elites.  My study offers 
an account of how future research may address the question of cohesion among elites.  In 
countries where accessing data is difficult, the focus on the common background, ideology, 
and interests of elites may be a useful tool to uncover how well integrated or not the elites are.  
The debate about cohesion opens up future research avenues on how this particular 
characteristic may improve or not institutional strength and progressive reforms.  For instance, 
while Costa Rican elites were divided post-civil war (the cafetaleros versus the industrialists), 
the country advanced a very progressive agenda until the elite’s cohesion during the 1980s.  In 
the case of El Salvador, the cohesion of elites in the period post-peace agreements, on the 
contrary, increased neoliberal reforms and weakening institutions until 2009, when the 
cohesion of elites broke.  In this regard, the question arises to what extent redistributive projects 
require a context of elites’ fragmentation and how progressive actors deal with it. These are 
central questions for further research. 
 
In addition, the findings on how elites are organized in informal groups -G20 and Alianza Costa 
Rica- to politically engage in actions add questions to the debate about how elites seek to 
influence public policies in Latin America.  While most of the literature on elites’ influence in 
Latin America has focused on business associations (Fairfield, 2015a; Salas-Porras, 2014; B. 
R. Schneider, 2013), my research provides substantial evidence that elites may prefer informal 
organization to influence the policy-making process.  These groups provide top elites with 
direct control over decisions, opportunities to elude bureaucratic constraints and a very 
secretive and secured environment for members.  As other research has shown, these groups 
are elite political action organizations (Briz-Garizurieta, 2002; Ortiz-Rivera, 2002). Those 
groups also became an expression of male power.  Women do not normally take part in either 
of the two groups.  In fact, throughout my research on elites in El Salvador and Costa Rica, I 
never found references to women participating in these meetings or in decision-making 
processes.  Where are the business women in Central America?  What is the role they play? 
Are they interested in influencing policy or the public? These are significant questions that 
remain to be studied.  
 
Costa Rica and El Salvador also show that when elites dispute control over the government, 
despite their interest in strategic resources such as money or ideas, they also seek to secure 
social status.  In my interviews with elites, some of them perceived themselves as a good option 
to lead countries because of their experiences managing companies and creating jobs.  This 
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may help to explain the growing interest of elites in participating directly in politics by 
intervening in traditional parties, such as Carlos Calleja in El Salvador (ARENA), or with new 
political platforms such as the cases of Martinelli in Panamá (Cambio Democrático); Bukele 
in El Salvador (Nuevas Ideas), Macri in Argentina (PRO) or Piñera in Chile (Renovación 
Nacional).  Elites are more interested in having direct control over media, as I mentioned 
before, but also over political parties.  Does this imply an increased feeling of insecurity and 
distrust of traditional institutions such as media or political parties? 
 
Finally, my findings also highlight the importance of distinguishing between the instrumental 
and the structural power of elites.  While the former entails the capacity of elites to carry out 
deliberate political actions, the latter refers to the fact that states depend on elites to invest, 
generate growth, employment, and prosperity (Fairfield, 2015b).  This is important because as 
Fairfield (2015b) has shown, when instrumental power is weakened, such as in situations of 
disputed media capture, more radical policy changes emerge in the public agenda.  Elites in El 
Salvador, despite their rupture, never lost their structural power; on the contrary, because of 
this they were invited by the leftist government of FMLN to be part of the Consejo para el 
Crecimiento.  But as I argued before, they lost their hegemony to shape public policies and the 
political and economic leverage necessary to engage in political actions.  This reduction of 
elites’ instrumental power facilitated the approval of, for instance, three progressive fiscal 
reforms in 2009, 2011 and 2014 (ICEFI, 2015).  Are elites aware of their weakness when their 
instrumental power is curbed? 
 
The third body of literature my research engages with is on counter-elites.  The results of this 
research coincides with the findings of previous studies that suggest that, first, growing 
inequalities and public discontent have led to the emergence of counter-elites; and second, the 
significance of the role of ethnic differences in the formation of counter-elites (Espinoza, 2014; 
Kaltwasser, 2018; Recce, 2010).  However, while the ethnic discussion has pointed out 
traditionally excluded groups such as the indigenous, El Salvador demonstrates that counter-
elites do not always emerge from exclusion, but on the contrary, from groups that have long 
been part of top circles.  For Salvadorians with Palestinian ancestry, the trigger of their 
opposition to and rupture with traditional elites was shaped by elites’ racism and disdain.  
Racism has been found to be a critical element in the ideology among elites in countries with 
high numbers of indigenous peoples, such as Guatemala (Casaús-Arzú, 2000).  Nevertheless, 
there is no research addressing this topic in the rest of Central America, especially in countries 
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like El Salvador and Honduras, with significant numbers of people of Palestinians, Syrian and 
Lebanese descent in the top circles.  Is there racism among elites? The above also opens areas 
for further research considering the role of these families in politics in the region.  Why are 
some of these families still electorally competing with traditional parties (Javier Simán, 
ARENA, in El Salvador), while others have decided to form new political parties (Nayib 
Bukele, Nuevas Ideas, in El Salvador) Do they play the same role in party politics as traditional 
elite families? Do they share the same ideological views of traditional elites?   
 
I found that counter-elites depend on electoral victories and pacts.  These two elements increase 
the vulnerability of counter-elites.  On the one hand, the control over the government opens 
opportunities of investment and rent-seeking, as well as legal chances to modify the rules of 
the game in their favor.  Pacts, on the other hand, are more problematic because they require 
not just some political consensus but also money.  Considering that the use or misappropriation 
of public funds entails important legal consequences, counter-elites have relied on private 
funds, such as the millions of dollars donated by Venezuela.  But the main problem with these 
findings is that rather than reducing dependency from external actors, counter-elites’ strategies 
enhanced clientelism and nepotism.     
 
The discussion about external funds opens up interesting scenarios for further research.  In 
regions like Central America, external funds have come mainly from the Global North, 
specifically from the United States.  Most of those funds, as I demonstrated in chapters two 
and three, have been funds with restrictions on the implementation of policies.  In the case of 
the money from Venezuela, those funds were used to support public policies, electoral 
campaigns or the creation of companies.  Behind those funds, there exists the suggestion that 
those funds may help to dispute the market control of elites.  For instance, in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, two countries that enjoyed flows of money from 2007 to 2014, new companies 
related to Alba Petróleos emerged in a variety of sectors.  Despite their attempts to compete 
with business companies most of them went into bankruptcy after the Venezuelan crisis in 
2014.  The lack of accountability of these funds allowed counter-elites to overcome legal 
restrictions for funding public policies or the financing of electoral campaigns.  But in countries 
were checks and balances are weak, private funds also increased the incentives of elites to do 
the same, undermining institutions once more.  Rather than invigorate institutions, the influence 
of private funds from Venezuela did the opposite.  What are the impacts of these flows to 
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Central American institutions?  Do these funds reduce elites’ structural power? To what extent 
do these flows of money also benefit elites?  
 
Media capture today acquires special relevance.  Elites, more than ever, compete over the 
control and production of information through new media platforms such as social networks 
(Facebook; Twitter; Whastapp). A very recent example of this was the crucial capture of 
traditional media (TV; Record), online portals and social media by Evangelical pastor-
billionaire Edir Macedo in the Brasilian presidential campaign of Jair Bolsonaro. What is clear 
is that media capture in the long term always leaves winners and losers.  Democratic institutions 
and society normally stand to lose, and from time to time also politicians.  Media owners and 
operators of digital bot machines almost always stand to gain.  It is of crucial importance to 
push for more research and public awareness to demand accountability and design and 
implement mechanisms of transparency that can ensure this accountability.  That is a pressing 
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9 Apendix 
9.1  List of interviwees of El Salvador 
2015        
Code Description Length Date Status Source Recording 
Confidentiality 
required  
Politician 1 Former president of El Salvador 1:12:53 15.06.2015 CP Politician AR yes 
Politician 2 Former government politician 54:14:00 26.07.2015 CP Politician AR yes 
Journalist 1 Journalist La Prensa Gráfica 50:00:00 3.06.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Business 
Leader 1 Publicist 38:39:00 16.06.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Politician 3 Deputy Arena 20:15 15.06.2015 CP Politician AR yes 
Vice 
Minister 1 Finance department advisor 57:58:00 11.06.2015 CP Vice Minister of Economy AR yes 
Journalist 2 El Faro journalist 1:13:00 23.06.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Publicist 1 Publicist 45:46:00 24:06:2015 CP Publicist AR yes 
Editor 1 Editor in chief online media 1:11:17 3.06.2015 CP 
Editor in Chief online 
media AR yes 
Academician 
1 Private university professor 44:43:00 2.06.2015 CP Academician AR yes 
   182 
Academician 
2 Public university professor 4:04:48 10.06.2015 CP Academician AR yes 
Journalist 3 El Faro journalist 45:05:00 26.06.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Business 
Adviser 1 Business association adviser 0:42:00 22.06.2015 CP Business adviser AR yes 
Editor 2 TV anchor 55:08:00 12.06.2015 CP Editor in Chief TV AR yes 
Journalist 4 Academician 25:00:00 10.06.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Journalist 5 
Former editor in chief online 
media 1:13:08 3.15.2016 CP Journalist AR yes 
Politician 4 
Former Super Electoral Court 
member 1:07:41 8.30.2016 CP Politician AR yes 
Journalist 6 Editor in chief online media 1:16:00 25.05.2015 CP 
Former editor in chief 
newspaper AR yes 
Media 
Owner 1 Media Owner  04.11.2016 Skype Media owner AR yes 
 
2017 
        
Politician 5 President of Congress 45:00:00 13.3.2017 CP Politicians AR yes 
Politician 6 Politician ARENA 1:02:00 14.3.2017 CP Politicians AR yes 
Politician 7 Politician FMLN 25.00:00 15.3.2017 CP Politicians AR yes 
   183 
Business 
Leader 2 Retail business man 40:00:00 16.3.2017 CP Business leader Notes yes 
Editor in 
Chief La Página editor 1.00:00 17.3.2017 CP Politicians AR yes 
Politician 8 Politician PNC 35:00:00 14.3.2017 CP Politicians AR yes 
Business 
Leader 3 Real Estate businessman 45.00:00 16.3.2017 CP Business leader AR yes 
Media 
Owner 2 Radio mogul 25.00:00 16.3.2017 CP Business leader AR yes 
Media 
Owner 3 TV mogul 40:00:00 21.3.2017 CP Business leader AR yes 
Media 
Owner 1 Media Owner 45:00:00 23.3.2017 CP Media owner AR yes 
Journalist 6 Editor in chief online media 1:18:00 3.11.2017 Skype 
Former editor in chief 
newspaper AR yes 
Codes.  CP, Conducted in Person.  AR, Audio Recorded. 
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9.2 List of interviewees of Costa Rica 
2015 
 
       
Code Description Length Date Status Source Recording 
Confidentiality 
required  
Business 1 Former newspaper editor in chief  1:17:12 25.05.2015 CP 
Former newspaper editor in 
Chief AR yes 
Journalist 1 Journalist La Nación 1:05:44 27.07.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Business 2 Inmobilien and comerce businessman 1:04:12 22.07.2015 CP Business Elite AR yes 
Editor 1 Editor in chief online media 40:43:00 08.05.2015 CP 
Editor in Chief online media 
outlet AR yes 
Editor 2 Newspaper editor in chief 1:02:03 21.05.2015 CP Editor in Chief newspaper AR yes 
Journalist 2 Former Journalist La Nación 40:58:00 13.05.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Journalist 3 Journalist online media outlet 33:29:00 7.15.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Former 
Editor 1 Former newspaper editor in chief (Al Día) 45:59:00 22.05.2015 CP 
Former editor in chief 
newspaper AR yes 
Former 
Editor 2 
Former newspaper editor in chief (La 
Nación) 2:10:03 12.05.2015 CP 
Former editor in chief 
newspaper AR yes 
Business 3 Finance businessman 1:43:12 27.07.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Editor 3 Editor in chief newspaper 57:25:00 21.05.2015 CP Editor in Chief newspaper AR yes 
Journalist 4 Former Journalist La Nación 1:20 18.05.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Business 10 Industry businessman 49:51:00 8.10.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
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Business 4 Industry businessman 38:59:00 30.07.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Journalist 5 Former Journalist in La Nación 1:04:26 15.10.2015 Skype Journalist AR yes 
Business 5 Retail businessman 45:41:00 21.07.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Journalist 6 Radio journalist 43:13:00 23.07.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Owner 1 Media owner 1:23:06 05.05.2015 CP Media owner AR yes 
Editor TV 1 TV anchor 1:24:13 19.05.2015 CP Editor in Chief -TV AR yes 
Business 6 Agro businessman 43:58:00 3.08.2015 CP Business leader   
Business 7 Automobile businessman 39:25:00 23.07.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Campaign 1 Publicist 19:02 18.05.2015 CP Campaign Adviser AR yes 
Politician 2 Former Vice-President 35:00:00 10.17.2016 Skype Politician AR yes 
Journalist 7 Editor in chief online media 1:16:00 25.05.2015 CP 
Former editor in chief 
newspaper Notes yes 
Business 8 Construction businessman 1:03:13 3.07.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Publicist 1 Publicist 1:16:12 28.07.2015 CP Publicist AR yes 
Politician 1 FA advisor 8:59:00 06.05.2015 CP Politician AR yes 
Journalist 8 Former Journalist in La Nación 32:20:00 21.07.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Journalist 9 Former Journalist in La Nación 1:06:12 25.05.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Business 9 Industry businessman 1:27:12 22.07.2015 CP Business leader AR yes 
Journalist 10 Radio journalist 47:07:00 20.05.2015 CP Journalist AR yes 
Acamician 1 Academician 1:03:13 23.07.2015 CP Academician AR yes 
Former 
Editor 1 
Former newspaper editor in chief (La 
Nación) 1:05:12 27.07.2015 CP 
Former editor in chief 
newspaper AR yes 
2017        
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Business 9 Industry businessman 0:48:27 04.04.2017 CP Business leader AR yes 
 Codes.  CP, Conducted in Person.  AR, Audio Recorded. 
 
 
 
 
